586. Letter From Eaton to Herter1
I have submitted separately for the record a classified report on the Geneva disarmament talks but since it runs to some 14 pages, I want to sum up here more briefly comments and recommendations on what strike me as the essential points emerging from the Conference.
1. It’s clear that we never got down to the stage of concrete and business-like negotiations on disarmament with the Soviet side. From our own point of view, the Conference was more a matter of continuing, backstage negotiation with our Allies, particularly France, on how far the United States was willing to alter its basic disarmament position to counter Soviet initiatives in this field.
2. We made an honest effort to find some genuine negotiating ground with the Soviets. However, the Soviet break on June 27 confirmed what had become obvious almost from the start, namely—that the Soviets came to Geneva with an all-or-nothing program they knew could not be negotiated with the West. At no time in Geneva was there any indication that the Soviets were prepared to discuss any disarmament matters which had a possible chance of acceptability to us. They knew this, and therefore at no time did they contemplate a serious negotiation.
3. I am not prepared to speculate at length about the conditions under which the Soviets might have been willing to talk seriously in Geneva, or whether they came here in March with the primary intention of using the Conference for [Facsimile Page 2] Communist propaganda and political warfare against the West. Regardless of their intentions, however, every statement and act in and out of the Conference appeared designed for propaganda and to win world opinion. I am not at all sure they succeeded in this, particularly in view of the poor timing of their break. [Typeset Page 2126] Nothing short of major substantive concessions from us of a character damaging to Free World security would have been likely to change the Soviets’ basic propaganda approach to the Conference.
4. Fruitful discussion of disarmament with the Soviets will only take place in bilateral talks. There must be fullest consultation with our Allies giving consideration to their views, their national interests and aspirations, but the decision must rest with us. Use might be made of NAC to facilitate this process. While bilateral negotiation will be politically difficult now, it will become far more difficult and perhaps impossible as time goes on.
5. One of the biggest problems facing us on the Allied side is how to resolve our basic differences with the French on disarmament, which ran through the whole Conference. The French position on early control and elimination of delivery vehicles is intended primarily as pressure on us. It counters our proposal to stop fissionable production before the French have really started, and serves notice that we should not expect to retain the bulk of our nuclear weapons and delivery means while the bulk of our nuclear weapons and delivery means while the French have none. By appealing to world opinion as a plausible avenue to disarmament, the French delivery vehicle proposal is intended to soften the difficult position in which the French would find themselves if they should refuse to go along with any agreement we might make with the Soviets in the nuclear field. It is probable that the only way out of our difficulty with the French would be to assure them that we will find a way to support their efforts to become a nuclear power. Failing this, French acquiescence to a common Western Plan will be obtained, if at all, only by the prospect of the tabling by the other four powers of a common paper before some public session, as in the UN.
6. A related major problem concerns the position and tactics we should adopt to handle the disarmament issue during the next phase in the UN. I feel strongly that, if any paper is to be tabled in the UN, we should seek flexibility by tabling a US Plan which the NATO governments would welcome and generally endorse without being committed—either [Facsimile Page 3] our June 27 plan or better yet its modified version, US/WP/09 (Rev. 5). This would give us a better opportunity to move into possible bilateral discussions in the future than if we were committed to either a Five-Power or Four-Power Plan from which we could not vary without the consent of our partners. My guess is that the British, Canadians, and Italians would prefer our tabling a plan unilaterally to isolating the French publicly. Furthermore, if we should do this, the French might not feel impelled to air their differences with us publicly by tabling their own markedly different proposals.
[Typeset Page 2127]7. As far as the Soviets are concerned, we can expect them to make renewed efforts to get UN approval of their approach to general and complete disarmament in order to set the framework for any new round of negotiations. They will probably seek to enlarge the composition of the Ten-Nation Committee perhaps by the inclusion of Communist China and India. The outcome of maneuvering in the UN during the next few months will be important, and we certainly must do our best to forestall Soviet moves which could have crippling effects on the future Western negotiating position.
8. If serious negotiation is to be undertaken in the future, it is important that the US not state a public position in detail until after the negotiations have commenced and it becomes apparent that the Communists are prepared for serious talk. The public position we will constantly be called upon to declare must be in general terms, sufficiently specific to be serious but sufficiently flexible and consonant with our basic security needs to permit detailed negotiation when such becomes feasible. Although this is difficult, the latest US proposal, in good measure, meets the requirement.
9. In view of Soviet disarmament initiatives designed for wide mass appeal, there may understandably arise pressures for US response in kind. The US should never design a disarmament proposal or plan with an eye to propaganda. Once the elements of the plan are determined, however, it should be put in clear and forceful language to enhance its public appeal. In the long run we will be best served before world opinion by straightforward espousal of reasonable and practical measures which we ourselves are fully prepared to carry out. Any US proposal must be consonant with US security. This does not mean that US security may not well require important controls, reductions [Facsimile Page 4] and perhaps eventual elimination of national armaments and forces, but the proposal must require that the first measures to be taken shall be reasonably verified before we are committed to further obligations which, if not honored by other states, would endanger our security.
10. In formulating a disarmament position, there is a natural tendency to focus on our present security and political posture. This is understandable, since we can not predict with assurance what the future will hold. However, we can be sure that during the several years time it would take to work out and put into effect any substantial disarmament measures, there will be important changes in the present situation. For example, our weapons systems may call for a quite different deployment from that of today. It may not be necessary to maintain substantial forces on the European continent or elsewhere abroad. Furthermore, as their own situation changes, our Allies may not welcome our presence to the extent they do today. I do not mean to suggest that [Typeset Page 2128] this will necessarily be the case, but such considerations should be taken into account in designing the future disarmament proposals.
Sincerely,
- Source: Sums up ten-nation disarmament conference. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12–GE/7–2560.↩