Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

570. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 17, 1960

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

• • State
  • Mr. Sullivan—S/AE
  • Mr. Spiers
• • UK Embassy
  • Lord Hood
  • Mr. Wiggin

Lord Hood called under instructions to present UK views on future Western activities in the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference. He reported that the Foreign Office feels that it will be increasingly difficult to hold to our present position in Geneva, that it is disadvantageous to the West to let the Soviet plan hold the field, and that it is not enough for us simply to probe and criticize while standing pat on our present position. The UK felt it was necessary to think up a new way of proceeding and suggests that we adopt the tactic of pressing the Soviets to discuss particular subjects in working groups. If the Soviets declined, we should then proceed to discuss these measures in plenary sessions. The particular items which the UK had in mind were: (1) the Irish resolution, which we are committed to discuss, (2) control of orbiting vehicles, (3) nuclear cut-off, (4) constitution, functions, and powers of the control organ, and (5) control over nuclear delivery systems. The UK felt that we should start with the items on which it would not be difficult to reach Five Power agreement.

Mr. Sullivan said that our own tentative approach was not greatly different from that which Lord Hood had outlined. We do not want to make a substantial departure from the present Western position but agree in principle to expanding or modifying the Western plan while staying within its present framework. He said that we had been considering tabling the terms of reference which are being coordinated among the five Western delegations and that this idea would have the same effect as that proposed by Lord Hood. He asked whether the British were thinking also of proposing studies of Third Stage measures such as elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems. Mr. Wiggin said that the British did not have the same hesitation about this as the US had previously demonstrated. Such discussion of the controls for these measures would conclusively demonstrate that they belonged in the Third Stage. Furthermore, the UK had never felt that there was implied in such study proposals a moral commitment to move directly to the implementation of the measures studied at the conclusion of the particular study. Mr. Sullivan said that we were reviewing these questions ourselves and did not rule out the possibility of our agreeing with this position. With respect to the delivery system problem with the French, our primary concern was over the French idea for prohibition against mating warheads and carriers in an earlier stage. This would have a dangerous and profound impact on our readiness of forces and thus on our entire deterrent posture.

Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Spiers reviewed the other points which we had been considering, emphasizing that they did not at this point represent firm US decisions, as follows: (1) exchange of military observers at agreed military bases as an initial confidence building measure; this function would in due course be taken by IDO. Mr. Wiggin observed that this would be characterized by the Soviets as control without disarmament. (2) a US–USSR surprise attack zone; we would not contemplate proposing a European zone at this time in view of the probable French reaction. (3) introduction of 1.7 million as the first level of reduction in Stage III of the Western plan; and (4) incorporation of reference to gradual elimination of military bases in Stage III of the Western plan. Mr. Sullivan said that we were not sure yet whether we would, if these ideas are accepted, wish to issue a revision of the Western plan or to table separate papers expanding on various parts of the Western plan. Two other ideas which are under consideration are to provide in the Western plan that transfer between stages would depend upon a Security Council decision that the prior stage had been implemented and for which the concurring votes of the permanent members would be required. Mr. Spiers noted that this was a reversion to previous Western positions which had normally provided for such a role for the Security Council and which would protect the West against the unacceptable automatic movement from stage to stage provided for in the Soviet plan. A further idea was to expand our proposals on transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses by indicating a proposed specific amount for to be transferred. Mr. Sullivan pointed out that the timing on this entire matter was of great importance since it was necessary to move rapidly if the Western powers were to be effective. We hope to have our own views by Tuesday and to be in a position then to discuss them with our Allies.

Lord Hood asked whether we had anything we could say at this point about the nuclear test negotiations in the light of Selwyn Lloyd’s letter to Mr. Herter. He assumed that it would be possible to arrange a meeting between Ambassador Caccia and Mr. Herter early next week. Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Spiers said that the main issue at the moment was the safeguards we would propose for the nuclear detonations in the seismic research program. Various alternative possibilities to the “black box” are now under review. Mr. Wiggin said that the Western powers would be in an impossible position vis-a-vis public opinion unless we could abandon the “black box” idea, since we were asking the Soviets to accept a type of control relying on good faith declarations and that this was a radical reversal of our own previous position in all disarmament talks. If we did not revise our position, we would be hoist our own petard. Mr. Sullivan said that we were keenly aware of these vulnerabilities and were quite confident we would find some way of proceeding with open devices. Mr. Wiggin inquired about our attitude on the composition of the Control Commission. Mr. Spiers said that while we were prepared to accept parity on the Control Commission we would continue to believe, as Mr. Herter had indicated to Mr. Lloyd in Paris, that we should not make this concession at this point before other potentially difficult issues such as high attitude treaty provisions had been identified so that all our bargaining leverage was not used up too quickly. He believed that we would soon be prepared to discuss the problem of the length of the moratorium if the Russians were prepared at the same time to be concrete on the size of the quota.

1. Source: Tactics for ten-nation disarmament conference. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12–GE/6–1760.