Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

529. Memorandum From Twining to Gates¹

JCSM–51–60

Washington, Washington, February 12, 1960

SUBJECT

• U.S. Disarmament Policy (U)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 4 February 1960, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Department of State draft of a recommended U.S. Disarmament Policy which was submitted on 4 February 1960 for Department of Defense views. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also reviewed the Department of Defense comments upon a recommended disarmament “position” previously submitted by the Department of State staff. It is apparent from a comparison of the two papers that the major objections and suggestions submitted by the Department of Defense in connection with the earlier “position” paper were not incorporated in the present “policy” paper. To the contrary, the papers are substantially identical.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorse the comments made by the Department of Defense. They feel that it would be unproductive to reiterate and to attempt expansion of those views in order to comment item-by-item upon the present “policy” recommendation. As an over-all view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard this present Department of State draft as unsatisfactory in its substantive content; also, in their view, it is not a proper expression of arms control policy. It is, rather, a negotiating POSITION paper both in content and format and should not be accorded the stature of a policy statement. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to an appropriate U.S. arms control policy are contained in Appendix “A” hereto.

4. The necessity for formulating a U.S. negotiating position for forthcoming 10-Nation talks, with attendant pressures, may require National Security Council decisions in the very near future. Therefore, it is considered desirable to also state the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to a U.S. negotiating position—a position in keeping with their concept of an appropriate arms control policy. These views are contained in Appendix “B” hereto.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagree with the fundamental philosophy underlying the current approach to the arms control problem reflected in the paper submitted by the Department of State staff. Basically, this philosophy seems to regard the prime test of arms control proposals to be their negotiability, political appeal and responsiveness to the vagaries of world public opinion, rather than their tangible effects on the welfare and security of the United States. Underlying this placement of emphasis seems to be the view that arms control, per se, will facilitate the resolution of political conflict, rather than vice-versa, and that the risks of serious military disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc are intrinsically less dangerous to U.S. security than the political risks of leaving arms control negotiating initiatives in Soviet hands.

6. Concrete examples of unsound commitments to which a negotiation-oriented approach leads are to be found in measures advocated in the Department of State staff papers for immediate negotiation to: (1) reduce present force levels (without any reference to any agreed appreciation of how this would affect U.S. security or NATO policy); (2) cease production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes (without reference to its long-range effect on U.S. military posture); and (3) cease the testing of long-range missiles (without an agreed intergovernmental appreciation of its effort on over-all security of the United States and its allies). The Joint State-Defense Study on Disarmament rejected all three of these proposals as matters for immediate negotiation because of their unfavorable impact on U.S. security. On 8 February 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, supported these views.

7. In the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the above examples point in the dangerous direction to which our arms control policy will almost certainly lead if it continues to be founded on the sacrifice of substantial security considerations to negotiating expediency.

8. It is recommended that the comments and proposals contained in this memorandum and its attachments form the basis for your reply to the Secretary of State; for use by the National Security Council in the development of a U.S. arms control policy; and as a position for negotiations at the 10-Nation Conference.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix A

U.S. POLICY ON ARMS CONTROL

A. General Philosophy Underlying Arms Control Policy

1. Arms control is essentially a matter of national security in the broadest sense and, as such, it is susceptible to resolution only at the highest levels of government. Most certainly, any decisions with respect to arms control can be made only after careful consideration of international relationships, national security and the effect on our broad national strategy. However, our military strategy and our force structure must inevitably be affected by any steps towards arms control. Therefore, arms control should have a significant role in our military planning, and negotiations attendant thereto should be made from an over-all security, and not political, point of view.

2. The United States should continue to conduct negotiations with the USSR, on any issue and through any appropriate channel, whenever it appears that over-all U.S. interests will be served by such negotiations. Negotiations with the USSR should be designed to help maintain Free World initiative and cohesion, to probe the intentions and expose the meaning of Soviet policies, and to resolve specific differences on terms advantageous to the United States. All such negotiations should also be directed ultimately, toward the peaceful resolution of the basic Communist threat; but the United States should recognize that there is little prospect that the process of negotiation will eliminate this threat during the foreseeable future, and also that useful agreements on specific issues may be possible even in the absence of a general settlement. The United States and its major allies should be prepared to sponsor mutual concessions between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc which will afford net advantages to the United States and which will leave unimpaired the over-all security position of the Free World. The United States should not, however, make concessions in advance of similar action by the Soviets in the hope of inspiring Soviet concessions. Agreement actually reached with the USSR should be dependent upon a balance of advantages and not upon implied good will or trust in written agreements. Agreements affecting strength and deployment of military forces should include provisions for effective safeguards against violations and evasions.

3. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver such weapons.

4. A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight and prevail in general war, should one be forced upon the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of general nuclear war, a danger of local conflicts developing into general war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve their interests; that it will not pay.

5. In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knock-out blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

6. Military planning of U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, in conjunction with indigenous forces and with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat such aggression, or to hold it pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to defeat it quickly. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force should be promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat such local aggression. Force should be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities broadening into general war.

B. Basic Objective of Arms Control Policy

The broad ultimate goal of U.S. policy of arms control is to achieve world peace under enforceable law.

C. Specific Principles of Arms Controls Policy

1. The United States will engage in arms reduction agreements after the study, testing, proving and adoption of a reliable system of inspection, reporting and control.

2. The regulation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery will be avoided except as part of the final and ultimate portion of any arms control arrangement.

3. To be acceptable to the United States any proposal for arms control should incorporate provisions to enable the United States to retain its nuclear stockpile and delivery advantage until the Communists are unable to wage war successfully against the United States and its allies because of:

a. The significant reduction of the Communist conventional forces; and

b. Major reductions of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and delivery capability; or until

c. The preservation of U.S. security can be trusted to an effective international peace enforcement arrangement.

4. Our position must be such that our Allies do not become alienated by reason of:

a. Fear that we would not lend them adequate military support in time of need; or

b. Unreasonable fear that our actions will involve them against their will in a nuclear war. (The word “unreasonable” is inserted where it is to emphasize the fact that the willingness of the United States unilaterally to go to war is essential, if the United States is to maintain its position as the leading world power. To illustrate, the United States has a variety of bilateral commitments with other nations of the world which have force, and indeed deterrent effect, only if it is clear that the United States intends to abide by these commitments without regard for the attitude of other nations).

5. In framing or accepting arms control proposals, public opinion should not of itself be considered a determinant of policy. No action should be proposed unless such action, if taken, and its foreseeable consequences, are clearly either in the interest of the United States or in no sense contrary to the interest of the United States.

6. In assessing the value and enforceability of an arms control proposal, the Soviets should be considered undeterred by adverse public opinion.

7. Unhampered research and development looms ever larger as the basis for U.S. military strength and its ability to stay ahead in the race for technical superiority. Every arms control proposal offered or accepted by the United States shall preclude the possibility of its resulting in stigmatizing the development or use of weapons systems essential to the security of the United States.

8. Any arms control proposal offered or accepted by the United States will be carefully evaluated to insure that no sacrifices of moral principle on the part of the United States are involved.

9. In seeking to achieve the objective of favorable world public opinion, the United States will place primary emphasis on the achievement of lasting rather than transient public support and will stand ready to endure immediate adverse reaction to this end.

10. No arms reduction or control proposals should be made solely for the purpose of increasing intelligence capabilities.

11. For the purpose of evaluating proposed arms restraints upon the Communist countries, the conventional and the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union, its satellites, and Communist China shall be treated as one.

12. Any Russian undertakings with respect to the performance of Red China must be backed by adequate means for the United States, on a current basis, to obtain proof of compliance.

13. We must correlate every arms control proposal in any particular negotiation with related areas of concern in other pending or programmed negotiations, with a view to assuring that the effect upon the U.S. security interest in all negotiations is beneficial and that our position is mutually consistent and logically sustainable in all negotiations.

14. In arms control negotiations the firm intention of the United States to be the world leader shall be maintained in the eyes of both friend and foe. Recent history has demonstrated that the Soviets react promptly to signs of weakness. To appear irresolute, uncertain, or fearful, is to invite aggressive probing. Not only is such probing intrinsically unacceptable, it is likely to be accompanied by Russian over-confidence that could precipitate general war. Accordingly:

a. Each proposal made by the United States shall be such as to preclude any inference that it is fearful of Soviet strength or of its own ability to be successful in any conflict within the foreseeable future.

b. Proposals postponing negotiations to a time when it is foreseeable that the United States will have less bargaining strength are unacceptable.

15. Prior to entering into joint international studies or negotiations in any particular field or facet of arms control, the necessary unilateral U.S. studies and interdepartmental consideration must be achieved so that there is a firm U.S. position which protects our security and national interest as well as a determination that the matters in question are desirable subjects for negotiation. We should subject all proposals to this criterion to preclude being committed to negotiations, the ultimate outcome of which could not or would not be in our interest. For example, negotiations aimed at a suspension of missile testing or the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons would not be proper subject for negotiations.

16. We should make clear to the world that armaments result from international political tensions and that the only lasting method of reducing armaments is to reduce the causes of political tension. The resolution of major international issues must therefore precede substantive reduction of the U.S. Military Posture.

17. Comprehensive proposals calling for arms control in phased stages, with an obligation to move from one stage to another, should be avoided. Instead, the United States should establish a broad ultimate goal for arms control, namely, world peace under enforceable law, and should propose for immediate negotiations only modest steps toward that goal, in order to test the intentions of the Soviet Union and actually to accomplish at least some progress. Concentration on a few points will bring all the prestige and power of the United States behind a few relatively simple measures, confine negotiations to manageable limitation, permit agreement on one or more points in isolation, and facilitate understanding by even unsophisticated peoples.

18. Until the Soviet Union has unmistakably demonstrated sincerity by deeds as well as words, elementary prudence dictates that we strengthen our guard against the Sino-Soviet military threat rather than relax it. Any deterioration of the United States or Western military posture relative to the Sino-Soviet posture during the extended process of negotiations which lie ahead should be avoided since this would lower any real incentives which may exist for the Soviet Union to accept meaningful arms reductions and controls with proper safeguards.

19. A secure nuclear deterrent to general war must be maintained as a first priority matter. The U.S. strategy is designed to achieve the basic objective of deterring or being prepared successfully to wage general or limited war. The United States must always be able to back up its Allies with forces to a degree which will make our willingness to fight credible both to our Allies and to our enemies, recognizing that the United States will use nuclear weapons when required to meet the nation’s war objectives.

20. Progress toward the arms reduction and control goal should be made as fast, but only as fast, as the security of the United States permits, in the light of the military capability of our probable enemies, our commitments to our Allies, unsettled political problems, technological considerations and the like. The test in each case should be to adopt only those arms control measures which are compatible with the goal and which involve less risk to the security of the United States than not adopting them.

Appendix B

U.S. POSITION ON DISARMAMENT

I. Our Ultimate Arms Limitation Goal.

This U.S. objective in disarmament negotiations is to contribute, by balanced, phased, and safeguarded arms control agreements, to the achievement of a secure and politically ordered world in which:

(1) There shall be universally recognized rules of international law, which, if followed, will prevent all nations from initiating armed conflict with other nations, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by effective means of enforcement.

(2) Through safeguarded international agreements, national military establishments shall have been reduced to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose enforcement of international law.

(3) An international control organ adequate to verify compliance with agreed measures of disarmament is established and operating effectively.

(4) An open world, including the institution of aerial and ground inspection adequate to detect any build up for surprise attack, large or small, has been achieved.

II. Steps which we are presently Prepared to Take and With Respect to which we are Presently Prepared to Negotiate and Reach Agreement.

1. Discussion of the nature and functions of the international authorities and arrangements which will be needed to preserve world peace as purely national armaments diminish. The specific objectives of the discussion should be to develop recommendations on the following matters:

a. Development and codification of international law.

b. Strengthening the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

c. Improvement of procedures governing the creation of a United Nations presence in areas where disputes exist.

2. An agreement to take into account, for possible application to other measures, any international control arrangements which may be established by the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

3. A joint study of an international arms control organization, followed by an agreement for the progressive establishment of this organization.

4. Collection of information by the international arms control organization on present levels of forces, including information on conventional equipment and armaments pertaining to land, sea and air forces possessed by the various powers. This would be followed by the establishment of agreed initial force level ceilings, which shall be subject to initial and continuing verification by the control organization. The collection of information would be based on declarations by States according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria.

a. Prior to establishment of initial force level ceilings there would be a mutually agreed definition of the term active military forces.

b. Initial force level ceilings for the U.S., USSR, and Communist China shall be set at 2.5 million each for active military forces. (NOTE: This figure subject to change if agree definition is not in accord with views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as stated in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 3 September 1957, subject: “Disarmament Planning”.)

c. Initial force level ceilings for the other Western nations, party to the negotiations, shall be set at:²

• Canada _____________
• France ______________
• Italy ________________
• U.K. ________________

d. Initial force level ceilings for Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia shall be set according to criteria mutually agreed to by the Ten-Nations.

e. Further U.S. force reductions should not be negotiated until:

(1) The USSR and Communist China have each in fact, reduced to 2.5 million in their active forces and this has been adequately verified by international inspection and control.

(2) The initial force levels for other states with significant military forces have been agreed and reduction to these levels adequately verified by international inspection and control.

5. Consequent upon the establishment and verification of initial force level ceilings, negotiations should be initiated with the objective of placing by these States in storage depots within their territories and under the supervision of the arms control organization, of specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the agreement.

6. Establishment of a European inspection zone (including all or an agreed part of the territory covered by Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Benelux and Denmark). Within this zone there would be an exchange of information concerning military forces, verified by aerial inspection, ground observers at agreed points, and mobile ground teams, all with specifically defined rights and authority, and overlapping radar.

7. If necessary to gain Western acceptance of the European inspection zone proposed in 6 above, then agree to the establishment of a zone in the USSR, a small zone in the Eastern Siberia-Alaska-Canada area, or a zone of aerial inspection in the Arctic area north of the Arctic Circle, together with appropriate arrangements for reporting flights of all aircraft within this area.

8. Prior notification to the disarmament control organization of launching programs for long range missiles according to certain predetermined and mutually agreed criteria, and reports on launching operations, including information on the location of launching sites.

9. Notification of anticipated launchings of satellites, international arrangements for tracking, and exchange of resultant scientific information. Subject to a determination of the feasibility of the necessary inspection and control measures, and their implementation, an agreement to prohibit vehicles capable of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or stationed in outer space.

10. Determination of timing and manner of extending an arms control agreement to include other States having significant military capabilities.

III. Future Steps Required to Reach our Ultimate Goal Expressed in Some Detail which we are Prepared to Set Down at the Present Time, but as to which we are not at the Present Time Prepared to Negotiate, or Agree Nor to Place in Any Time Phase.

(Note: The achievement of the ultimate goal can only be anticipated as the world moves concurrently toward greater stability and order and this presupposes the resolution of important East-West political conflicts, which, among others, includes the reunification of Germany as a prerequisite to the withdrawal of non-indigenous forces.)

1. Progressive extension of the international control organization in the light of accession to the arms control agreement by other States and in accordance with the expansion of inspection and control requirements.

2. Continue to completion the establishment of the international authority to preserve world peace.

3. Progressive, safeguarded reduction of national military establishments to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose enforcement of international law; such reductions to be phased to coincide with the build-up of international law enforcement capability to preserve world peace.

4. Collection and verification of information relating to manufacture of armaments and equipment of all kinds.

5. All states producing fissionable materials to make full declaration on all plants producing it and their capacity.

6. A joint study on (a) the possibility of the transfer, under control, of fissionable materials from national stockpiles into IAEA custody, and (b) the possibility of accounting for past production of nuclear weapons.

7. Cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, conditional upon specified progress on other arms control measures.

8. Further measures for reducing the threat of great surprise attack, including on-the-spot control and prior notification of missile launching, and the installation of an international tracking system. Extension of the inspection system to detect possible preparations for surprise attack.

9. Progressive extension of international control arrangements to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only.

10. A ban on the initiation of the use of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction.

11. Progressive disposition of surplus armaments in phase with the reduction of national military establishments.

12. Control over manufacture of all type of armaments to ensure that production is limited to that required to achieve the objective stated in the ultimate U.S. goal.

IV. Joint Studies Which We Are Presently Prepared to Make With Respect to Certain Steps Referred to in Section II.

1. A study of the means of verification and control to insure that initial force level ceilings are not exceeded.

2. A study of the means of developing international authorities and arrangements for preserving world peace, including effective means of enforcement.

3. A study of the feasibility of the necessary inspection and control measures to prohibit vehicles capable of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or stationed in outer space.

(Note: The question of the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapon uses is one which our allies will probably urge as a subject for joint study at this time. The U.S. should not agree to a joint international study of this problem unless or until it has been studied within our government and a firm U.S. position established after weighing all the implications. This would also apply with regard to a study on the cut-off or limitation of long-range missile testing or production.

1. Source: JCS views on U.S. disarmament policy. Secret. 18 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, NSC Special Meetings.
2. To be determined during the course of Western preparations for the Ten-Nation Conference. [Footnote is in the original.]