Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

46. Memorandum from McNeil to McElroy.¹

Washington, April 25, 1958

SUBJECT

• Comments on NSC 5810, “Basic National Security Policy”

The paper as proposed for NSC consideration is definitely an improvement over NSC 5707/8 which it is designed to replace. I note that many of the suggestions we made last year in connection with the review of NSC 5707 have been incorporated in the present paper. In one most important respect, however, the paper is still seriously deficient; namely, US objectives towards the USSR itself.

The policy paper in this regard appears to suffer from what might be called a “containment psychology”—not in the old Kennan or geographical sense of the term, but rather in the sense of trying to contain Russian progress in science, technology, education, production, foreign trade, etc. Throughout the paper there are statements of policy which imply that we should try to isolate the Communists behind the Iron Curtain and minimize their contact with the rest of the world. Our major political and economic efforts, apparently, are to be devoted to maintaining the free world alliances and winning over the neutrals to our side, thereby helping to isolate the Communists.

In my judgment this policy is both negative and inadequate. Note paragraph 4 of the new paper which deals with the “basic problem”. Listed in this paragraph are four courses of action which, if followed, are supposed to achieve our basic objective “to preserve and enhance the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions”. I submit that even if we are successful in carrying out these four necessary courses of action, this, in itself, would not achieve our basic objective as stated in the paper. Even if we were to win over to our side all the neutral nations and succeeded in completely isolating the Communists behind the Iron Curtain, our national security would nevertheless continue to be endangered. The Communists already have very great resources and a rapidly advancing technology behind the Iron Curtain. There is no way in which we can alter this situation. It is the military power which these resources and technology generate that poses the basic threat to our national security. In fact, isolating the USSR from contact with the rest of the world might well increase our danger.

It seems to me that the only way in which we can hope to alleviate the basic threat to our national security is to effect a fundamental change in the character of the government of the USSR. No matter how remote this eventuality may seem to be, it must remain our ultimate objective.

But this is not enough. We must also know in which direction we wish to effect this change in the Russian government. To my mind the desired direction is unmistakable. It must be toward a government more responsive to the will of the people, and, eventually, a government squarely based on the will of the people. This is the most dependable and perhaps only real assurance for world peace in the future. Agreements with dictators, no matter how well meant they may be, are always subject to sudden renunciation. Furthermore, Khruschchev is here today but may be gone tomorrow. The United States could not with assurance embark on a major disarmament program so long as the government of the USSR is in the hands of a real dictatorship. It is much more difficult for democratically based governments to initiate sudden aggression, especially when it would expose their people to virtual annihilation. It should, therefore, be our objective not only (in the words of paragraph 4(d) of the paper) “to engage successfully in a world-wide peaceful contest with the USSR”, but more importantly to influence and encourage the USSR directly in every possible way to move, no matter how slowly, towards a more popularly based government—and to move, no matter how slowly, into becoming a respected member of the family of nations.

It will probably be argued by many people that this is a Utopian objective; that there is no hope of ever converting the Communists to a less aggressive, more peaceful and democratic way of life. This, to my way of thinking, denotes a negative and defeatist attitude. It denotes a crisis of confidence in our ability to surmount the obstacles confronting us. This psychology is dangerous to our leadership in the world—moreover, it is not justified.

The increasingly dangerous situation in which we now find ourselves is by no means one-sided. The increasing threat to our security arises from the explosive progress in science and technology which is producing weapons of ever increasing speed and destructive power. But the USSR is in the same boat. They have every reason to be just as fearful as we are—and more so. Ironically, of all the peoples in the world, they and we are the most in danger. In this we have a community of interest and for this reason the people of the USSR and the people of the United States have the greatest stake in the achievement of a solution to this terrible dilemma.

On the political-economic side of the problem we have every reason to be confident that ours is the “wave of the future”. Present trends in the USSR give strong encouragement to this belief. President Eisenhower, in his recent address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, noted this trend. He said:

“And slowly but significantly the Iron Curtain has started to lift. Behind it the personal security and intellectual freedom of the oppressed peoples gradually increase—another development not without promise.”

It is unfortunate that this same hopeful and positive note is not reflected in the proposed policy paper. In this connection, of all nations in the Communist bloc the USSR is, in certain respects, the best prospect for conversion to a way of life more similar to ours. The more advanced, educated and prosperous the people of the USSR become the greater will be their demand for a voice in their own destiny and the right of freedom of speech and movement and in the selection of jobs. It is not fortuitous that Khruschev holds up the United States as a shining example of achievement towards which the Russian people should strive. He is constantly exhorting the Russian people to catch up with the United States in food, clothing, industrial production, etc. After forty years the leaders of the USSR are still striving to achieve the material success that we have achieved in this country. Our policy should be to encourage this competition; to take up this challenge and make it more difficult for the Russian leadership to reverse this trend. The Russian people have everything to gain and we have nothing to lose in a race to see which system can do more for its people.

This point of view was most eloquently expressed by President Eisenhower in his Second Inaugural Address. He said at that time:

“We honor, no less in this divided world than in a less tormented time, the people of Russia. We do not dread, rather do we welcome, their progress in education and industry. We wish them success in their demands for more intellectual freedom, greater security before their own laws, fuller enjoyment of the rewards of their own toil. For as such things may come to pass, the more certain will be the coming of that day when our peoples may freely meet in friendship.”

Again, it is unfortunate that nowhere in the policy paper do we find this positive objective with respect to our policy towards the USSR itself. Instead, we find in those paragraphs of the paper dealing with “Other Means of Influencing the Communist Bloc” (pp. 16, 17, 18) vague references to “alternatives. . .which would be acceptable to the United States”—“Measures which make more difficult the reversal of policies more acceptable to us”—“Sustaining current ferment in the thinking, and fostering evolutionary trends, within the Bloc”—“Accelerate evolutionary changes in Sino-Soviet policies”—etc. Nowhere in the paper is there any clear indication as to what alternatives”, what “measures”, what “evolutionary trends” and what “evolutionary changes” we would like to see take place behind the Iron Curtain. Certainly, in this most important of all policies, we should have positive, specific objectives.

The negative tone of the paper is clearly indicated in paragraph 33 a (5), “undermine the faith of the Communist ruling classes in their own system and ideology”. Why should not our policy be positive? Why should we not seek to hold up to them the advantages of our own system and way of life? Do we or don’t we believe that our system is superior to the Communist system as a way of life? Undermining their faith in their own system would simply leave a vacuum. Would it not be wiser to offer something better to take its place? Certainly if we have faith and confidence in our own way of life we should not hesitate to urge it on other peoples for their own good and ours as well.

I am personally convinced that as time goes on our way of life with its many freedoms and respect for the rights of the individual will look better and better to the people of the USSR. Already the Russian leadership is under great pressure to meet the growing demands of the people for more and better consumer goods. Khrushchev’s constant harping on such bourgeois frills as better food, more attractive clothing, is a far cry from the hard-bitten, austere communism of the Stalin regime. Already the communist economic system of the USSR is beginning to show signs of its inability to cope effectively with the problems emerging as a result of Russia’s present stage of economic development. Note the recent decentralization of industrial administration and the transfer of farm machinery to the collective farms. (For a further discussion of USSR economic problems see Harry Schwartz’s article beginning on p. 145 of the April Conference Board Business Record.)

Regarding specific paragraphs of the paper, I would like to offer the following comments:

Paragraph 3 (d)—It seems to me that this overstates the problem. We have a tendency in government to blame the people for our own failures.

Paragraph 14—The words in brackets, “an appropriate conventional capability”, do not appear to be necessary. It is getting increasingly difficult to define “conventional capability”. For example, does it include non-nuclear armed missiles? small nuclear weapons?

Paragraph 27 c (5)—With respect to economic development aid, we should recognize that here is another competitor for the government dollar. If what is said in paragraph 43, “Sound U.S. Economy”, is to be taken literally, care must be exercised not to go overboard on expanding economic development assistance to other countries, or seek to outbid the USSR in every instance.

Paragraph 28—This paragraph represents an improvement over existing policies but it does not go far enough. While we should do everything possible to prevent the Communist bloc from subverting or gaining political control of independent states through economic aid, we should not oppose Communist economic aid, per se, to these countries. The US must recognize that the productivity and technological capabilities of the USSR will continue to grow. These capabilities will be used for one purpose or another. It would seem that the use of Soviet resources in the form of economic aid to independent states offers less of a danger to the security of the US than the use of these same resources for weapons production or for advancing their military technology. Therefore, we should oppose Communist economic aid only when there is clear evidence that such aid is being directed towards subverting or winning political control of independent states.

Paragraph 35 a (1)—Here is another good example of the negative approach in this paper. The paragraph talks about giving the peoples of communist nations a clear conception of the true US and the free world purposes and offers as an example only what we are against—not what we are for. The quote from the President’s Second Inaugural Address is highly pertinent in this connection.

Paragraph 35 b—Should be read in conjunction with the first sentence of Paragraph 39. In paragraph 35 b the point is made that we should, among other things, take every opportunity to negotiate with the Soviet bloc. Paragraph 39 reads, “The United States should continue its readiness to negotiate with the USSR whenever it appears that U.S. interest will be served thereby.” Paragraph 35 b says we should take the initiative—paragraph 39 is completely passive. This inconsistency probably arises from the fact that paragraph 35 b is new, whereas the first sentence of paragraph 39 has not been revised and except for the deletion of one word is the same as in the old paper.

Paragraph 36 b (2)—This is another example of the timid, uncertain approach toward the USSR. Why must we discreetly inform Free World nations that expansion of US-Soviet Bloc contacts does not signify US acceptance of Soviet Bloc attitudes? Why should our talking to the Communists raise any question about our accepting their attitudes? It seems to imply a lack of confidence in our own values. We should say openly and most emphatically to the whole world, and particularly to the USSR, that we are expanding contacts with them in the hope of making them better neighbors in this world that we both inhabit.

Paragraph 40—The last part of this paragraph is a considerable improvement over the old paper. But I believe it can be sharpened. Our overriding objective with respect to disarmament, arms reduction, etc., should be to make more difficult a surprise attack against the US. Any reduction in the possibility of surprise would be of the utmost value to the US—of much greater value, for example, than say a 25% reduction in the active duty strength of Communist forces or even a 25% reduction in the number of their active aircraft. It is reasonably certain that the USSR would never contemplate an all-out attack on the US unless it felt sure of virtually complete surprise. President Eisenhower recognized this point in his address to the NATO heads of government last December when he talked of “establishing a system which would exclude the risk of massive surprise attack”.

Paragraph 42 c—This should be the job of many people in government, not just the USIA. We should have a positive program which would entail the deliberate preparation of official statements designed to get our views across to the world and particularly to the people of the USSR. We should carry the battle to the Communists by taking the initiative and every allegation made by the Communists should be promptly answered by an appropriate official of the US Government. We should exploit their vulnerabilities and expose their every weakness in an organized, planned national effort. For example, on the matter of housing the head of the Federal Housing Administration, should, in public statements, point out the glaring inadequacies of Russian housing as compared with the US; the Secretary of Agriculture should point to the great advances in American agriculture as compared with the backwardness of Russian agriculture, etc.

Paragraph 43 a (1)—This sentence should be revised to read:

“Counter the current recession in such a way as to foster sustainable economic growth”, etc.

This is the essential point in the present policy as I understand it.

Paragraph 47—The last sentence of this paragraph should be revised to read:

“Implementation of these objectives should give priority to those measures which would contribute to immediate combat readiness,” etc.

This would be more in line with our intent.

W.J. McNeil
Assistant Secretary of Defense

1. Source: Comments on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.