388. Memorandum From Wilcox (IO) to John Foster Dulles1
SUBJECT
- Telephone Conversation with Ambassador Lodge
Ambassador Lodge has indicated he will call you on Tuesday to discuss: (1) the proposal for an 81-nation Disarmament Commission; (2) resolutions on testing which are pending in the First Committee. The following comments may be useful in your discussion:
1) 81-Nation Committee
The Department has strongly opposed the establishment of an 81-nation Disarmament Committee since it is believed that such a committee would not serve a constructive purpose. The 81-nation committee would have the same problems that the First Committee has encountered in establishing even a moderately satisfactory negotiating body since such a body would have to be both small and representative. The enlarged Disarmament Commission would constitute in effect a continuing session of the General Assembly in which little of substance could be accomplished. It would supplant the present DC. Meetings of the 81-nation DC would probably deteriorate into a propaganda battle. Such a group would provide an opportunity for constant meddling by a number of countries. Attached (TAB A) is a statement which the Department has previously transmitted to USUN on this point.
On the other hand, it is recognized that acceptance of this proposal by the US would be responsive to the small power interest in maintaining a continued UN role in disarmament and would, as Ambassador Lodge believes “have important psychological value as an overall UN umbrella.” Moreover, it is true that at such time as such Commission met it undoubtedly would have to set up sub-groups in order to function. We agree also that it is not possible in the words of Ambassador Lodge “to dream up another truncated Disarmament Commission.”
Ambassador Lodge indicated there is “widespread support” for the idea of an 81-nation Disarmament Commission. We have been of the opinion up to now, based on information made available to us by USUN, that this proposal could be defeated if we continued our [Typeset Page 1472] opposition and that this could be done without placing us in a seriously untenable position, since part of the onus for denying the UN a role would rest on the USSR for boycotting the 25-nation Disarmament Commission.
[Facsimile Page 2]On balance, we believe it still is preferable not to support the 81-nation DC proposal. Since USUN has not made a systematic canvass of the strength of this proposal, it would be desirable for you to suggest to Ambassador Lodge that they provide us with a tabulation of the expected vote on this proposal. You might wish to add that if the systematic count confirms his view that there is widespread support for the 81-nation DC proposal, Ambassador Lodge would have discretion to support it.
2) Resolutions on testing
As Ambassador Lodge has indicated, the 17-power resolution (TAB B) with the US as one of the co-sponsors has somewhere between 45–50 votes in favor of it. Ambassador Lodge has not made any recommendations in his letter for further modifications of specific language. In response to Ambassador Lodge’s previous recommendations, he has already been authorized to make certain changes in the 17-power resolution, if necessary. The 17-power resolution with such changes is attached (TAB C).
The Indian draft resolution to which Ambassador Lodge refers in his letter has since been superseded by an Indian-Yugoslav resolution (TAB D). We believe this formulation is not acceptable since it still tends to treat the subject of nuclear testing in isolation. However, we have authorized Ambassador Lodge to discuss certain modifications with the Indians and Yugoslavs which would make the resolution acceptable to us (TAB E).
In these circumstances, we believe you should indicate to Ambassador Lodge the following: (a) We would be able to support the Indian-Yugoslav resolution provided they accept the changes we have suggested; otherwise we believe (b) he should stand firm on the 17-power draft resolution with such modifications in it as Ambassador Lodge has already been authorized to accept; and (c) if the modified 17-power resolution does not have the necessary support or it seems desirable for other reasons, we could accept the procedural resolution suggested by the British as the concluding action of the Committee in lieu of any substantive resolution (TAB F).
[Typeset Page 1473]- Source: Proposal for 81-Nation Disarmament Conference, nuclear testing resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 320.11/10–2758.↩