Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

386. Note From Gray to Goodpaster¹

Washington, October 11, 1958

GENERAL GOODPASTER:

I thought you might like for your files a copy of the Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Edward Teller, which has been reworked a little further since you saw it. I have sought to incorporate your suggestions. Also attached is a copy of the Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Bradbury.

Gordon Gray

Enclosure

Memorandum of Conversation

October 9, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH DR. EDWARD TELLER (in the company of General Goodpaster and Captain Morse)

In accordance with a request made of me by Chairman McCone on Friday morning, October 3, in connection with the NSC-OCB visit to the Nevada Test Site, I arranged for General Goodpaster and me to spend some time with Dr. Teller. This was primarily accomplished by driving with Dr. Teller from Las Vegas to the NTS on Saturday morning, October 4, and by sharing a car with Dr. Teller throughout the day’s activities. Captain Morse was in almost constant attendance.

I indicated to Dr. Teller that I was particularly interested, in connection with the question of nuclear test suspension or moratorium, in loopholes, both from the point of view of the “threshold concept” and from the point of view of the reservation of testing for peaceful uses. There follows a summary of various points made by Dr. Teller:

1. Dr. Teller indicated that there was no disagreement as to the facts and that the difference came in interpretations, which he felt in individual cases were largely based on motivation.

2. Atmospheric tests. Dr. Teller pointed out that at Geneva there had been no attempt to work out a system of policing these tests under 1 KT. Down to 5 KT the system proposed would present good chances of detection of atmospheric tests, but not down to 1 KT. Atmospheric tests are not essential for development of weapons, but are important for weapons effects.

3. Underground Tests. The chances are not good of detecting an underground shot of the magnitude of 5 KT, and it is virtually impossible to detect an underground shot of 1 KT.

Originally in the Geneva conference we asked for 650 stations (even this number in Dr. Teller’s opinion might not be enough to give a high degree of assurance against evasion). We finally agreed upon 160 to 170 stations with the statement that these could detect underground shots down to 5 KT, with some small chance below 5 KT, but not down to 1 KT.

In the course of a year there are approximately 100 natural events which, with present detection systems, would not be distinguishable from a [text not declassified]—20 or 30 of them in the Soviet-Sino bloc.

The Geneva report says that inspection groups investigating a suspected nuclear explosion would be provided with equipment and apparatus “appropriate to its task.” What the report does not say is that such instruments do not now exist. The only way to prove an event to have been of a nuclear character is to locate radioactivity. In such a case the detection machinery would have been effective only with respect to an area 10 × 10 miles, and a detection been would then have to seek the specific radioactive area and the precise locale of the shot. (Dr. Teller’s estimate is that for an underground shot, drilling would be required and the chances of success on any one drill-hole would be about 1 in 40,000.)

If one is thinking in terms of [text not declassified] the number of such events in the course of a year is about [text not declassified] in the Sino-Soviet bloc. This, from the point of view of sheer members, would present a physical impossibility to inspection teams.

In the matter of underground testing, there is some reason to believe that it is more difficult to detect an underground explosion if it is fired in hard rock, unlike the test conditions at the Nevada Test Site. Also, it is believed that an appropriate structure around the devise could, in effect, decouple the transmission of shock waves to the earth.

Dr. Teller believes that a series of underground tests, [text not declassified] progressively pursued, could enable the development of weapons of increasing yield without the great risk of detection. Thus, Dr. Teller believes that the largest loophole in the test control system developed at the Geneva meeting is the [text not declassified] especially involving experimentation with decoupling. He feels that this loophole is so great as to eliminate fears about loopholes arising from the reservation of explosions for peaceful purposes.

[text not declassified]

4. Generally, underwater shots can be detected with effort and if one is willing to spend the sums of money involved for patrol ships, etc. As far as ocean shots are concerned, whether atmospheric or underwater, they probably can be detected and indentified but it is very difficult to prove the source. In other words, if there were a test moratorium and if there were an ocean shot, the Soviets could have been responsible but could seek to place responsibility upon the U.S. with very little possibility on our part of disproving the charge. If the shot were under 1 KT it would be very difficult to detect and identify.

5. High-altitude Tests. At Geneva it was agreed that no known system can detect and identify shots above 70 miles (the U.S. has now had 25 and 50 mile tests). However, the use of a number of satellites could detect radiation. High-altitude testing was not seriously discussed at Geneva and two methods of evasion of detection are: one, testing behind an object, such as the moon, and the use of distance. It is possible to go one-third of the way to the sun.

6. The significance of a violation involving high-altitudes would be that big weapons could be made lighter and of a violation underground that weapons below 1 KT and be below 5 KT (which have been neglected) could be developed; also that “clean” weapons could be developed.

7. Dr. Teller feels that a moratorium would not be to our advantage in any case. However, assuming a moratorium, the question is, how best to go about it. He suggests banning all shots that can be policed:

a. Forbid all atmospheric shots (thus getting rid of fall-out).

b. Forbid all oceanic shots (this assumes that we will be prepared to put sufficient money into patrol ships, etc.)

c. Forbid all underground shots above the agreed level of detection. With respect to this point, Dr. Teller acknowledges the difficulties and suggests two ways in which it could be done, the first being more easily explained, but the second preferable in his opinion.

(1) Prohibit all shots above 5 KT. If one wishes to make a shot, give notification to the international organization and have observers present although not telling them what is inside the device. These observers could detect the yield. This would be a form of international inspection.

(2) Prohibit all shots causing an earthquake equivalent above a certain magnitude—say 4.5. This means that if we make a shot which gives a 4.5 reaction or less, we can announce the shot and no inspection is indicated. However, if the shot produces greater than 4.5 then the inspection teams go into action.

d. High altitude shots. If high-altitude shots are to be reserved from the Treaty, it could be provided that they be allowed above 30 miles until a system was devised to detect them down to a certain size. Then if the treaty were to be revised each year it could be progressively tightened.

8. Explosions for peaceful purposes. Dr. Teller urges that if there is to be a moratorium, we should reserve explosions for peaceful uses. He does not feel that peaceful uses open up any loopholes which are not already in existence because of the “threshold concept.” He acknowledges that we might consider opening up peaceful tests completely to international inspection. He also feels that we should make clear that we reserve nuclear experiments that are not tests of weapons, citing specifically nuclear reactions at the level of low yield explosions, or just below.

9. Dr. Teller said that in recent exchanges with the British we found that although they had devoted a fraction of time and money to their program as compared with the U.S. program, their developments substantially parallel our own. Nothing of special significance has escaped the British and on the other hand the British have learned nothing of special significance that we do not know.

Gordon Gray

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation

October 7, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH DR. BRADBURY

The following points were developed in a conversation with Dr. Bradbury, with General Goodpaster and Mr. Harr present, Sunday morning, October 5:

1. Dr. Bradbury feels it is extremely important to continue experimentation. As an example, he alludes to the current work in rocket propulsion (Rover). He believes that this process should continue although in the experimentation there could develop a situation in which a fission action could blow materials out of the nozzle which would appear to have been a nuclear explosion.

2. Dr. Bradbury thinks that it is important to continue high-altitude activity primarily for scientific purposes.

3. Dr. Bradbury feels that it is very important to reserve explosions for peaceful uses.

4. It is Dr. Bradbury’s view that although it can be said in a technical sense that we are ahead of the Russians in weapons development this actually means nothing. His point is that although we seem to have developed weapons of high yield in smaller packages than the Russians, this is substantially meaningless if one makes certain assumptions about Russian war strategy and accepts the best information one has about delivery systems. Whether the Soviets have weapons of as high a yield as some we have tested is relatively unimportant because we know that they have weapons large enough now to destroy our largest cities. Incidentally, Dr. Bradbury feels that we have erred in insisting upon developing weapons of a precise size, and that there is a margin of error of from 10 to 15 to 20% in any case.

5. With respect to peaceful uses. Dr. Bradbury thinks that we could stand almost any kind of inspection although it would be a considerable nuisance.

6. Dr. Bradbury indicated that we now know that the British have little to learn from us and that we have little to learn from them. This is comforting, he feels, in the sense that their efforts have corroborated the correctness of ours, although disquieting from the point of view that it may be assumed that the Soviets have made equivalent progress.

Gordon Gray

Attachment

Memorandum for the Record

October 10, 1958

Memorandum for Record regarding Trip to Nevada Atomic Test site—3–5 October

Discussions regarding the project for suspension of atomic tests brought out that the “equation” can be written in three major terms:

A. Military Security

1. Technically, there is no clear or substantial advantage either to the Soviets or to the United States in suspending.

2. Militarily, although there is some reservation on this point, the suspension is to the considerable disadvantage of U.S. security.

3. Should the Soviets continue in testing under exceptions to the suspension, or in evasion of it, while the United States did not, then (irrespective of whether the U.S. knew of Soviet action or not) extremely serious—possibly even fatal—damage to U.S. security could occur; there is a division of opinion as to the likelihood of such action by the Soviets and the U.S.

B. Foreign Affairs—Defensive Objectives

The Secretary of State has considered that world public opinion regarding testing has come to such a point that the United States diplomacy cannot be satisfactorily conducted without the suspension of tests or a demonstrated effort to nuclear agreement to suspend.

1. World opinion has been successfully brought to a state of alarm by propaganda regarding the genetic effects of nuclear tests.

2. World opinion, as expressed in the efforts and attitudes of several governments, is demanding a suspension of tests as a means of “lessening world tensions,” an objective on which they place a high value; as a corollary they call for agreement with the Russians on any significant subject as a means of lessening such tensions.

3. World opinion in many areas, and particularly those which have undergone heavy serial bombardment in past wars, attaches the horror of atomic warfare to the testing of nuclear weapons.

C. Foreign Affairs—Positive Goals

1. It is possible that agreement on suspension of testing, if achieved and if faithfully carried out, might prove to be a step to more significant measures of disarmament and reduction of the over-hanging armed threat of the Soviet Union to the United States, and vice versa.

2. It is possible that the inspection operations incident to the suspension of testing may “open” the Soviet bloc in such a way as to introduce liberalizing and democratizing effects, which may lessen the threat of use of armed force at totalitarian decision and direction.

D. Influential groups in the United States, both inside and outside the Government, are desirous of test cessation on a variety of grounds, largely represented as moral, humanitarian, etc.

Discussion

Of the considerations listed under A above, it may be said that they represent a substantial, though not fully agreed and not fully evaluated, cost and danger to the United States.

Of the considerations listed under B above, it may be said that the genetic effects are extremely small (most recent scientific findings indicate that the products of testing are below the threshold at which genetic effects would appear) and that the Soviets and those who have helped them have thereby achieved the end of influencing policy through false propaganda; with regard to the lessening of tensions, question exists whether partial suspension, or suspension that can be only partially policed, will achieve this end; also whether in an era of protracted conflict waged by the Communists against the West, in which tension arises from the conflict of Soviet aggressive aims with free world intent to defend and maintain itself, the lessening of tension is an objective that has validity for the free world. These considerations represent a propaganda defeat for the United States, which may well require to be retrieved by concessions at the cost of our security, if our diplomacy is to have satisfactory results.

The considerations listed under C above, to the extent we may have expectation that they will in fact be achieved, represent a true offset to the costs of suspension to our security.

It seems a fair summary that the United States has proposed action which, if taken, balances on the one hand a net cost and risk to U.S. security against, on the other, the necessity for some relief from Soviet propaganda successes, some hope of further disarmament steps and of tendencies toward liberalization in the Soviet bloc, and the satisfaction of the desires and objectives of certain influential groups within the United States.

There is some belief in some quarters that the Soviets may not accept an agreement on cessation of testing which satisfies the minimum terms acceptable to the United States, and that as a result of this whole exercise, the United States will have scored gains in world opinion and in propaganda without security cost to itself. Such gains, arising from a recognition of Soviet intransigence as the cause for failure to reach agreement, would have to be offset by any world opinion that may exist that the United States should have lowered its requirements in order to reach agreement. The danger must be foreseen that the United States, confronted with such later strands in world opinion, might progressively reduce its requirements and thereby incur greater danger of Soviet test evasion and other costs to U.S. security.

Finally, it is probable that the interest of the United States in its own security, in national solidarity, and solidarity with our allies, will require that, whatever the balance of the equation written above, it be represented to the world as a net gain or “triumph” for U.S. policy. At some level in government, however, the truth must be recognized, or the dangers will be compounded.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: Conveys memoranda of conversation between the President and Teller and Bradbury, dealing with detecting nuclear tests. Top Secret enclosures. 11 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Nuclear Testing.