Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

382. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 8, 1958

SUBJECT

• International Atomic Energy Agency

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
• Mr. Vance, Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission
• The Secretary
• Assistant Secretary Wilcox, IO
• Mr. Breithut, S/AE
• Mr. Cargo, UNP

Mr. McCone, who had just returned from the Second Conference of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva, said that the American contribution at Geneva was superb. He had heard nothing but favorable comment on it. It was a big operation, however. He thought that if such conferences were held in the future, it might be better to break them down by subject—health aspects in one year, power in another, etc.

The Secretary wondered whether Mr. McCone had the impression that we had surpassed the USSR on atomic matters. Mr. McCone thought that we had in every area. The Soviets showed little advance over their position of three years ago except on the subject of thermonuclear fusion. On this they were working along parallel lines with us. In fact all four of the countries doing major research in this area were working along similar lines.

Mr. McCone said that he wished to report to the Secretary on the results of his discussions in Geneva with atomic leaders of other countries on matters relating to the IAEA. He said that he had talked with Emelyanov and Bhabha, as well as the representatives from Western countries, and they all were concerned about the present position and future prospects of the Agency. Mr. McCone thought that there was legitimate reason for concern. Emelyanov had said that he would propose a scientific council, with Director General Cole as chairman, to devote its time to the establishment of objectives and a program for the Agency, and Mr. McCone told Emelyanov he would support this proposal.

Mr. McCone said he had had long talk with Mr. Ralph Bunche. Mr. Bunche said that the Secretary General and the UN Secretariat felt responsible for the Agency and believed that its failure would be a black mark against the UN. Mr. Bunche believed, however, that the organizational structure of the IAEA had the effect of drawing it away from the UN. The Board of Governors was like a little General Assembly. As a result of the political character of the Board of Governors, there was a reluctance on the part of the United Nations and specialized agencies to give the IAEA major responsibilities. For example, Hammarskjold was reluctant to see the IAEA take over responsibility for further conferences on peaceful uses of atomic energy. He said there would be similar doubts with regard to work in the field of radiation, where the UN Radiation Committee is now active. Mr. Bunche doubted that the IAEA would be given any responsibility in relation to the verification of test suspension.

Mr. McCone added that each specialized agency was carrying out its own role in atomic energy matters. The IAEA did not seem to be serving the UN, whereas it should be a sort of “Atomic Energy Commission” for the UN.

The Secretary observed that this was not the original concept for the Agency and that the position of the Agency described by Mr. McCone was not an accident but was designed. What was sought was to create an atomic energy agency with only a tenuous connection to the UN, something like the International Bank. Mr. Breithut observed that the thought was that a direct connection with the UN might inject irrelevant political considerations into the resolution of IAEA problems.

Mr. Wilcox said that of course the specialized agencies should not jump in and deprive the IAEA of its proper functions. He noted that the Secretary General had a coordinating role in this respect.

Mr. McCone said that he believed that the question he had outlined, the relation of the IAEA to other UN bodies and its position in the UN system, would be the subject of debate in Vienna. He said that he would need guidance on this.

The Secretary remarked that the IAEA did not get off to a good start. The Soviets had stalled in the establishment of the Agency. He recalled his own negotiations with Molotov, who had been evasive and difficult over a long period. The negotiations had in fact taken from 1953 to 1957. Meanwhile, things had not been standing still. There had been bilateral atomic arrangements. EURATOM was conceived. The Geneva conferences were organized. The question was how the IAEA could get back into its hands various matters that it would have undertaken if it had been created earlier. The IAEA, for example, should be organizing the peaceful uses conferences held at Geneva. The Secretary asked whether the answer to the problem was not to establish specific goals for the Agency and to pursue them.

Mr. McCone said that he was seeking specific objectives for the forthcoming conference but that he had not been able to get very far as yet.

The Secretary remarked that we certainly did not wish to see the IAEA fail. While Mr. McCone had referred to Mr. Hammarskjold’s concern about this, the United States had an even bigger investment of prestige in the Agency. The Agency had been created in response to a proposal of the President. There had been a major battle in the Senate over it. It would be a blow to the United States if the Agency collapsed or withered away.

Commissioner Vance thought that the Agency’s purposes, as stated in its Statute, were so broad that they were capable of almost any interpretation. He said that Mr. McKinney and Mr. Cole wanted the Agency to go into the power promotion business. He considered that the Agency did not have a place in this. All the plans that had been advanced implied that the United States would have to come up with very substantial funds to support power development. Commissioner Vance believed that the Agency should be a regulatory body and that it should also carry out some research. In the latter connection, Commissioner Vance believed that research contracts, supported by US funds, could be placed in other countries. He referred particularly to a “pool of talent” in atom research in Western Europe. In an exchange of views with Mr. McCone, Commissioner Vance indicated that we would need to know where these research contracts would be placed. Mr. McCone thought there might be some resistance to this idea by other countries and that the Agency would want to have some voice in how and where such research would be carried out.

Commenting on the possibilities of a nuclear power program, Mr. McCone remarked that there was now a much greater degree of realism about the possibility of nuclear power than heretofore. Commissioner Vance observed that operating costs were very high. He said that he presumed that we should not be so willing to bolster up the IAEA that we would be willing for the United States to go into an extensive nuclear power development program. The Secretary indicated agreement.

At the end of the meeting, Mr. McCone again said that he would need guidance as to whether we wanted the Atomic Energy Agency to continue in a position like the World Bank or whether we would want it tied more closely to the United Nations. He felt that the Agency would be likely to be ineffective unless it were tied more closely with the UN.

1. Source: IAEA. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA–General.