58. Editorial Note
During the National Security Council meeting on June 4, 1959, Allen Dulles reported on Soviet weapons developments:
“The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would comment first on certain developments relating to the Soviet guided missiles program. On May 30 the Soviets had launched another vehicle from Tyura Tam. There were several unique features in this launching and it had been difficult to state the precise purpose of it. We think, however, that the launching was of another successful ICBM with a much longer range—perhaps somewhere between 4000 and 5500 nautical miles. If so, this would constitute the first test firing of a Soviet ICBM with a range beyond 3500 nautical miles. Such a development was of course not unanticipated.
“In connection with the Soviet program for outer space exploration, Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the 8th of June would be the best date for a probe of the Planet Venus for the next two years. The Soviets may try a Venus probe on this date although we have no direct evidence of an intention to do so.
“Mr. Dulles then turned to the current estimate of the intelligence community with respect to Soviet aircraft production. He noted that in the first quarter of 1959 Soviet production of heavy bombers was marked by a very low level of activity. The majority opinion in the intelligence community thinks that the production of Bisons has fallen to about one a month although the Air Force believes that the production was two a month. In any event the total of heavy bombers of the Bison type would be in the range of about 100. It was extremely difficult to state the reasons why production was so low.
“Meanwhile, there was some evidence that certain of the Bison aircraft had lately been improved both as to altitude and range capabilities. It was estimated that there were about twelve of such improved Bisons in operational units. With one refueling such improved Bisons would be able to make two-way flights from the Soviet Union to the U.S. and back.
“With respect to the Bear turbo-prop heavy bomber production had ceased early in 1957. The total production of this bomber was estimated at between 50 and 60 aircraft.
“As for the Badger—the B–47 type—which was the backbone of the Soviet Air Force, such aircraft were capable only of one-way ‘suicide’ missions to the U.S. Production of the Badger had apparently virtually ceased and it was estimated that the total number of Badgers produced in the U.S.S.R. to date was between 1800 and 1900.
“The only large new bomber under development in the Soviet Union was the so-called Bounder. This was a supersonic bomber. Mr. Dulles [Page 216] said that we had estimated that this program would be ready for flight test in January 1959. However, we had as yet no evidence of a test flight.
“The President inquired whether the Bounder was an aircraft on the order of our B–58? Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative and added that there was some disagreement in the intelligence community as to whether this new aircraft would be nuclear-powered or powered by some new chemical.
“In summary Mr. Dulles pointed out that we believed that for the next year or two Soviet-manned bomber capabilities against the U.S. would remain substantially unchanged.
“Turning to developments in the Soviet submarine program, Mr. Dulles reported that on May 29 the U.S. Navy submarines had made sonar contact with a Soviet submarine between Iceland and Scotland. The Soviet submarine [1 line of source text not declassified] when it had surfaced had been photographed from U.S. aircraft. It had been identified as Z-Class Submarine #82. It was thought possible that it was equipped to fire guided missiles.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The NSC also discussed “Effects of U.S. Import Trade Policy on National Security;” see the Supplement.
At the NSC meeting on June 18, Dulles reported that the Soviets had launched another ICBM on June 9 and that they were placing more and more emphasis on new types of submarines, one of which was probably nuclear-powered and at least one of which might be equipped to fire missiles. (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; ibid.)