48. Editorial Note

At the National Security Council meeting on January 29, 1959, Allen Dulles discussed significant world developments affecting U.S. security with emphasis on Khrushchev’s speech in Moscow on January 27 to the 21st Congress of the Communist Party: “After considerable study, Mr. Dulles said that the most careful translation indicated that Khrushchev had stated that ‘serialized production of ICBM’s has been organized’. If this were an accurate translation, Mr. Dulles indicated that it fitted well with our U.S. intelligence estimates which have assumed that ICBM’s would be coming off the production line in small numbers this Calendar Year. Khrushchev’s statement did not indicate that Soviet production of [Page 180] ICBM’s was ahead of our estimates.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

During his briefing at the NSC meeting on February 26, Dulles considered recent National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet missile capabilities: “By and large he felt that there had not been a significant degree of error in the period covered by the Estimate of December 10, 1957 down to the most recent Estimate of December 23, 1958. He also pointed out that Khrushchev’s statement made in January 1959 that series production of ICBMs in the Soviet Union had been organized, fitted very well with our prior intelligence estimates.

“Secretary McElroy expressed the view that the most important matter was the date when the Soviets would have attained an initial operating capability of 500 ICBMs. This date was crucial for Department of Defense planning and on this point our estimates have been changed rather significantly.

“[2 paragraphs (16 lines of source text) not declassified]

“Secretary McElroy then pointed out that in point of fact the so-called missile gap had recently been narrowed because we were now estimating a longer period before the Soviets obtained a genuine operational capability with ICBMs and also because we ourselves have made more rapid progress in some of our own missile programs, such as the Polaris, than we had originally anticipated.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; ibid.)

The estimates referred to are NIE 11–4–57, November 12, 1957, “Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 1957–1962,” and NIE 11–4–58, “Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958–1963.” (Both in Department of State, INRNIE Files) A memorandum from John S.D. Eisenhower to Goodpaster, January 27, compares and contrasts the two estimates in some detail, noting that the principal difference was the lowered projection in NIE 11–4–58 for long-range bomber capability, revised to 200 to 300 by 1962 instead of the 400 to 600 expected by that year in NIE 11–4–57. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records)