Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

31. Memorandum of Discussion at the 373d Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, July 24, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. “Significant Developments Affecting U.S. Security Elsewhere Than in the Near East,” and 2. “The Situation in the Near East.”]

3. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1903 and 1934; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 21, 1958)¹

Mr. Gray presented the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)²

The Director of Central Intelligence summarized the conclusions of SNIE 100–7–58, entitled “Sino-Soviet and Free World Reactions to U.S. Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited Wars in the Far East”,³ prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1934–d (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).

At the conclusion of his summary, Mr. Allen Dulles said that these estimates were necessarily conjectural, and that the Joint Chief s of Staff had certain reservations concerning the one summarized at this meeting. However, Mr. Dulles felt that it was clear that (1) the United States cannot expect to use nuclear weapons in the Far East without provoking enemy retaliation, since the enemy would not be deterred from retaliation by fear of general war; and (2) there would be an adverse world reaction to U.S. use of nuclear weapons in the Far East.

Mr. Gray then asked the Secretary of Defense if he wished to make any explanations with respect to the Defense recommendations on the military section of NSC 5810/1.

Secretary McElroy said his Department had been studying the matter since the NSC meeting on the subject last May. Defense wished to emphasize four points:

(1) Because of the nature of the Soviet threat, the United States must continue to place primary emphasis on an all-out deterrent to war which should be adequate but not excessive.

(2) The United States has a significant limited war capability, and there should be flexibility in the U.S. forces in order to deter or meet limited war.

(3) Hostilities between the United States and Soviet forces could not be confined to limited war.

(4) The policy stated in NSC 5810/1 is adequate to permit an adequate but not excessive capability to deter general war, and adequate and flexible limited war capabilities.

Secretary McElroy said we must make clear to our allies that our position of deterrence has not changed. It was equally important that our principal opponent should have no doubts as to our steadfast adherence to a policy of deterrence.

Mr. Allen asked whether, if the USSR sent Soviet troops into Syria, there was not a possibility of limited hostilities between such Soviet troops and U.S. forces in Lebanon. Or must any clash between Soviet and American troops become general war?

Secretary McElroy said this situation would have to be met when it arises. However, he thought that in the NATO area a conflict with Soviet forces would not be confined to limited war.

General Twining then read a memorandum to the National Security Council dated July 23, 1958, which stated the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject, originally presented at the 364th NSC meeting on May 1, 1958 (NSC Action No. 1903–a). (A copy of the memorandum read by General Twining is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)⁴ General Twining added that on this question he supported the views of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Gray said there had been some division of opinion in the Planning Board, as well as in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on this subject. He asked if the Secretary of State wished to speak to the question.

Secretary Dulles said he had quite a few thoughts on the subject. He felt that we must recognize that military doctrine is in flux at the present moment and that the military paragraphs which we write into Basic Policy at the moment may not remain valid very long, and certainly will not be fixed for all time. However, budgetary questions are arising, and he was willing for the time being to accept the old language of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 as proposed by Defense.

Secretary McElroy said that review of Basic National Security Policy was an annual exercise, and that the problem of the military elements of national strategy would undergo further study in Defense.

The President said he felt that further study and consideration must take place before final action was taken on paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1. He did not want to approve these paragraphs finally without further study; the paper should be kept open. The Department of Defense could proceed if necessary to prepare its budget on the basis of the old language, but further study must be given this question.

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Noted an oral summary by the Director of Central Intelligence of Special National Intelligence Estimate 100–7–58 on “Sino-Soviet and Free World Reactions to U.S. Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited Wars in the Far East”, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1934–d.

b. Noted and discussed the recommendations by the Department of Defense relative to the military elements of national strategy in NSC 5810/1, including paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof (prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1903–b–(3) and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 21, 1958); in the light of:

(1) An oral summary by the Secretary of Defense.

(2) An oral summary by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, originally presented at the 364th NSC meeting on May 1, 1958 (NSC Action No. 1903–a).

(3) A statement by the Secretary of State that he concurred at this time with the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense that no change be made in the military section of NSC 5810/1, but that U.S. military doctrine should be kept under study and review.

c. Noted a statement by the President that:

(1) Final action on paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 should be deferred, pending further study and consideration in the light of the views expressed at this meeting.

(2) Meanwhile, the Department of Defense is authorized to continue preparation of its Fiscal Year 1960 budget submission on the basis of the present wording of paragraphs 13 and 14 in NSC 5810/1.

Note: The President, after further study and consideration following this meeting, approved paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1, with the understanding that they would be kept under continuing study pending the next annual review of basic policy.⁶ This decision by the President subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC 5810/1.

[Here follows Agenda Item 4. “U.S. Policy Toward Iceland.”]

Marion W. Boggs
Director
NSC Secretariat

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on July 25.
1. See the source note, Document 30.
2. Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)
3. Dated July 22; the Special Estimate stated that if the United States used nuclear weapons in East Asia, there was “grave risk that the Communists would retaliate in kind;” that it was unlikely that any East Asian Communist state would launch local aggression without previous assurance of Soviet support; that the Soviets would probably estimate that “local Communist use of nuclear weapons” would not necessarily lead to “expansion of hostilities into general war;” and that “US use of nuclear weapons would arouse wide-spread fear of general war and tend to obscure Communist responsibility for initiating hostilities.” (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) See the Supplement.
4. Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)
5. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1952, approved by the President on July 28. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

6. In Gray’s memorandum of his meeting with the President held on July 28, the section regarding this action reads as follows: “After some discussion, he [Eisenhower] indicated that he felt that while the policy needed continuing review and should be specifically reviewed in the annual revision of the Basic National Policy, he would like to have the Record of Action note that subject to such review the existing paragraphs 13 and 14 will be considered to be in the National Policy paper. He approved the revision presented by Mr. Lay” (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up)

   On August 5, Sprague informed the Department of State that the Department of Defense would prefer to defer State-Defense consultation on the subject of the military paragraphs of basic policy pending Defense decisions on the FY 1960 budget. (Memorandum from Howard Furnas of S/P to Smith, May 6, 1959; Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5904 Series)