Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

262. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Twining) to President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, September 15, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Arms Control Proposals and Your Speech at the United Nations, 22 September 1960¹

1. I have reviewed an early draft by the State Department Staff² of a speech which you might make to the United Nations General Assembly and consider that certain basic aspects of the approach proposed in the arms control area would have serious implications relative to the security of the United States. The draft I saw probably will be revised. However, I feel that the following comments, which are addressed to the early draft, should be considered in formulating the arms control section of the speech you plan to make:

a. I question the view reflected in the speech that in a time of increasing tensions, as at present, the United States should feel compelled to increase the attractiveness to the Soviets of U.S. disarmament proposals by offering the Soviets one-sided military advantages. To do so, would be dangerously misleading to people throughout the world. The Soviets could only interpret this approach as a sign of weakness on the part of the United States and a sign of U.S. uncertainty about fulfilling its world-wide commitments.

b. I don’t mean to imply that we should refuse to entertain new ideas, but it does seem clear that in the arms control field we can’t expect to out-match the Soviets in offering fancy gimmicks for their propaganda appeal. Our interests surely lie in sticking to a responsible arms control program based on sound principles and realistic regard for the facts of international life.

c. Rather than the arms control approach taken in the draft speech, I believe that the United States should make clear that the unrenounced and frequently repeated Communist objective of world domination is the prime reason for the present level and deployment of U.S. armed forces and armaments.

d. With respect to arms control proposals, I believe that the United States should reiterate its interest in and willingness to negotiate international arms control agreements, and should demonstrate that the Soviets have consistently sabotaged all efforts in this direction through their repeated threats against and attacks on other peoples, their continued use of negotiations strictly as propaganda exercises and their refusal to negotiate in the 1960 Geneva disarmament conference, highlighted by their walk-out from that conference. In this connection, far greater stress than is now given in the draft should be placed on the Soviet penchant for secrecy as an obstacle to arms controls.

e. The United States should then restate—not renounce, as the draft speech implies—its 27 June 1960 disarmament proposals³ and invite participation in renewed negotiations on these proposals. As you no doubt recall, these proposals received your approval shortly before they were tabled in Geneva. To discard the 27 June 1960 proposals, as would be the case if we were to come forward now with what, in effect are new proposals, would—in addition to being a sign of great weakness—play into Soviet propaganda charges used to justify the Communist walk-out at Geneva in June 1960.

f. The arms control proposals in the draft speech are contrary to U.S. Basic National Security Policy in that they do not provide for balanced and phased disarmament. For example, the arms control proposals contained in the draft advocate the reduction of nuclear military capabilities without requiring substantial conventional disarmament, thus potentially impairing U.S. nuclear capabilities while leaving Sino-Soviet conventional capabilities unimpaired. The following are additional examples of proposals contained in the draft considered undesirable:

(1) One proposal asks the United Nations to “call on nations to engage in no military activities” on celestial bodies. This would be an uncontrolled ban, probably binding on the United States, but not on the USSR. A major principle of U.S. policy is that disarmament measures must be controllable and controls must be operative; this proposal is contrary to this principle and could establish a dangerous precedent. Also, this proposal could and probably would lead to additional U.N. resolutions such as ban the bomb, liquidate overseas bases, and eliminate means for delivering nuclear weapons.

(2) Another proposal asks that an “urgent study be initiated” in connection with control of nuclear delivery systems. This proposal, presented out of the context of the 27 June U.S. program, unduly emphasizes this aspect of the program in keeping with the Soviet desire to place the control of nuclear delivery means in Stage One.

(3) The proposals concerning nuclear weapons, aside from being undesirable because they are not tied to conventional disarmament, invite the ninety-odd nuclear have-nots, who have no capability and no responsibility for preserving the security of the Free World, to negotiate and pass resolutions on arms controls for U.S. nuclear weapons. In addition, the proposal to close nuclear production plants one-by-one is undesirable because it is offered without requiring verification to assure that new plants are not being established on the territory of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(4) The United States cannot agree to terminate “nuclear” production, as is proposed in the speech. This would encompass tritium without which many of our existing or remaining nuclear weapons would quickly become ineffective. For this reason, the U.S. proposals have only suggested termination of the production of “fissionable” materials.

(5) The speech deals inadequately with Soviet aggression over international waters and with the problem of obtaining the release of the RB–47 crewmen; also, it hands the initiative in this matter to the Soviets. The major points to be stressed are that a continuation of Soviet aggressive acts over international waters is a bar to peaceful negotiations; that the continued illegal imprisonment of the RB–47 crewmen is a constant reminder of the fact of Soviet aggression; and that the RB–47 crewmen must be released immediately to afford any hope that Soviet brigandage over international waters will be stopped and, therefore, any hope that negotiations might be fruitful.

(6) The section on arms control fails to specify that nuclear and non-nuclear arms controls must be balanced and that “general disarmament” must be under effective international control.

2. I believe that specific arms control measures listed in the draft speech should be redrafted to conform to the U.S. proposals of 27 June 1960, which are the latest arms control proposals which have been fully coordinated within the Government and approved by the President. The arms control proposals contained in the draft speech have not been so coordinated. They represent a drastic departure from the concept of balanced and phased arms control measures at all times under effective international verification and inspection, as reflected in the 27 June proposals, and would have serious security implications.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur fully in the views expressed above.

N.F. Twining

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secret.
1. For text of the speech as given, see Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 707–720. Eisenhower’s speech was part of the general debate on disarmament at the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. On September 23, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev addressed the General Assembly on Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament. Extracts of that speech are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 715–718. A Soviet declaration submitted to the General Assembly and the Soviet proposals on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, both September 23, are printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 229–248.
2. The draft was not found.
3. For text of the proposals, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 126–131.