Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

260. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, August 19, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Merchant, Chairman McCone
• General Goodpaster

Mr. McCone said that Prime Minister Macmillan sent his warmest regards to the President. He added that he is following Mr. Nixon’s campaign with close interest. Finally, he said he is deeply appreciative of the care we have taken not to bring the British into the Powers trial in any way.¹

Mr. McCone said the United States and British representatives from the Geneva negotiations gave a report to the meeting of himself and Mr. Merchant with the Prime Minister.² Mr. McCone explained why it is not feasible for the United States to go to the fall-back position—that the Congress will not accept this. He said the British tried to tie the question to the election in some way, but he resisted this. The British pressed us very hard for a statement of our intentions as to when and whether we planned to initiate unilateral nuclear seismic experimentation. Ormsby Gore wanted a commitment, which he was not given, that the United States would not do anything until the next Congress and Administration had come in.

Mr. McCone was willing to say that we would take no precipitous action, and that we will resume negotiations at the end of the five weeks’ recess. Mr. Merchant commented that the British seemed greatly relieved that this was the purpose of the visit.

Mr. McCone said he cited to the British the President’s statement that we would not wait forever to resume testing if no progress is made toward an acceptable agreement.³ He and Mr. Merchant agreed on a proposed date of September 27th for reconvening after the recess. He said he proposed that, in the meantime, the United States and the United Kingdom should summarize very strictly the issues that divide the East and West before the recess began.

Mr. McCone said that the Soviets are pressing hard for a commitment from the United States as to the duration of moratorium we would accept. Mr. McCone thought the moratorium should cover the period of seismic improvement experimentation. The British also want to know our thinking on this matter. Mr. McCone said he and Mr. Merchant finally agreed that the moratorium could be of two years’ duration plus three to six months, which is the time it would take to make preparations for testing after a decision to test. He said it was agreed that the Western delegations can announce their thinking on the moratorium.

The President said he is inclined to feel, if we could keep the secret from the press, he would authorize small clandestine shots because the delay has been so long in negotiations, and we cannot be sure whether the Soviets are testing or not. I told the President I hoped he would give no consideration to this, since there is one thing our experience has proven, and that is that this government cannot keep a secret. Mr. McCone said that if he had the authority to do this, he would guarantee to do it secretly insofar as his agency is concerned, but added that scientists would know about this and would talk to each other and to the press. At this point the President adverted to several recent security breaches.

Mr. McCone suggested, and said he had suggested to the British, that in the early days of the recess the US and UK negotiators should report on what the issues are that remain in the negotiations with the Russians, and what the US and UK positions are with respect to these issues—and that thereafter the governments should try to decide what to do about them.

Mr. McCone commented that the proposal for reciprocal inspection of seismic improvement devices involving nuclear explosions was not put forward very strongly or effectively by our negotiating team in Geneva, nor was it supported by the British. He acknowledged that, even had it been, it would not have been accepted by the Soviets. Mr. McCone said that during the meeting with Macmillan, Ormsby-Gore reviewed the issues, and his review disclosed that the British see them just as clearly as we do. The Soviets say that we cannot start the research program until a treaty has been initialled. They also say that the first inspection cannot occur until the whole system has been installed. These may be negotiating positions, but they show the extent of the difficulty.

The President said the fundamental question in his mind is this: is it of primary importance to the Soviets that they want no more nuclear explosions, or is it of primary importance that they do not want to open up their country? While a total number of inspections as low as three would be inadequate to provide effective inspection, even these three would disclose a great deal of their country. Mr. McCone said the British are saying that three inspections are not enough. They seem to be thinking in terms of ten, asserting that we could not do more. He said he told them that there was no practical limit of this order and that the number depends simply on how much effort we are willing to make.

Mr. McCone said that, with respect to the seismic improvement program, he felt that by the meeting he and Mr. Merchant had just completed with the British, we have extracted ourselves from the commitment to put forward the fall-back position. He commented that this leaves us in a vacuum, however, since the Soviets have disagreed with our earlier proposal. The President said that it may be necessary for himself or the new President to go up to the Congress in January to see if we could obtain the fall-back position. He added that in many ways he prefers the fall-back position. He acknowledged that the present Congress didn’t consider the question rationally and that there is no point in advancing it now.

To a question by the President, Mr. McCone indicated that it would be possible to declassify these devices, but in that case we would have to make the information public, according to the terms of the law, and this would be contrary to the policy of not spreading nuclear weapons knowledge among additional countries. He suggested that the best course was probably to wait until after the election and reappraise the situation. The President said this depends upon the outcome of the election. If Kennedy were to win, the President thought he would not wish to engage with the present Administration in any activity on this problem. If Mr. Nixon wins, the President thought Macmillan might then have to be told that an early decision to resume or not to resume testing was mandatory.

The President suggested that, in the meantime, we should carry out some large-scale HE explosions, adding that perhaps it would be possible to introduce a nuclear component clandestinely. Again I urged him not to consider this.

Mr. McCone suggested that it might be possible to build a completely new device, not at all in the form of a weapon, using some new principle to create the critical initiatory conditions, which could be completely declassified. He said he would pursue this.

Mr. McCone said it is his view that we and the British are not on the “same wicket”—that we are trying to suspend what we can control and the British want to suspend everything, including tests below the threshold of inspection. The President said he had seen nothing to warrant this conclusion, and disagreed with this judgment.

Mr. McCone said finally that Prime Minister Macmillan had indicated he would like very much to get together with the President some time in December. The President said he too would like this. London seemed completely out of the question, although Culzean Castle or some similar place might be a possibility.

G.
Brigadier General, General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 23.
1. Documentation on the shooting down of a U.S. U–2 reconnaissance plane, piloted by Francis Gary Powers, over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960, and the subsequent trial of Powers in the Soviet Union is in volume X, Part 1.
2. McCone and Merchant went to London on August 15 for discussions with Macmillan and other British officials on the future of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing. Before leaving for London, McCone discussed his visit with Eisenhower. The President told him that he “should simply tell the British that we have so many political problems in regard to this matter during the next 2-1/2 months that he did not feel it is possible to prepare the way for the proposal now. He did not, however, want to be in the position of breaking up the negotiations” A report of this August 15 meeting is in a memorandum of conference with the President by Goodpaster, August 19; ibid. See the Supplement.
3. Reference is apparently to Eisenhower’s statement in his August 10 press conference on the lack of progress in the Geneva discussions. The President stated that “when we come to the place that progress is not possible, then we will have to take care of ourselves.” See footnote 8, Document 259.