254. Memorandum for the Files0
This morning I spent about forty-five minutes with the President and General Goodpaster. Thereafter, the President and I joined Secretary Herter for one-half hour.
I stated to the President, and later to both the President and the Secretary of State, my views with respect to continuation of the disarmament and test suspension negotiations. I stated that both negotiations were stalled pending directives from the Summit; obviously no directives were forthcoming, but that Khrushchev had most emphatically reaffirmed his position that inspection and controls must await disarmament, and after disarmament was completed any type of control could be instituted because countries would be “open.”
In view of this position it seems that the Soviet delegates in both conferences could not move to resolve unresolved questions to the satisfaction of the West.
I reiterated that with respect to disarmament, protracting negotiations could harm us because the Soviets would use our refusal to accept their broad proposals (all of which would be based upon faith) as an attempt to paint us as war mongers. Furthermore, there is a psychological complication in attempting to maintain a reasonable security posture and a state of readiness and at the same time pursue protracted disarmament negotiations.
With respect to test suspension, the above considerations apply; but, also it must be recognized that we are suffering a severe restriction in our weapons development program; no progress in new or improved weapons is being made and our vital interests are, therefore, being adversely affected.
In a private conversation with Secretary Herter, en route from the residence to the Chancery, and also in his office, I re-emphasized the very great importance that I attach to the dangers of a further extension of an uninspected test moratorium with no prospect of reaching an agreement on adequate or comprehensive inspection.
The President and Mr. Herter recognize that our policies with respect to the continuation of the Geneva conferences are most serious and should only be re-established after most deliberate and careful consideration and that decisions should not be made in the atmosphere of Paris today.
[Page 880]Later, I discussed the subject with Secretary Gates and Secretary Irwin, stating that I felt the long continuation of the Geneva test suspension negotiation would have very damaging effects on the Commission, the staff, and the Laboratories, and I did not feel that I could be responsible for this deterioration. Secretary Gates, much to my surprise, seemed to question the value of weapon improvement and seemed to be doubtful of the effect on world opinion should the test suspension negotiation break down.
Following a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, I pointed out to Secretary Herter that the recent Rand Report, as presented by Dr. Albert Latter, is not to be considered as an authentic scientific conclusion as it is not based on solid technical information. I pointed out that Dr. Latter had briefed a group in Paris on Sunday, and stated that he could not endorse the Rand conclusions1 because they were drawn from the most fragmentary technical data and, therefore, could not be considered as solid. Dr. Latter later stated that while he had confidence that the relocation of stations, together with nine additional ones, would give an improved capability, the final degree of the improvement of capability must await further experimentation.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 5. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 253.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩