Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

239. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, January 12, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Threshold Proposal for Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• State
  • Acting Secretary Merchant
  • S/AE—Philip J. Farley
  • S/AE—Vincent Baker
• AEC
  • Mr. McCone
  • Dr. English
  • Gen. Starbird
• CIA
  • Dr. Scoville
• White House
  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Mr. Keeny
  • Mr. Gray
• DOD
  • Mr. Gates
  • Gen. Loper
  • Gen. Fox
  • Mr. Knight

Mr. Gates recalled that Defense and AEC had been requested at the last meeting of principals to comment on the threshold proposal that Dr. Kistiakowsky had presented at the meeting of January 8.¹ He said that the Department of Defense had prepared a paper, which he circulated for consideration by the group (attached).² He said his staff questions the basic threshold idea and that the proposal had been reviewed by ARPA, Dr. Romney and Mr. Northrup. Defense felt, if advancing the threshold proposal were deemed essential for political reasons a level of magnitude of 5.00 should be proposed. We should not, however, discuss the details of any threshold proposal in our initial presentation. His Defense technical advisers were of the opinion that a large expenditure on research would be necessary before we would know how good seismic capability really is and would be able to devise suitable methods for implementing a threshold proposal.

Mr. McCone after reading the paper which Mr. Gates had circulated, asked for a clarification of the reference in para 6(d) to the effect that all located events should be eligible for inspection in comparision to the reference in para 7(c) saying 50% of detected events shall be subject to inspection. General Loper explained that, while all events should be eligible for inspection, only 50% under the Defense proposal would actually be inspected.

Mr. Gray recalled that the President had endorsed a threshold proposal at the time when the Department of Defense was supporting it through Mr. Quarles. Mr. Farley recalled the President at the Augusta meeting³ had not been unsympathetic to the threshold and, in a summary in the course of the meeting, had postulated a 3 stage approach in which we would attempt first a comprehensive treaty, then a threshold proposal and then an atmospheric approach. Mr. Gray agreed but said this group however should not assume anything about the President’s attitude, and instead should simply make its own best recommendations.

Mr. Gates asked why we didn’t just go ahead and table a phased atmospheric treaty. If our purpose was propaganda this would put the Russians on the spot to demonstrate their willingness to reach agreement. Why should we make it hard for ourselves by devising other complicated steps before tabling the atmospheric treaty. Mr. Farley said that there were at least two arguments for the threshold approach as an intermediate stage. First, it would give us a right of on-site inspection, and second it would make a gesture toward demonstrating U.S. willingness to include as much as possible in the initial test ban treaty. In addition, the Soviets, for different reasons, might conceivably agree to the proposal in the hope of tying our hands on all underground tests. Mr. Gates said if we were looking for alternative proposals perhaps we should propose to announce and inspect each other’s tests. Mr. Farley recalled that we had invited observers to one of our Hardtack tests, and that most countries had shown reluctance to attend.

General Fox said that Defense technical experts in AFTAC had carefully considered the threshold proposal and their considerations lead them away from it at the present time. One difficulty was that the proposal, instead of dealing with the decoupling problem, served to put a premium on the use of decoupling. Mr. McCone said he could see that there were technical problems in the proposal. He believed that implementing it would add a strain on the operations of the system, and possibly on relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union because of the complexity of its operations. He was agreeable, though, if the other Departments desired, to proceed to a threshold proposal subject to one strong caveat. The AEC caveat was that, before the time we discussed details of a threshold proposal, we should reaffirm we would agree to a ban only in environments where it can be adequately monitored. He believed that this had been lost sight of in the negotiations, and said that our negotiators had not made this point clear. The UK in particular did not seem to fully understand it. No treaty would be acceptable to AEC or to Congress if it were not adequately safeguarded.

Mr. Merchant asked whether McCone was referring to the China problem. McCone said not necessarily, since a higher number of inspections could compensate for the absence of control posts in China to help identify events in the Soviet Union. If the principle he outlined were stated, AEC would accept the threshold and would pick 4.75 as the best threshold magnitude though it had no strong feelings about the exact level. He stressed that, if the Soviets wanted fewer stations or a lower threshold, they would have to accept more inspections. Mr. McCone pointed out that the threshold approach ignores the decoupling problem. However the zone above the proposed threshold was not an important one from the standpoint of weapons testing, and AEC saw no significant danger from decoupling provided the threshold were set as high as 4.75 or 5.00. We should continue the current moratorium only on a day to day basis and make clear we cannot agree to endless negotiations. If we cannot get the threshold idea adopted, we should go to the phased treaty proposal of April 13,⁴ beginning with atmospheric treaty. If that in turn fails, we should decide what kind of unilateral announcement to make. Mr. McCone circulated to the group the attached memorandum elaborating the AEC views which he had expressed.⁵

Mr. Gates said that if you don’t have criteria you have no basis for inspection. General Fox concurred, saying that without agreed criteria the control organization has no basis for a choice of events to be inspected. Mr. Farley pointed out that as long as criteria for locating events are agreed, it is possible to bypass differences with the Soviets on criteria for their identification. Mr. Keeny pointed out that the unilateral choice of 20% of unidentified events to be inspected would afford a more powerful inspection mechanism then the 20% random selection proposed in our treaty draft of Annex I tabled in December 1958.

Dr. Kistiakowsky questioned the statement in the Defense Department paper, paragraph 2, as follows: “if we suggest the percentage of the total events in order to eliminate the criteria problem we will introduce a very undesirable factor, namely, the necessity for the East and West to act unilaterally in selecting events to be inspected in the host countries thus degrading the authority of the International Control Organization”. He said the right to apply unilaterally our best scientific judgments and intelligence data appeared to him to be advantageous.

General Loper said that unilateral selection becomes a problem only if the inspection system is expanded beyond the original three parties, for example, to France. We cannot leave to each nation the right to determine what events are to be inspected. Dr. Kistiakowsky agreed that we must not of course allow the country which is being inspected to make the selection. Dr. Scoville noted that a smaller number of inspections would yield the same margin of security as a larger number if we had wide freedom to make our own selection of the events to be inspected. Mr. Gates asked what was the problem of the unilateral inspection as a disarmament precedent, for example, in the Norstad zone. Also he could not see how a control system and threshold proposal could be justified on the basis of existing technical information.

Mr. Gray asked if there was any sense in fiddling around with threshold, was it worth getting the President to consider and make further proposals merely to have something else turned down. If there were political factors that make this desirable, the Department of State might comment upon them. We should not think for a minute the Soviets would accept a threshold proposal. Moreover he did not think the President should be asked to take the moral position that we should stop all tests we can control and then be asked to propose a threshold that permits all the testing we want to do. This might be good Defense policy but was not good policy for the President.

General Loper pointed out that a threshold in the range recommended by the last meeting of principals was chosen on purely technical grounds by Dr. Kistiakowsky’s panel. He said that the Department of Defense could probably accept a threshold of 4.75 if the number of inspections bore a reasonable basis in technical fact, and particularly if all unidentified events were eligible for inspection.

Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that a threshold in practice is unavoidable. It will in fact always exist even under a comprehensive treaty in the fractional kiloton yield range. Moreover to produce what the Secretary of State had called “an adequate deterrent” it would not be necessary to inspect everything. Under his proposal the rigid criteria of Dr. Fisk and the U.S. Delegation would be applied in determining eligibility. Mr. Merchant asked Mr. McCone specifically whether he favored the threshold proposal. Mr. McCone said yes if the other things he had mentioned were done. He would also accept the 4.75 threshold because of his recognition that the higher you go the more awkward the position the President is placed in.

Mr. Merchant said that Mr. Herter had considered the threshold from the standpoint of getting inspectors into the Soviet Union, from the standpoint of tactics in negotiations and from the standpoint of securing an adequate safeguard. He had tended to favor the proposal, but in the light of the divergence of views between Departments we would need time to check further with Mr. Herter before reaching a final decision. Mr. Gray recalled that Mr. McCone would be away during the next few days. Mr. McCone said any necessary decision could be taken by Commissioner Floberg, Dr. English and General Starbird.

Mr. Gates said that his main concern was that his technical people felt we needed more work on the problem—that much needed to be done on the basis of actual nuclear tests—and that otherwise the threshold proposal and the control system were questionable. It was difficult to proceed if the detectability is in question. Dr. Fisk had mentioned at the Augusta meeting that there were many unknowns and imponderables. He was sympathetic to the objective of getting people into Russia but he believed that this factor had been over-rated. We should not proceed if we have real technical doubts about how to operate the control system.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that a threshold does introduce grave complications both in writing a treaty and in putting it into effect. Mr. Gates said if the system were 3/4 foolproof it would not be so bad, but the question is our basic technical capabilities to execute this proposal. As he understood the position of Defense experts, there are grave doubts as to whether we have the knowledge to establish effective control. General Loper said we are assuming things that are not experimentally confirmed. For example, the 100 instrument array which is postulated has never been tested, and we are coming to very specific conclusions on the number of inspections without a correspondingly specific knowledge of technical facts.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he was certainly not arguing feverishly for the proposal, but would wish to point out it was based upon the use of the U.S. Delegation’s rigorous criteria which, in their judgment, is sufficiently firm to be codified without further experimentation. He said that we wouldn’t have to worry about exact numbers of inspections if we used a percentage basis. Mr. Gates could not see how this problem could be avoided if we don’t have agreed criteria. Mr. Scoville said on the percentage basis the technical uncertanties were largely overcome and such a proposal could be applied without agreement on criteria. Mr. McCone asked whether the group was agreed on the caveat contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the AEC paper.⁶ It was generally agreed that, apart from the specific wording which the group had not time to consider fully, the idea expressed in these two paragraphs was consistent with U.S. policy.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Baker and approved by M on January 20. For Kistiakowsky’s account of this meeting, see A Scientist at the White House, p. 226.
1. At the January 8 meeting, Kistiakowsky explained that it was technically possible to define a threshold in terms of magnitude of seismic events as detected by the control system. With this plan it would be feasible to achieve effective monitoring of underground tests with a strong deterrent against cheating, according to Kistiakowsky, either by insisting on a level of monitoring that ensured inspection of either 10 percent of seismic events over 4.75, or 20 percent of all located seismic events below 5 kilotons (the proposal already submitted by the United States at Geneva), or by setting a quota of 10 inspections per year. Dillon suggested that it might be necessary to accept a higher threshold if the AEC and Defense felt it necessary for the U.S. testing program. (Memorandum of conversation by Baker, January 8; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) See the Supplement. See also Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House, pp. 222–223.
2. See the Supplement.
3. See Document 238.
4. See footnote 4, Document 213.
5. See the Supplement.
6. Paragraph 1 of the AEC paper reads: “U.S. confirms its position that it will agree to prohibitions in areas where safeguards have adequate capabilities for monitoring.” Paragraph 2 states that the U.S. Delegation at Geneva “must determine at the outset of negotiations and prior to discussion of the threshold concept” the willingness of the Soviet Union and British delegations to negotiate a treaty only in areas where adequate safeguards can be provided.