Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

237. Memorandum of Discussion at the 428th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, December 10, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1 and 2. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

3. Major Problems Associated With Control of Long-Range Ballistic Missiles (NSC Actions Nos. 1840 and 1888; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement”, dated March 28, 1958)¹

Mr. Charles A. Coolidge joined the meeting at this point.

Mr. Gray introduced the subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)²

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he wished to amplify the “off-the-cuff” remarks he had made at the December 1 Council meeting³ during the discussion of disarmament. He then displayed the following chart:

“Major Problems Associated With Control of Long-Range Ballistic Missiles”

1. Cessation of Flight Tests

a. Is it detrimental to U.S. interests?

b. Is it feasible?

c. What about the exploration of outer space?

2. Control of ICBM Production

a. Is it detrimental to U.S. interests?

b. Is it feasible?

c. What about outer space?

3. Control (limitation) of force size

a. Is it detrimental to U.S. interests?

b. Is it feasible?

4. Control for Early Warning of Operational Sites

a. Is it detrimental to U.S. interests?

b. Is it feasible?

Dr. Kistiakowsky recalled that some months ago he had chaired an ad hoc panel, which had looked at the technical question of monitoring agreements to stop missile tests and had reported to the Council (Reference Memorandum of March 28, 1958). The ad hoc group had dealt only with Item 1 of the above chart. Item 4 of the chart had become one of the issues at the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack. The ad hoc group had concluded that it was feasible to monitor and detect Soviet ballistic missile flight tests in the light of the limited Soviet missile testing organization which had existed at that time. With respect to 1. c on the chart, the ad hoc group had pointed out that operational long-range missile capabilities could be materially assisted by space exploration missiles, and that the achievement of control over outer space might require an international organization. With respect to 1. a on the chart, the ad hoc group had concluded that an asymmetric situation existed; that is, that it would not be to U.S. advantage to agree to a cessation of missile tests because the Soviets at that time were more advanced in missile technology than the U.S. Accordingly, the cessation of flight tests would have left the Soviets with operational missile forces, but would have prevented the U.S. from obtaining an operational missile capability. Dr. Kistiakowsky recalled that when this issue was raised during the disarmament discussion on December 1, he had pointed out that the situation had changed. The U.S. now has an operational ICBM (the Atlas) and in a few months will have a mobile missile which will be nearly invulnerable (the Polaris).

In reply to a question by the Vice President, Secretary Gates reported that the first Polaris submarine with a complete missile capability would be operational in seven months.

Continuing his presentation, Dr. Kistiakowsky said the whole issue was now ripe for reconsideration. However, technical arguments suggested that if the U.S. desired to conclude an international agreement for the control and reduction of missile forces, early steps would be necessary. The Soviet missile forces were now large and cumbersome; Soviet missiles could not be concealed in a haystack and fired with only a little preparation. In four or five years both the U.S. and the USSR would have solid propellant missiles which would be small in size, mobile, automated, difficult to monitor, and more accurate than existing missiles. The certainty that the Soviets could achieve their objectives by surprise attack will be less during the period when missiles are limited in mobility and accuracy than at a later time. Indeed, in four or five years the results of surprise attack can probably be mathematically calculated in advance. For all these reasons. Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested that the Council direct a new study of the subject. On the other hand, he did not wish to minimize the complications of the problem, even as regards Item 1 on the above chart. As far as the other items on the chart were concerned, he pointed out that the staff of the U.S. Delegation to the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack privately had grave doubts that an international organization to provide early warning against surprise attack could be successful.

Secretary Gates wished to interject a note of caution. He felt that any factor involved in disarmament should be studied quietly, but it was inconceivable to him that the U.S. could ever agree to stop flight tests of missiles in the light of the philosophy that the more we move toward an invulnerable deterrent, the less likelihood there is of war. Studies had a way of leaking out, of getting into politics and service problems, and of being blown up out of all proportion to their importance. Even if a committee studied this problem and decided that missile testing could be controlled, it was inconceivable from the military point of view that we would agree to such control. He was afraid a study of this subject would only cause trouble unless the study were confined to scientific problems and did not extend to controversial questions of policy.

Secretary Herter wished to present a slightly different view. The U.S. would shortly be faced with disarmament negotiations in which negative answers would be as important as positive positions. General De Gaulle thinks control of missile testing is a top priority problem in disarmament. Unless the U.S. can present good reasons for not agreeing to such control, its disarmament negotiators will be in a very difficult position. He felt it was imperative to give our negotiators the best answers possible in order to avoid imposing severe handicaps upon them. He did not want to prejudge the answer, but did want to obtain the answer. In every case, Secretary Herter felt we must weigh the advantages to the U.S. and to Russia. He asked whether his impression was correct that the previous study mentioned by Dr. Kistiakowsky had indicated that, on the basis of relative advantage, we would be the loser. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied in the affirmative. Secretary Herter agreed with Secretary Gates that a study of this kind should receive no publicity, but he did feel that such a study should be made.

Mr. Gray shared some of the views of the Secretary of Defense on the difficulties which might arise from such a study. He believed if the study were made, it should be presented directly to the Council, and should not go through the Planning Board. Secretary Gates said that sometimes studies result in a split answer rather than a clear answer. He agreed with Secretary Herter that answers needed to be provided, but had reservations on the suggestion that a study was the best way to provide answers. He recalled that the Department of Defense had not participated in the previous study referred to by Dr. Kistiakowsky, and indicated that if a study should be requested, Defense wished to participate. Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that the late Deputy Secretary Quarles had decided that Defense need not participate in the study by the ad hoc group.

The Vice President thought that studies sometimes led to second guessing. Leaks often occur when experts are brought in from outside the Government. He felt there were experts in the Government who could take responsibility for a study by tapping outside resources and making recommendations to the Council under security safeguards which would prevent a leak.

Secretary Gates said that an unidentifiable study undertaken for the purpose of informing the Council would be a different matter. He repeated, however, that in his judgment, flight testing of missiles should not be stopped. The Vice President said he was inclined to share Secretary Gates’ view while recognizing that difficult problems of politics would soon arise which might necessitate our changing our views.

Secretary Anderson, noting that changes in policy would have to be made by the President, suggested that Dr. Kistiakowsky assume individual responsibility for making a study. Dr. Kistiakowsky could get judgments from Defense and other interested agencies, and could assemble the pros and cons without a formal study. Any differences which arose could be reconciled by submitting them to the President for decision. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he was not very anxious to offer himself for the study. He thought this was a matter of interdepartmental concern; moreover, the technical people in the interested departments and agencies were essential to the success of the study.

Secretary Herter said he visualized a study of an advisory nature. He thought it was essential that the Department of Defense, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, participate in the study. His guess would be that the study would conclude that the U.S. could not afford to stop missile testing. However, if this a priori judgment could be substantiated by a study, then we would be in an excellent position to reject proposals for cessation of missile testing during disarmament negotiations.

Admiral Burke said that although he had not consulted with Secretary Gates in advance, he shared the Secretary’s views. We needed to study all factors connected with missile testing but the problem was a continuing and a delicate one. A number of strong views were involved, including strong pressures for disarmament. He agreed that State would need support in the disarmament negotiations, but felt that any study must be done carefully, and wondered whether the Secretary of the Treasury’s suggestion was not the most feasible line of approach. The Vice President felt that it might not be appropriate to discuss the merits of a cessation of missile testing at this meeting. The question was: should responsibility for concluding a study be placed on Dr. Kistiakowsky?

Mr. Gray noted that a number of studies had been made under Dr. Killian and under Dr. Kistiakowsky which had not become part of the public domain. The study might be less visible if it were organized as a study for the President. Mr. Gray agreed that it would be unfortunate if a study of this problem should be organized along the lines of the Gaither Study. He thought the study might concentrate on the pros and cons rather than on the formulation of policy recommendations.

Mr. Coolidge reported that the Disarmament Study, after considering the problem of controlling missile tests, had reached the tentative conclusion that the U.S. should not seek such control. However, he believed a study should be made because more arguments in support of this tentative conclusion were needed.

The Vice President agreed and asked Secretary Herter why De Gaulle considered this problem one of top priority. Secretary Herter said De Gaulle did not want his conventional forces touched.

Mr. Gray suggested that the Council request Dr. Kistiakowsky, in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense and CIA, to draw up the terms of reference for a study of major problems associated with control of long-range ballistic missiles.

Secretary Herter said he was not sure the Department of State would have anything to contribute. Secretary Gates, referring to Dr. Kistiakowsky’s chart, said the question, “Is it detrimental to U.S. interests?” immediately opened up policy problems. The Vice President felt that the Department of State should participate in drawing up the terms of reference. Mr. Gray wondered whether Dr. Kistiakowsky’s chart had not referred to U.S. interests in a technical military sense. Secretary Herter said guidance was needed on the technical balance of advantage and disadvantage. Negative considerations were as important as positive considerations.

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation on the subject by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, with particular reference to developments which might affect the conclusions of the report transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 28, 1958.

b. Requested the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, to draw up terms of reference for a study on the monitoring of tests and production of long-range ballistic missiles, and to coordinate the conduct of such a study and the preparation of a report thereon to the President.

Note: The above action subsequently transmitted to and approved by the President, and transmitted to the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate action pursuant to b above.

[Here follow unrelated agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on December 10. For Kistiakowsky’s account of this meeting, see A Scientist at the White House, pp. 193–194.
1. See footnote 15, Document 136; and footnotes 2 and 3, Document 148.
2. Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File)
3. See Document 236.
4. The following paragraphs and Note constitute NSC Action No. 2161, approved by the President on December 23. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)