223. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (McCone) to Secretary of State Herter0
Dear Chris: In our meeting on July 2,1 I summarized to you the impressions I had gained during my recent trip to Geneva to observe negotiations underway there. I shall repeat these in this personal note, together with certain suggestions I made to you, so that you may have them readily available for such use as you may care to make of them.
I gained the distinct impression that the US–UK tactics of advancing questions concerning the Soviet position gives to the Soviets the opportunity to answer with very minor concessions (if any at all) and then to advertise the answer to the press as representing a real concession. From my contacts and observance, the press in Geneva appeared willing to repeat such advertisements. For example, I can mention the case occurring while I was there where the Soviets, agreeing to raise the manning from 4–5 to 6–7, and to “a different procedure for the appointment of engineering and technical personnel,” were reported by the press as being of importance.
As you know, the British are supporting our position but show great anxiety that an agreement be concluded. Sir Michael Wright stated to me and the other members of our visiting group that the concluding of an agreement was of paramount importance and that, if one is not made now, there will never be another chance. This desire naturally leads to optimistic statements made by the Prime Minister before the British Parliament as to the likelihood of successfully concluding an agreement. As a related matter, Tsarapkin gave us the distinct impression that Mr. Macmillan’s discussions with Khrushchev on the quota plan were more than casual.
The Soviets are, of course, insisting that agreement be reached on the principle of a quota approach before discussing numbers, and that the quota need not be related to the technical capability of the system. Though queried by our group they gave little or no indication of the numbers of inspections they were considering, although in one answer Tsarapkin implied their “few” was less than 15. They continue to refuse discussion of the Hardtack II and Berkner Panel data, referring back to the Geneva Conference of Experts’ Report as final, developed by eight nations, and approved by the US, UK and USSR. In a private conversation with me, Tsarapkin ridiculed the unmanned seismic instruments as absolutely impractical, extremely costly, and impossible to maintain. He [Page 756] simultaneously ridiculed the removing of the veto control on budgets. I believe it obvious that the Soviet strategy is to force our agreement in principle to a “quota plan” and then to attempt agreement on a very low number using all possible propaganda for the purpose (together with such assistance from the UK as they can secure). It is obvious, too, that they will continue to press for complete suspension under a system which has severe limitations on control of underground firings. The UK, too, appears to consider that we are talking only about complete suspension with no regard to a threshhold.
In private talks again, Tsarapkin gave me the impression that his objective is to reach an agreement on testing and then to expand the agreement to a ban on nuclear weapons. This matter disturbed me and the other visitors greatly. It appears we must decide now what the US wants as the next step in disarmament negotiations and to lay the groundwork for that step.
While in Geneva I suggested to both the UK and US delegates that they use the statement from the Khrushchev letters to the effect that the control system should “establish such controls as would guarantee strict observance of the treaty.” I do feel, however, that the protracted negotiations have given, and will continue to augment, the impression that we are close to agreement while in truth we have not met the major issues. I suggested to you, therefore, that:
- a.
- The conference should be recessed, if possible, and at an early date.
- b.
- The US situations immediately should be carefully reappraised by the senior people in our government to establish our objective (and the limits to which we can go) on each of the important issues unresolved—number of inspections, the underground problem, staffing, freedom of access and veto.
- c.
- On reconvening, the negotiations should be centered on the more major issues and these should be dealt with completely before going further with the fringe matters.
- d.
- To place the status of the negotiations and agreement in proper perspective before the world, we should develop and issue as rapidly as possible a “white paper” which describes the major issues, points out those still unresolved, and (while explaining also the matters upon which agreement has been reached) emphasizes how large have been our concessions as contrasted with those of the Soviets.
- e.
- Decision should be reached as soon as possible as to what the US believes should be the next step to be taken in disarmament negotiations, and that public preparations therefor be initiated.
I feel that our visit to Geneva was most beneficial to us. I hope that these thoughts may be helpful to you. Should there be any way I can be of assistance, please call on me.
Sincerely,