Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

203. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, February 25, 1959, 3:25 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Dr. Killian
• General Goodpaster

The President said he had asked Dr. Killian to stop in so that he might discuss one or two matters relating to the progress of the negotiations at Geneva for the suspension of atomic testing. He recalled that we have separated our proposals on suspension of testing from efforts in the direction of general disarmament in order to improve the possibilities of obtaining an agreement. By eliminating any extraneous features we have centered the negotiation on the crucial point—the right to carry out inspection untrammeled. The President thought that if we have stations such that we can detect if the Russians test a weapon in the air, and can be sure they are not setting off large weapons underground, then the idea of teams to be sent out from place to place seems rather secondary in importance.

Practically, the President said he doubted whether such teams could find the sites of underground explosions of a size say of 20 kilotons. He also commented that he and the Secretary of State were in agreement that the provision of teams is not a feature of too great importance in this scheme.¹ Accordingly, he is wondering whether we could not agree that the system will not apply to tests below say 10 kilotons—what would be prohibited would be tests in the atmosphere and tests underground above a certain size. He thought that if we bar some underground tests, but then cannot be sure they are not occurring, the tendency for suspicions to arise will be very great, and our whole nation will become more and more jittery.

The President said what we are concerned about is that we do not want to be vetoed as regards the reading of instruments in the fixed stations and making the decision to conduct an inspection. Dr. Killian agreed that this is vital. The President said that what is essential is the right to inspect.

Dr. Killian then said that a great deal depends on the size of explosion which is set as the “threshold.” There exists a problem of possible concealment of underground tests, the difficulty of which is not yet understood, although we expect to have data and findings in about ten days. There is, at least theoretically, and perhaps practically, the possibility of accomplishing “decoupling” of an explosion from its surrounding environment, and if this can be done the result would be to blur and fuzz the seismographic data, and hence invalidate the threshold concept.

With regard to Mr. Macmillan’s idea of setting an allowable number of test inspections each year, the basic problem is of course the one of discriminating between underground explosions and earthquake shocks. Unless there were authority to visit the site of shocks, there could be no confidence that they were not underground tests. Dr. Killian said that there is good indication that the capability of the Geneva system can be restored by the addition of new methods; although determination is not final, this might include the necessity to add to the number of observing stations.

I suggested that if the problem is in fact as the Russians are indicating a deep concern over the misuse of this system to make it serve simply as an intelligence device, it might be possible to meet this concern through assurances and safeguards against the misuse or promiscuous use of the inspection system. The type of misuse about which they are concerned would be of the form of frequent inspection trips not based upon seismographic events which in fact require investigation. Without obstructing the right to conduct such inspections, means might be found to audit them after they are made to assure that they were not carried out without valid basis. The President thought there might be some merit in such an effort.

G
Brigadier General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on February 28.

1. Earlier on February 25, at 9:25 a.m, Eisenhower and Killian briefly discussed the negotiations at Geneva. The memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster reads as follows:

   “The President asked Dr. Killian to talk to Mr. Herter concerning our minimum position on inspection in connection with the negotiations on suspension of atomic testing now under way in Geneva. Specifically, he is to examine the limits of the position which might be acceptable to us.

   “For example, they should consider the acceptability of a system adequate to give assurance against atmospheric shots and underground shots above a certain size. Under this concept, the suspension of tests would be limited to these particular modes.

   “Dr. Killian said he would go into the matter with Mr. Herter.” (ibid.)