Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

199. Memorandum of Meeting⁰

Washington, February 12, 1959.

MEETING ON NUCLEAR TESTING

PARTICIPANTS

• Gordon Gray
• Dillon—G. Smith—P. Farley
• McCone—Starbird
• Allen Dulles
• G. Allen
• Beckler—Keeny

(No Defense representation because Mr. Quarles was called to the President’s office)

1. Mr. Gray explained that he had called the meeting of the group, the first in two and one-half weeks, because of the view held by Mr. McCone and Mr. Quarles that the U.S. position on nuclear testing, as well as our present public posture in the Geneva negotiations, needed to be discussed. Mr. Gray made clear that he did not expect any decisions to be made by Mr. Dillon in the absence of Mr. Herter who had been handling the test policy.

2. Mr. Farley, at Mr. Dillon’s request, gave a report on the progress of the Geneva negotiations:

a. Soviet insistence on the veto and discussion of the Soviet position on controls have been kept as the major issues.

b. The Soviet position on controls has shifted from a very hard one to a more reasonable one, including Soviet requests for Western counter-proposals to their stated views on controls. There is no evidence that the Russians would accept controls satisfactory to us but the negotiations should be continued until Soviet unreasonableness is made more clear publicly and their present posture of appearing willing to negotiate on controls is revealed as being insincere.

c. The Soviet public position on issues other than controls is better than it should be. Therefore, Western efforts must be continued to make clear publicly the unsatisfactory nature of the Soviet final position.

d. The USSR does not now appear on the verge of breaking off the negotiations. Three weeks ago they appeared to be leading up to a break. Now Soviet delegates in Geneva have told U.S. officials there that the Russians are prepared to stay indefinitely and, if there is to be a break, force the U.S. and the UK to make it.

3. In response to a question by Mr. Allen as to whether our aim in Geneva is a propaganda victory or the achievement of a test suspension agreement, Mr. Dillon replied:

a. At the outset, we wanted an agreement if the Russians would meet us on controls and inspection. We have now come to feel that the Russians will not sign an agreement acceptable to us.

b. Data which we have learned since the Geneva technical negotiations last summer, if known then, might have led us to avoid undertaking the negotiation of a treaty. In addition, the new data has led us to believe that an agreement such as that visualized by the technicians last summer is less desirable now than we thought then.

c. Therefore, propaganda has now moved into the ascendency and our future tactics will seek to prevent the Russians from putting on us the onus for failure of the treaty negotiations.

d. The tactical problem consists of concentrating the discussions on controls and disengaging at the best possible time. To do so, we will:

(1) Introduce boiler-plate articles to keep the discussions going and to avoid future Soviet accusations that we did not even try to discuss all aspects of the treaty.

(2) Keep the talks on dead center until Prime Minister Macmillan returns from his visit to Moscow. Secretary Dulles discovered that Mr. Macmillan’s views on nuclear testing treaty were unsatisfactory when he discussed the issue with him recently in London. The Prime Minister was “soft” on the question of controls and appeared willing to take a test cessation agreement at almost any price. Mr. Dillon said Secretary Dulles had persuaded him differently and helped to bring him back to a stronger position, but that nothing should be done in Geneva or with the British which would prompt the Prime Minister to go back to his earlier position while discussing the issue with the Russians in Moscow.

4. Mr. McCone said he unfortunately had to leave the meeting but urged that another meeting of the group be held promptly to discuss the substantive issues of the U.S. position. He pointed out:

a. If we continue to negotiate with the Russians indefinitely in Geneva, in effect we have accepted a test suspension without an agreement.

b. The second Berkner report may turn out to be more pessimistic about improving the capabilities of an underground test monitoring system than the first. The Berkner reports are based on tests in a single geographic area and in a single geological formation. Further underground tests will be required to obtain authoritative data applicable to underground tests in differing areas and formations. The technology of a deep underground monitoring system requires further development.

c. Increasing concern has been expressed to him by several Congressmen who feel that the U.S. may be led into an area where we almost had to accept an unsatisfactory test suspension agreement.

5. Mr. Dillon said the State Department had no intention of continuing negotiations in Geneva indefinitely, nor did it intend to abandon the present firm position on the detection and control system. He said that the talks would be broken off when it was possible to do so advantageously. In the meantime, in order to keep the discussions going, the U.S. Delegation would introduce only minor matters (details of control, staffing, finance, etc.). In response to a question by Allen Dulles, Mr. Farley said there were plenty of minor matters to discuss for a considerable period of time without tabling additional important substantive articles.

6. Mr. Allen stated his belief that the U.S. should now move to a position of seeking the cessation of atmospheric tests only. He expressed a fear that if eventually we planned to seek an atmospheric only test ban, it would be a mistake to try to put the Russians in a difficult propaganda position now because, if we succeeded, the Russians would be hostile toward an atmospheric test ban.

7. Mr. Beckler, representing Dr. Killian’s office, asked whether the State Department’s doubts regarding the possibility of negotiating a satisfactory nuclear suspension treaty were based primarily on technical considerations. He pointed out that many technical facts had not yet been determined. Further study by the scientists would be required before they were willing to come to firm conclusions regarding the capabilities of underground test detection. He said that the technical situation was not as bad as Mr. Dillon had made it out to be. He said there was no reason to be pessimistic, and therefore no decision to abandon efforts to obtain a treaty could be based on a statement that technically a satisfactory treaty was impossible. In reply, Mr. Dillon repeated State’s belief that the primary reason why the Department doubts that a treaty will result from the Geneva negotiations is Soviet insistence on the veto, and only secondarily on the technical difficulties of monitoring tests.

8. Mr. Gray stated that it appeared that Defense, AEC and Mr. Allen favored giving up the present U.S. position and proceeding to try for an agreement prohibiting only atmospheric tests. He indicated his belief that if the President were asked to decide whether to continue negotiations as we are now doing or to change the U.S. policy as suggested above, he would favor the former position.

Mr. Gray expressed his concern that possible policy differences were being aired in the press, that a Congressional hearing might lead to full public airing of any differences, and that a charge might be made that although there are differing views among Cabinet members, there had been no real opportunity for the proponents of these views to be heard.

Mr. Gray indicated that the group should meet again in the near future for a discussion of the substantive issues, possibly before the completion of the second Berkner report, which will not be ready before March 6.

(Mr. Keeny, who met with the Berkner panel last week, indicated his belief that the second Berkner report would not materially change the conclusions reached in the first report. He said that he felt that the scientists would not be willing to make firmer judgments as to the effectiveness of additional seismic techniques but would recommend further underground tests not limited to one geographic or geological area. He added that the scientists at their next meeting on March 5 would be prepared to add their views on the question of concealing or covering underground tests.)

Bromley Smith¹

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Confidential. Drafted by Smith on February 13. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. A handwritten note on the memorandum by Gordon Gray reads: “This is in accord with my recollections. GG. 17 Feb. 59.”
1. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.