Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

194. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, January 26, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests—Report of Panel on Seismic Improvement

PARTICIPANTS

• State
  • The Under Secretary
  • Mr. Philip Farley—S/AE
  • Mr. Charles Sullivan—S/AE
  • Mr. Ronald Spiers—S/AE
  • Mr. Donald Morris—S/AE
  • Mr. Robert Rich—S/S
• White House
  • Dr. James Killian
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Mr. Bromley Smith
  • Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
• AEC
  • Chairman McCone
  • Admiral Paul Foster
• CIA
  • Mr. Allen Dulles
  • Dr. Herbert Scoville
• DOD
  • Col. Fred Rhea

At Mr. Herter’s request, Dr. Killian explained that the four promising approaches outlined in the first report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement¹ were, of course, based on preliminary considerations and that the members of the Panel were presently formulating recommendations for further studies. In particular, Dr. Street of Livermore Laboratory is preparing an estimate of what further underground nuclear explosions would be needed to provide more data. These recommendations will be reported at the second meeting of the Panel on February 9. He noted that the report was in general optimistic and said he felt it was conceivable that within the recommendations set out in the report, significant improvement of the capability of the Geneva System for dealing with the underground problem could be expected. Nonetheless, he felt we should have more data on this question if possible.

Dr. Killian said he felt it important that the U.S. Delegation be informed of the work of the Panel. However, he did not believe the Delegation should be authorized to provide the Soviet Delegation with more than the broad conclusions reached by the Panel and that details of the Panel’s recommendations should be withheld until after the February 9th meeting and the techniques have been further evaluated. In this connection he thought it would be useful to have as soon as possible the quantitative analysis by AFOAT–1 of the effects on the capabilities of the Geneva System of the four approaches recommended by the Panel. Colonel Rhea noted that this analysis should be available by January 29.

Mr. Farley recalled that when we tabled the Hardtack II data on January 5, we informed the Soviet Delegation that our scientists were studying the implications of this new data and asked that their scientists join ours in Geneva to consider what the data would mean to the Geneva System. Thus, he felt we should give them as much of the Panel findings as possible, in order to show that we were trying to find solutions. He noted that our public position with regard to this problem will depend largely on what people think were our motives in making this data available to the Russians. He also drew attention to the fact that Senator Humphrey had described the Panel’s conclusions in some detail on the Senate floor on January 20 so that the Panel’s findings were coming into the public domain.

Mr. McCone said he felt that the longer we pursue our present position in the negotiations, the more difficulties we will encounter. He did not believe that our present position on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests will be accepted in the U.S. and noted that there is a wide school of thought which believes that the inadequacy of the data on seismic detection necessitates more tests to improve our knowledge in this field. He said that the AEC feels two or three years of experimentation will be required to obtain sufficient data to enable us to design a good system for monitoring underground tests.

For this reason the AEC wished to reaffirm its proposal that our position in the negotiations be changed to provide only for a discontinuance of atmospheric testing, with provision for a carefully developed plan of experimentation for the development of a system for monitoring underground tests. Otherwise, he believed that the U.S. would be pursuing a reckless course by relying on techniques which are based on inadequate appraisal and are too new to be fully understood. We would be running a great risk of finding ourselves committed to an area of agreement which we would ultimately not be able to accept.

Mr. Herter reminded the group that we had proposed the present negotiations on the basis of the conclusions reached last summer by the Conference of Experts who had generally agreed that all nuclear explosions down to 5 kiloton yield could be monitored with 90% reliability. Now, of course, we are faced with the lessened capability of the Geneva System as a result of the new data. However important the resolution of this difficulty may be, he wished to note that Secretary Dulles feels that our tactics in the negotiations should be such that if the Conference fails for any reason, the break should be based on an issue such as control, which would be attributable to the Soviet position, and not on one on which we would bear the blame. Mr. Herter noted that, therefore, we are trying to focus discussion in the negotiations on the most critical matter—the question of adequate organizational arrangements for control. Until we are satisfied with the Soviet position on this matter, we believe it unwise to expose ourselves to the possibility of a break because of disagreement on the new data.

Colonel Rhea said he believed the Department of Defense would support Mr. McCone’s position and that they would not support an agreement which would outlaw tests beyond the reach of detection.

Mr. Farley recalled that the Conference has not yet reached the point where the Soviets are faced with agreeing that every unidentified event can be inspected.

Mr. Gray asked Mr. McCone why the Commission thought a proposal seeking agreement on banning atmospheric tests alone would have appeal to the Russians. Mr. McCone replied that the AEC feels it would meet world public opinion because it would eliminate the problem of nuclear fall-out which seemed to be the primary concern. He wished to recommend this position not as a fall-back position, but as one on which we would take the initiative now in the negotiations.

Dr. Killian pointed out that it would be dangerous to propose an agreement to ban atmospheric tests, since that would imply that the fallout hazard was real. If the Soviets refuse, our only fall-back from the new position suggested by Mr. McCone would be a unilateral cessation of nuclear tests. He felt that such a unilateral deprivation which left the Soviets free to test as they wished while we could test only in outer space and underground would be very dangerous for the U.S. He noted that there was substantial disagreement among scientists as to the value of underground testing.

Mr. McCone agreed that whereas we could expect to make some progress by testing underground, it would be far less than that by testing in the atmosphere. He personally did not feel that outer space testing was feasible in the near future.

Dr. Killian said he wished to make clear that an absolute and perfect control system could never be designed. The important considerations in control were the percentage capability and the deterrent aspects which a system would have. It is very likely, he felt, that the Geneva System as it stood prior to the Hardtack data would have been sufficient as a deterrent to any future testing. He believed that the scientists who are now considering the implications of the Hardtack II data will conclude that the Geneva System can be restored to its former capability. He stressed that the Geneva Experts’ report was not “mistaken”, but had been overtaken in some respects by new data. It is important to remember that science must always adjust to new data and that we must look to the probabilities and possibilities of improvement. It is, therefore, highly desirable that we pursue agreement on a system in the current negotiations that recognizes these possibilities and that will allow us to conduct such experimentation as may be needed to provide more data.

Mr. Farley said he believed we should make the Panel Report available to our Delegation with full contingent instructions as to what they may transmit to the Soviet Delegation. These instructions should enable them without delay to transmit a version of the Panel Report to the Soviet Delegation in the event of a press leak. He noted that we should also decide whether the information should be transmitted to the United Kingdom and to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee. Moreover, in view of the Humphrey statement on the Senate floor, the public should at least be informed of the existence of the Panel.

It was agreed: (1) that the Delegation be provided with a copy of the first report of the Panel and that the State Department prepare instructions to the Delegation with regard to transmitting the general findings of the Panel to the Soviet Delegation; (2) that the Panel Report be transmitted to the United Kingdom; (3) that the Congressional Committees be informed of the existence and the work of the Panel in non-specific terms, with an explanation that the Panel has not yet finished its work; (4) that the line in any public discussion be similar to that in (3).

Mr. Herter noted that Mr. McCone had recommended an immediate change in our position at the negotiations which would provide for an agreement dealing only with atmospheric tests. He explained that the State Department considers this proposal as a fall-back position and that Secretary Dulles would be very much opposed to any immediate alteration in our present policy. He said he felt we should be sure that those who advocate such a policy change do so from the point of view of our national military security. He asked Mr. McCone if he wished to press for an immediate decision on this matter.

Mr. McCone replied that he had a deep conviction that the United States would be in serious trouble if the Soviets accepted our present position in the negotiations and that the situation will become increasingly bad unless we revise our approach. He would like, however, to discuss more fully with the full Commission the question of seeking a meeting with the President on the AEC recommendation.

Mr. Gray said he felt that if the AEC and the Defense Department conclude that a change in policy should be undertaken, their recommendation should be taken to the President for discussion.

In response to a suggestion by Dr. Killian that we move ahead to plan for a program of underground tests to gain more data on the question of seismic detection and identification, Mr. Farley suggested that we would want to design a program which would provide an evaluation of any positive approaches such as the four suggested by the Panel. We would be in a far better position in making such a proposal if it could be shown that its purpose was not simply to prove difficulties but to test ways to overcome these difficulties.

Dr. Killian noted that Mr. Herter had asked him to convene a Panel of Experts to review the question of outer space detection and proposed a Panel under the Chairmanship of Dr. Panofsky of Stanford University. The other members of the Panel would be: Dr. Hans Bethe of Cornell University, Dr. Morris Bradbury of Los Alamos Laboratory, Dr. Arthur Donovan of the Space Technology Laboratory, Dr. Richard Latter of Rand Corporation, Dr. Pickering of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Dr. Abe Silverstein of NASA, Dr. Edward Teller of Livermore Laboratory and Dr. Whitson of ARPA. It was agreed that Dr. Killian should convene such a Panel as early as possible.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1–2659. Secret. Drafted by Morris and approved by Spiers and Farley. Herter approved the memorandum on January 27.
1. The Report of the Panel on Seismic Improvement, January 7, concluded that “four promising approaches are within the present limits of technology and should be considered.” The four approaches were: 1) analysis of long-period surface waves, 2) a network of unmanned auxiliary seismic stations, 3) larger arrays of seismometers at manned control posts, and 4) detectors in deep holes. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament) The report and appendix are in the Supplement.