192. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0
OTHERS PRESENT
- Dr. Killian
- Dr. Kistiakowsky
- General Goodpaster
Dr. Kistiakowsky said that, as the Geneva meetings on Surprise Attack went along, he became more and more impressed with the hazards [Page 688] to the United States of a system of inspection against surprise attack. While we tabled papers asserting the value of such a system,1 privately he had growing concern about it. Such a system would reveal detailed information on our deployments, our readiness, and the protective strengths and arrangements for our striking forces. If the system failed to give us warning, it would have given great net advantage to the Soviets. This advantage becomes especially great with ballistic missiles and supersonic aircraft.
The President recalled that he took initiative in 1955 (at Geneva) in proposing aerial inspection against the “means of delivery” of highly destructive weapons; at that time such means of delivery were aircraft. Except for that proposal, he said he had never been wedded to the concept of inspection against surprise attack. In particular, he questioned the significance of the far north, which to him is simply an area of passage.
Dr. Kistiakowsky added that, as against missile launching submarines, no way to monitor was seen. He added that both the scientists and the military men of the group came to feel that the only fruitful approach to this is to couple inspection with arms limitation. Through such a means, a reduction in the threat would be accomplished, without it being dependent for us upon obtaining split-second warning. There would be ample time to observe whether forces had in fact been reduced to and held at agreed levels. Such a limitation, in the case of aircraft, might provide that only so many could be in the air at once. Total numbers of missiles might be limited. As to submarines, not more than a certain number might be allowed to be on station.
The President recognized the difficulties but pointed out that, if we do not follow this line, we must face the question what line do we follow. He did not see much hope for a world engaged in all-out effort on military build-up, military technology, and tremendous attempts at secrecy. One reason for seeking an inspection system in connection with the atomic testing is that if we get one such system we may then be able to go on to another. He recognized that this matter is very difficult, but added that, with aerial inspection, we can find out where great military concentrations are located, and what is their state of readiness. Even if the Soviets should be contemplating a massive surprise attack, if they wish to secure the results of such an attack they must prepare forces to move into the devastated areas, and these we could see. He concluded by saying that, in the long run, no country can advance intellectually and in terms of its culture and well-being if it has to devote everything to military build-up.
[Page 689]Dr. Killian said that in view of the gravity of this matter there is a need to have a more sustained study under way. He suggested setting up study groups, and a standing group of top governmental officials concerned who would follow the matter. They would go deeply into the problems involved in monitoring surprise attack. Dr. Kistiakowsky commented at this point that the Soviets have had a high-powered group at work since the end of World War II on disarmament. They were very well up on this subject, as evidenced by the fact that when our delegation made proposals at Geneva, the Soviets instantly showed knowledge of the weak points and the implications of such proposals. The President agreed with the suggestion. He thought that someone should draw up a charter for the effort, showing just who would participate—i.e., from what agency, having what qualifications—whose time would be devoted to the effort, and who would comprise the top-standing body.
To indicate the need for a competent body in this area the President cited the importance of a periodic inspection of the inspection system and operations incident to supervision of suspension of atomic weapons tests.
Dr. Kistiakowsky added the point that everything to this point has been done on paper. He thought there was need for a high-level command (actually a task force) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose job would be to conduct monitoring and inspection, carry out maneuvers and tests against various combinations of forces and develop the necessary doctrine. The President thoroughly agreed. Dr. Killian recalled that our group at Geneva had proposed that we set up in the United States a small pilot system to see just how the proposals would work.
Dr. Killian next said that there is a group studying ways of improving the inspection system for the supervision of test suspension, thus offsetting the effects of the findings of the Hardtack II series of tests (which indicated that the test system devised last summer at Geneva is less effective than was then thought). The President said he saw possible merit in a scheme which allowed underground tests up to perhaps 10 KT. A corollary would be, however, that we would have to tell if test shots greater than this size were fired.
Dr. Killian next referred to some of Dr. Kistiakowsky’s impressions and observations about the Soviet missile capability, since these impressions ran counter to our best intelligence estimates. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he was very much impressed with the importance that the Soviets attach to long-range ballistic missiles. These are in fact a focal point in their whole defense concept. They referred to it as a special area not subject to discussion at the Geneva meeting. He said it is his opinion that they now have an operational long-range missile force. The President said he could accept this possibility, but still holds a question as to the numbers and accuracy of such weapons. He then asked the question, if [Page 690] the Soviets should fire these weapons at us, where this action would leave them. They would still be exposed to destruction. In his mind there is the question whether this is a feasible means of making war; he granted that it is a feasible way of destroying much of the nation’s strength, but the resulting retaliation would be such that it does not make sense for war. He said he thought it would be at least a few years before the Soviets could conceivably have enough missiles so as not to have grounds to fear retaliation.
Brigadier General, General, USA
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. According to Eisenhower’s Appointment Book, this meeting lasted from 10:35 to 11:15 a.m. (ibid.)↩
- For texts of the major papers submitted by the Western Experts at the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 1223, 1230–1264, 1275–1297, and 1306–1316.↩