Attachment 2
5
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
* All-out war is obsolete as an instrument for the attainment of national
objectives. The purpose of a capability for all-out war is to deter its
use by an enemy, but once a stalemate of such capabilities has been
achieved, to perpetuate it at minimum loss of other capabilities.
*Strategic strength is not usable strength for stable deterrence of, or
reply to, minor aggression.
*The U.S. should determine, establish, and maintain the minimum invulnerable strategic forces adequate to deter
initiation of all-out war by a rational
opponent.
*The force determination just mentioned should be on the basis of the
softest target system that will do the job of deterrence, viz., at
present, population.
*With savings realized from the resulting moderation of U.S. strategic
striking objectives (elimination of the “blunting” mission), our
“graduated deterrence” capability to cope with limited aggression can
and should be improved.
*A graduated deterrence capability, based on possession of a spectrum of
nuclear weapons down to the lowest yields, and/or improved conventional
weapons, will become increasingly essential for dealing with limited
aggression in the ICBM/FBM era.
*The phasing-out of vulnerable in favor of invulnerable retaliatory
systems will contribute significantly to the flexibility of our
strategic position.
Supplementary conclusions are the
following:
*The response to limited aggression must be limited as to objectives, and
generally as to means. Action policy at both diplomatic and military
levels must be restrained by the principle of not trying to “win too
much.” The goal of winning should be replaced by the goal of stabilizing the situation, with minor advantage
to be expected in perhaps not more than 50 percent of cases.
*It is essential to keep our opponent rational by avoiding a superfluity
of strategic “deterrence”. Too much, like too little, constitutes
provocation. The maintenance of excessive strategic deterrence power
- (a)
- exacts a price in over-all readiness (in that expenditures for
all-out preventive or “blunting” war readiness are subtracted
from those that support limited-war readiness);
- (b)
- stimulates any paranoid tendencies of the enemy
leadership;
- (c)
- gives any such tendencies the basis of popular support they
need by inflaming otherwise groundless fears of preventive-war
action on our part;
- (d)
- affects our position adversely in the eyes of neutrals.
*Our declaratory policy (interpreted as what we tell the enemy leadership
in general through non-public channels) should adhere closely to action
policy. Our public information policy should promote the relaxing of
tensions by emphasizing the fact that we have nothing to gain from
aggression.
*Restricted communications, as imposed by the Iron Curtain, provide a
refuge for paranoia that can threaten the long-term stability of
deterrence. Therefore penetration or elimination of the Iron Curtain is
a major national policy objective.
*The initiation of a large-scale “crash” defensive program by either side
can appear to be a warlike act, detrimental to the stability of
deterrence. The institution of a gradual, inexpensive minimal-shelter
program, slanted toward new construction, appears to be a preferable
approach to defense.
*In our research and development program, increased emphasis on long-term
projects and basic research appears desirable. Shorter-term military
development should be oriented toward improving the invulnerability and
diversification of strategic forces, and toward urgent build-up of the
graduated-deterrence capability.
*Profitable areas of agreement with the Russians do not appear to include
disarmament, as long as mutual good faith cannot be assumed. Several
other areas in which agreements might be reached (particularly where
inspection is not required) should be explored. Limitation of high-yield
weapon tests may be one of these.
*There appears to be no peaceable means by which the major powers
currently possessing H-bombs can indefinitely prevent other nations from
becoming possessors, as long as the major powers refuse to compromise
any of their own sovereignty. All members of the “suicide club” acquire
shorter life expectancies as the membership increases.
*When advanced retaliatory systems are introduced, characterized by
effective invulnerability, the strategy of automatic massive retaliation
in response to all-out attack can profitably be replaced by a
cat-and-mouse strategy of graduated retaliation-coercion.