Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

189. Memorandum of Discussion at the 392d Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, December 23, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting, Agenda Items 1 and 2 concerning Canada, and Agenda Item 3. “A National Petroleum Program.”]

4. The Geneva Conferences on Nuclear Weapon Tests and on Surprise Attack

Mr. William C. Foster, U.S. Representative at the Geneva Conference of Experts on Surprise Attack, reported that this Conference accomplished a great deal, despite newspaper stories to the contrary. The Conference, a long step forward, had been useful in three ways: (1) The U.S. and its allies had presented a united front against the Soviets; (2) The U.S. had, as a result of probing at the Conference, learned a great deal about the sensitivities of the Soviet Bloc. For example, it was clear that the Soviets would not permit inspection of missile-firing sites without receiving a great quid pro quo; (3) The complexity of the problem was now clearly apparent; but the resources of skill developed during the meetings will be available for future use in the national interest.

Continuing, Mr. Foster said it was clear the Soviets would permit inspection on their territory only if inspection was associated with some form of armament limitation. A purely technical form of military inspection to insure against surprise attack, therefore, appeared to be ruled out. The Soviets had indicated that their acceptance of inspection would depend on a one-third reduction of armed forces in Europe and the “denuclearization” of Germany. Mr. Foster hoped that the U.S. would seek to find a way of meeting this Soviet position. He would recommend that a high-level U.S. group study the problem and that a task force consult with the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow before another conference was held.

Mr. Quarles said he talked with Mr. Foster yesterday and was in agreement with him. Mr. Quarles believed the Surprise Attack Conference had enabled us to learn a great deal about Soviet attitudes. Mr. Foster said the Conference had unfortunately ended on an intemperate note because the Soviet delegate had been instructed by his government to reverse himself on the communiqué.¹ As a result, the Soviet delegate had made an intemperate attack on the U.S. at the end of the Conference.²

Secretary Herter wondered whether an early report on our future position in this field was not required. The Soviets would probably make propaganda capital out of any reluctance on our part to reconvene the Conference after January 5. Mr. Foster agreed that the need for action was urgent; he hoped personnel would be assigned to study of the subject on a priority basis. The President asked Secretary Herter to initiate the necessary studies on the subject.

Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, U.S. Representative to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests, reported that the atmosphere of this Conference was different from that of the meeting described by Mr. Foster. A gathering of experts last summer had cleared away much of the underbrush in the nuclear testing field. Accordingly, the Conference began with five weeks of argument over the agenda, after which substantive matters were discussed. The first four articles of a proposed treaty were agreed on. Three of these agreed articles deal with control, to which the Soviets pay much lip service. The Soviet idea of control involves a veto by each nuclear power on the control commission and the staffing of control posts and inspection teams largely by the host country—e.g. in the USSR control would be exercised by 150 Russians plus 1 or 2 Westerners. In the course of the Conference, however, the Soviets had modified their positions considerably. Ambassador Wadsworth felt that the British would concede a great deal if necessary to avoid a breakdown of the negotiations. He believed the Conference had been a success, though a long road lay ahead. He looked forward to resumption of the negotiations in January.

The President thanked Mr. Foster and Ambassador Wadsworth for their interesting reports.

The National Security Council:³

a. Noted and discussed an oral report by Mr. William C. Foster, as U.S. Representative to the Conference of Experts for The Study of Possible Measures Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack And For The Preparation of A Report Thereon to Governments.

b. Noted the President’s directive that the Department of State should continue to take the lead in developing the United States position for further meetings of the Conference referred to in a above.

c. Noted and discussed an oral report by Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, as U.S. Representative to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation of b above.

[Here follow Agenda Items 5. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” 6. “U.S. Policy Toward Iraq,” and 7. “Report by the Director, U.S. Information Agency.”]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs.
1. For the report of the conference as issued, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1405–1406.
2. Apparent reference to the December 18 statement by the Soviet Representative, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 1325–1334.
3. The following paragraphs and Note constitute NSC Action No. 2028, approved by the President on December 30. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)