Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

180. Memorandum From Members of the Inter-Agency Group on Surprise Attack (Kistiakowsky and Minshull) to the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Killian)⁰

Washington, September 30, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Surprise Attack Policy Considerations

In 1955 the President made the Geneva “Open Skies” proposal.¹ At that time aerial inspection coupled with an “exchange of military blueprints” and the most rudimentary form of ground inspection could have provided an effective safeguard against a surprise attack. Furthermore, if such an inspection system had been implemented, it would have tested inspection techniques that, if successful, could have formed the framework for monitoring future phases of disarmament.

In addition, the proposal was attractive to this country for three quite different secondary reasons. First, by making such a proposal this country was in a position to test Soviet intentions in the disarmament field. Secondly, the proposal provided an excellent propaganda move for this country, indicating our good faith and sincere desire for peace. Finally, it was realized that if an inspection system were implemented, it would provide a means for raising the Iron Curtain and increasing the chances for hard intelligence from USSR.

It should be recognized that if the Soviets had accepted the 1955 proposal, it would have been for one or both of the first two reasons. The final three reasons were important to this country but could not have appealed to the Soviet Union.

Advances in weapon technology in the past three years and the advances expected in the next few years will greatly modify the value of an inspection system as a safeguard against surprise attack. The advent of the ICBM and the greatly increased readiness capability of manned bombers makes it necessary to go one step beyond inspection and toward limited disarmament before one can obtain a substantial reduction in the danger of surprise attack or accidental war. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Surprise Attack appointed by Secretary Dulles, Secretary McElroy, and Dr. Killian concluded that to obtain an effective safeguard against surprise attack from modern manned bombers would require an inspection system that monitored and agreed upon limitation of bomber readiness (for example, an agreed upon maximum number of bombers airborne at any given time). In the case of ICBM’s the Working Group felt that an inspection system that monitored and agreed upon maximum force level (i.e., total number of missiles) would be required to afford real protection against surprise missile attack. The Inter-Agency Group concluded that the value of an inspection system without such arms controls is limited to the secondary values that existed in 1955.²

In the test cessation technical discussions, Dr. Fisk had an easily definable technical objective. It was to determine the technical feasibility of designing and operating an inspection system to monitor a test cessation agreement. It was only because of this simple, easily definable technical objective that the talks were successful, and that Dr. Fisk was able to keep the meeting from digressing into political areas. If the forthcoming Geneva talks on surprise attack are to be successful, they too must have an equally simple technical objective.

In 1955 such a technical objective would have been easily defined. It would have been to determine the technical feasibility of designing and operating an inspection system to monitor or “to see that there is no dangerous concentration of military land forces or of air or naval forces.” The advances in weapons technology have made such an objective obsolete. No country needs to mass a “dangerous concentration” of military equipment to launch a surprise attack. Thus, if the forthcoming discussions are to be productive, the technical objective must be modified.

The conclusions of the Inter-Agency Working Group indicate that a reasonable technical objective for the forthcoming meeting would be to determine the technical-military feasibility of designing and operating an inspection system to monitor agreements that would result in reducing the danger of surprise attack. If the Geneva discussions parallel the Inter-Agency Group’s thinking, some of the “agreements that would result in reducing the danger of surprise attack” might involve limitations on bomber readiness, limitations on total numbers of ballistic missiles, and limitations on the deployment of conventional land forces.

If this country were to go to Geneva to discuss only the technical feasibility of an inspection system as a safeguard against surprise attack in an environment of totally unrestricted military forces, the delegation would find itself in a very difficult position. First of all, as the Inter-Agency Working Group has indicated, an inspection system without force limitation is practically useless as a means of safeguarding against surprise attack. The very attractive secondary effects (for this country) of an inspection system, employed within the Soviet Union, are such that they cannot form the basis of technical discussions. Furthermore, the past Soviet discussions on the matter of inspection and disarmament indicate that Soviets feel that an inspection system by itself provides little protection against surprise attack. Thus, if during the course of the meeting, the Soviets pursue the effect of limited arms control or partial disarmament and we refuse, we would provide the Soviets with an important propaganda wedge.

The actual agreements on limitations of forces are political in nature and therefore no discussions of them will be accepted in the forthcoming meeting. By this are meant discussions of force levels of both sides, location or types of air bases or missile sites, etc.

Since, however, it is clear that surveillance of unrestricted forces provides but a small measure of relief from the threat of massive surprise attack, the meetings may, upon a successful completion of discussions of surveillance without limitations, turn to the discussion of techniques of monitoring of hypothetical situations in which limitations on forces are imposed. No discussion of specific limitations, e.g., number of missile sites on both sides will be allowed, but the problem of monitoring an undefined restriction on the number of operational missiles may be proper under conditions defined above.

Unless the delegation has the freedom to actually explore the technical feasibility of such safeguards against surprise attack, they will be [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

• G.B. Kistiakowsky
• W.H. Minshull, Jr.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Surprise Attack Policy. Secret. The interagency group was formed pursuant to Eisenhower’s July 14 request. (Letter from Kistiakowsky to Dulles, August 15; ibid., Surprise Attack Panel)

   In an April 28 letter to Khrushchev, President Eisenhower suggested that as a means of moving toward disarmament, the United States and the Soviet Union should instruct their technical experts to study among other things the practical problems and feasibility of inspecting against surprise attack. (Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 1006–1007) After a lengthy exchange of correspondence on the subject (letters from Khrushchev to Eisenhower, May 9 and July 2; notes from the U.S. Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, July 31 and September 8; and a note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the U.S. Embassy, September 15; all ibid., pp. 1036–1041, 1084–1090, 1126, and 1129–1131), the two sides were close to an agreement on a technical conference that would include experts from countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union. On October 10, the United States agreed to a meeting of experts at Geneva, beginning on November 1, 1958. (Note from the U.S. Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, October 10; ibid., pp. 1145–1146)

1. The text of the proposal, which Eisenhower made at Geneva on July 21, 1955, is ibid., pp. 486–488.

2. On September 30, at 9:30 a.m., Killian and Eisenhower discussed the work of the Inter-Agency Group as follows:

   “Dr. Killian said that the study group is having a very hard time on the Surprise Attack project. It is very difficult to get prepared for the discussions. One key question is as to the scope of the project, i.e., as to what should be monitored, and specifically as to whether limitation of arms and control of size of forces should be among the things being monitored. The President thought the first step is to determine what are the fields or areas wherein by certain actions we could limit or eliminate the danger of surprise attack. Then, what are the means of doing this, i.e., through observation or inspection; then what programs should be carried out to establish these means; then finally in what areas or in what respects could these measures be expected to be effective. Dr. Killian concluded by saying that the President may have to decide, before the matter is resolved, as to whether to include limitation of arms and inspection of such limitation in the Surprise Attack proposal” (Memorandum of conference with the President by Goodpaster, October 2; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) See the Supplement.