Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

178. Record of Meeting⁰

Washington, September 23, 1958.

PREPARATIONS FOR NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador Wadsworth chaired a meeting in the State Department this morning attended by General Byers for Defense, Mr. Robert Amory for CIA, Mr. Spurgeon Keeny for Dr. Killian’s office, Ronald Spiers, the State Department officer in charge of the test suspension negotiations, and representatives from AEC.

Ambassador Wadsworth circulated a State Department draft of a treaty on suspension of nuclear test explosions,¹ and requested that Department comments be available in time for a meeting on September 29.²

Ambassador Wadsworth stated that issues on which the working group could not agree would be referred to the Cabinet-level committee created by the President to prepare for a possible Summit meeting. He assumed that the final position to be taken by the U.S. Delegation would be discussed and approved by the National Security Council. He questioned Mr. Spiers as to whether he agreed. Mr. Spiers said he doubted that the final position would be discussed by the NSC.

Mr. Keeny summarized a paper listing 10 problems which need to be studied prior to the departure of the Delegation for Geneva. They are:

1. Cost Estimates—An order of magnitude estimate as to the cost of the entire monitoring system should be made. Funding the U.S. share of the cost is a problem which needs consideration.

2. Site Selection—Before the Delegation leaves, the U.S. should know exactly where it wishes to have monitoring stations located in the United States, in the UK and elsewhere abroad. Such a list would be shown to the Soviet Union early in the negotiations in an effort to avoid needless argument on the basis of generalized statements as to the location of monitoring stations.

3. High Altitude Detection—The Geneva experts made no recommendations on how to monitor high altitude tests. The U.S. was reluctant to discuss such tests because of the security implications, including such matters as Argus effects, etc. The Russians were hesitant for fear that high altitude test detection methods would make available to us intelligence other than that applicable to monitoring test suspension. The method for detection of such tests must be in the treaty. The recent U.S. tests in the Pacific provided us with the information necessary to draw up an acceptable monitoring technique. Satellites may be required to monitor high altitude tests. If so, it is conceivable that the first space activity to be undertaken on an international basis would be the launching of satellites and communications with them as part of a test suspension monitoring system.

4. Peaceful Purposes—The treaty must define and seek to limit nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, if the objective of the weapons test suspension is not to be defeated.

5. Communications Systems—Language must be included in the treaty to insure satisfactory communications in order to make the test monitoring successful. Technical information as to the kind of a system required is needed on an urgent basis.

6. Personnel—Decisions must be made promptly as to the staffing of the test monitoring organization, who is to appoint the officers, how many are required and what competence they should have.

7. Automation—The U.S. Air Force operation in data processing should be studied with a view to providing guidance as to what is required for the greatly expanded system requisite to test monitoring.

8. Phasing of Installation—The Geneva technicians did not discuss the major problem of phasing of the installation of the monitoring stations. Since all stations cannot be built at once, a choice will have to be made as to whether priority on construction should be given to stations in one area, or whether the first stations to be constructed should be scattered throughout the world resulting in a loose system but a more widespread one. Involved in this problem is the question of stations in Communist China and the political issues arising out of the necessity of establishing monitoring stations in countries not participating in the test suspension treaty.

9. Organization of the System—-Problems involving the administration of the system should be given urgent study.

10. Definitions—Agreed U.S. definitions of the terms used will be necessary. For example, what is a nuclear explosion. Possibly some definitions will have to be included in the treaty itself.

Ambassador Wadsworth indicated that as soon as the technical delegate to the negotiations was named, the Department would consult with him, and immediately thereafter send letters to the appropriate departments and agencies requesting their assistance in preparing information appropriate to their area of competence.

The AEC indicated that, informally, Mr. Northrop was working on the problem of peaceful uses—Plowshare.

General Byers indicated that General Rodenhauser, Commanding General of AFOAT–1, Assistant for Atomic Energy Matters, had already put his staff to work on problems falling in his area of competence.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Executive Secretary’s Subject Files, Policy Re Use. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
1. Not found.
2. No record of this meeting has been found.