Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

142. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy (Farley) to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

Washington, March 18, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Review of Disarmament Policy

Discussion

1. We have reviewed present U.S. disarmament policy and, in this memorandum, recommend changes in present policy for your consideration.

2. In preparing recommendations, the following major criteria have been applied:

a. The national security interests of the United States.

b. The major points of view and interests of our NATO allies, and particularly the U.K., France, and Germany.

c. To avoid a sharp break with the August 29 proposals, but to find proposals growing out of this document which demonstrate forward movement, respond to valid criticism directed against our proposals by other governments, and give promise of negotiability vis-à-vis the USSR.

d. To accord with the principles approved by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution of November 14, 1957,¹ which was adopted upon our initiative.

e. To set forth a broad and tenable United States position responsive to the “disarmament problem” as it is seen by the majority of governments, and therefore dealing, in some manner, with the following elements:

1. nuclear tests

2. nuclear cut-off

3. surprise attack inspection

4. outer space and missiles controls

5. manpower and conventional arms limitation.

3. The principal elements of the new U.S. disarmament policy which we now propose are the following:

a. Nuclear testing. Nuclear tests would be suspended for a period of three years, beginning January 1, 1959, or as soon thereafter as agreement is reached on the nature and location of control posts to monitor the agreement. Testing would be resumed if agreement on an adequately inspected cut-off of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons had not been reached at the end of three years. The U.S. would announce that, if it thus became necessary to resume testing, the U.S. would henceforth test only underground.²

b. Cut-off of fissionable materials production. Production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons would be suspended as soon as an effective inspection system was agreed to and in operation. This proposal could be advanced in two alternative forms: (1) fissionable materials plants would continue to operate, subject to international inspection to insure that the material produced was used only for peaceful purposes; or (2) plants now producing fissionable materials would be shut down, thereby drastically simplifying the inspection problem initially. In the latter case peaceful uses requirements would be supplied from existing stocks or by dismantling weapons. Transfers of fissionable materials from previous production to non-weapons purposes would be made in agreed equitable ratios.

c. Surprise attack. The following measures might be undertaken simultaneously or separately:

1. The broad U.S.–Canada–USSR zone set forth in the August 29 proposals would be reaffirmed.

2. A European zone extending from 5°-35° east, with the smaller central European zone proposed by General Norstad (but expressed in terms of geographic coordinates) as a fall-back position, with or without an arctic zone similar to that proposed on August 29.

3. Ground control posts (à la Bulganin) be established on a reciprocal basis at agreed installations (both within the US and USSR and at their foreign bases—e.g., naval and air) with or without the zones described above.

d. Preliminary measures relating to strategic missile controls and outer space. The following measures might be undertaken simultaneously or separately:

1. Immediate initiation of an international working group to plan an inspection system to insure that the sending of objects through outer space is for peaceful purposes only.

2. Joint cooperation in selected outer space projects, such as the development of an outer space platform, and interplanetary rocket and reconnaissance satellites, looking forward to centralization of all outer space activity in an international organization when the program envisioned in (1) goes into effect.

3. Advance notification, and, if possible, inspection of all vehicles, military or otherwise, entering outer space (or, as a fall-back, all objects to be launched into orbit).

e. Manpower and conventional arms. If agreement is reached on any two of the three major surprise attack measures proposed in (c) above, we would be willing to agree to reduction of U.S. and Soviet armed forces to the level of 2.2 million men, and U.K. and French forces to corresponding levels, with placement of designated quantities and types of modern conventional arms capable of serving as nuclear delivery systems (submarine, missiles, aircraft, etc.) in international arms depots. If the cut-off of fissionable materials production with a total U.S.–USSR–Canada–European inspection zone is agreed to, we would be willing further to agree to reduction to 1.8 million men for the U.S. and USSR, and comparable levels for other states (with a listing of the overseas bases which the U.S. would give up as a consequence of such reduction), together with placement of such amounts of important conventional armaments in international arms depots that the armaments retained will have an agreed relationship to the armed forces remaining.

The reasons for these proposals are discussed in Tabs A–E, along with their relationship to present policy and anticipated reactions by our allies.

4. We have not included in 3(d) above any specific measures relating to cessation of testing, production, or deployment of strategic missiles. A position on these matters is an urgent necessity, particularly in view of the Soviet March 15 proposals on outer space. The present study underway under Dr. Killian’s direction is limited to determining the feasibility of controlling an agreement not to test missiles. Before we can spell out the U.S. position on outer space or make specific counterproposals, we should have a broader technical study directed at the following problem:

Is it possible to devise an effective inspection system to police an agreement banning production and/or deployment of strategic missiles, taking into account present and prospective U.S. and USSR progress in developing and testing operational missiles traversing outer space?

Such a broader technical study would provide a basis for reaching conclusions as to the conditions under which agreement to use outer space only for peaceful purposes would be acceptable to the U.S. It may be possible in the first instance to reach conclusions regarding the acceptability of a missiles test ban, in time to include a proposal on this aspect during initial renewal of disarmament discussions with the USSR.

The study of the effect of a missile test ban could, if pressed with vigor, be completed in time to include a proposal on the subject in this package, before the package is discussed with the USSR. If undertaken soon enough, a test ban could prevent the development of an operational ICBM, which would threaten the United States, and of improved solid-fuel IRBM’s, whose instant reaction time could pose a growing risk of accidental war. These advantages might warrant our accepting, if necessary, limitations on the deployment of existing types of IRBM’s in certain areas immediately adjoining the Soviet Bloc in return. This question cannot be decided, however, until a study of the effect of test cessation has been completed.

The study of the inspection requirements for a ban on deployment and/or production will take somewhat longer. It thus seems unlikely that we could include proposals for the total elimination of strategic missiles in this package before it went to the Soviets. If, however, study indicates that elimination is feasible, we should be able to submit proposals soon afterward. Such proposals might combine missile elimination with reduction of conventional forces to 1.8 million men, for much the same reasons that this reduction was proposed under (e) above, in return for a nuclear cut-off. The relation of missile elimination to other elements of disarmament cannot be judged with confidence, however, until the inspection issue has been appraised.

5. Any of the above measures, except as specified in (e), could be accepted independently by the United States. Linkage between some of the above elements may be desirable for negotiation advantage or to meet Soviet Union positions. To take account of these possibilities, as well as to outline other considerations relating to presentation of a modified U.S. position, a separate paper on tactics is being prepared. It is assumed that U.S. policy proposals would be discussed with the UK, France, Canada and the North Atlantic Council before presentation to the Soviet Union through agreed diplomatic channels.

Recommendations

1. That you approve our submitting the disarmament policy proposals in paragraphs 3 above to the panel of disarmament advisers at an early date, to be followed by discussion in the NSC and (in April) with the U.K., France, Canada and the North Atlantic Council.

2. That you ask the NSC to request the Science Advisory Committee, on an urgent basis, to develop answers to the question posed in paragraph 4 above.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3–1858. Secret. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers of Farley’s office and Henry D. Owen of S/P with the concurrences of Elbrick, Gerard Smith, and Walmsley. According to notes on the source text, the memorandum printed here reflects revisions made on March 21. Tabs A–E, entitled “Nuclear Test Suspension,” “Cut-Off of Fissionable Material Production,” “Establishment of Surprise Attack Zones,” “Preliminary Measures Relating to Missile Controls and Outer Space,” and “Reduction of Manpower and Conventional Armaments” are in the Supplement. Tab F (see footnote 2 below) was not attached and has not been found.
1. See footnote 10, Document 136.
2. This is, we believe, a matter of urgency and importance, in view of the telegram from Embassy Moscow reporting that the Soviets may soon announce a unilateral suspension of testing, thus securing a major propaganda victory and depriving us of the principal disarmament benefits (inspection and effect on Nth country programs) which we would expect to result from a ban on tests (Tab F). [Footnote in the source text.]