103. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0
OTHERS PRESENT
- Dr. Kistiakowsky
- Mr. Gordon Gray
- General Goodpaster
Dr. Kistiakowsky said he wanted to talk with the President about intelligence satellites.
[14-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Because the volume of information that would be pouring in from the system is so tremendously great—amounting to a trillion “bits” of information a year—one element in this system is a proposal for an enormous electronic computer to handle and sort out the information mechanically.
The President interrupted to say that he thought Dr. York’s office should challenge the feasibility of such a project. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that Dr. York does not control military requirements for intelligence. The President stated that Mr. Gates certainly has responsibility for such military requirements.
[Page 413]Mr. Gray said that under existing directives each Service Department has authority to set its own intelligence requirements, and that no one is given authority to challenge the requirements as stated by the others. The inevitable result is tremendous log rolling.
The President said that there are certain aspects of this which can be taken up in the NSC: first, what information is really needed in the armed services; and second, what is scientifically feasible. If we were developing a system gradually, to be available in 1970, some of these proposals would make sense, but doing them on such a crash basis does not.
Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested setting up an ad hoc committee to look into this, and mentioned Dr. Killian as the type of individual who might head it up. The discussion brought out that the group, if it is established by the President, should not render a report, but should advise him. There was some discussion as to whether the group should be set up in the Defense Department or directly under the President. The former has the disadvantage of risks of free wheeling.
The President said that his notion of what we need in the intelligence field is fairly limited. We want to know what a possible enemy has in the way of weapons that could be used against us because we know that, should war occur, we would never be able to strike the first blow. The idea of elaborate targeting is rather foolish. We would simply hit his cities. He said he would like to see a committee appointed to go into this, with two or three fine scientists and some government people with good sense as its members. He asked me to develop a directive for such a study, the purpose of which would be to get things out where we can look at them.
Dr. Kistiakowsky said there is one further question of major proportion involved, which is whether analysis of data should be more centralized or whether SAC, for example, should set up its separate data analysis system. The President said he could imagine nothing more absurd than this. He said that there would be no sums in the FY’62 budget for this project until needs had been determined and proven and the scientific feasibility had been evaluated. The President asked me to tell Secretary Gates that he has heard so much regarding various kinds of intelligence satellites that he wants to see a clear delineation of what they are, and what needs they are supposed to fill, together with an assessment of feasibility.
He then wants this brought before the NSC.
The President asked how a project of this kind can slip out of control. I recalled that I had advised him of this probable outcome a year ago when Mr. McElroy took the action of dispersing operational use of satellites to the Departments, rather than keeping it under centralized direction. While there is centralized supervision by Dr. York during the developmental stage of these items, the sky is the limit so far as the operational [Page 414] use is concerned. The President said the study may help to get this back under some kind of control.
Brigadier General General, USA
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 31. On February 5, the President discussed military reconnaissance with Herter, Douglas, Twining, Kistiakowsky, and others. (Memorandum of conference with the President by Goodpaster, February 8; ibid.) Other accounts of these meetings are in Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House, pp. 245–246 and 336.↩