Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

101. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, May 5, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

• General Twining, General Goodpaster

General Twining recommended that the staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee be held together to make future studies, suggesting as the next one a study on the possible range of damage to the United States in case of nuclear war in 1963.¹ The President agreed to this proposal.

General Twining next told the President that a study group has made an estimate of the situation that would exist after a nuclear attack, and although the findings of the study are rather questionable in some respects, he thought it was a good report generally. He said that it would take about thirty minutes to present, and the President agreed to hear it, sometime next week.

General Twining said that the meetings Secretary Gates is holding with the Joint Chiefs of Staff are proving effective in resolving split papers that have been stalled for a long time. He said that there are two very difficult ones left, the rest having been resolved. The first of these pertains to the question of organization for the control of Polaris forces—specifically whether these should be tied to SAC, conducted like carrier operations, or coordinated in some other way.² The second question relates to targeting concepts. The President said that in his judgment, so long as we have our main force of manned bombers, we would send the Polaris in to disrupt and knock out organized defenses. It would be necessary, however, to know wind directions and bomber positions. Therefore, he thought that the Polaris must be drawn in to the over-all plan and tightly coordinated. He thought the coordination could probably be accomplished by assignment of targets and by specifying timing of attack. General Twining thought that some form of coordinating organization, to accomplish what the President had in mind, was the most desirable solution.³

General Twining next said that the Navy is concerned regarding the boycotting of American ships by the Arabs, and specifically as to the possibility of their boycotting our oil ships. However, he added that the Navy had just obtained information that oil shipments are not being boycotted, at least in several of the major areas.

General Twining then said the Chiefs are concerned over the fact that they have never fired a complete ICBM (or IRBM for that matter). He said they would like to fire one. I left the room briefly at this moment. When I returned I asked the President the outcome of this discussion. He said he had expressed agreement. To my further question, he said he understood that General Twining was not of course talking about actually firing the nuclear warhead, but only the high explosive components thereof. I spoke to General Twining a few minutes later. He said the Chiefs actually had in mind to fire the nuclear warhead (as I had understood him earlier). When I told him that the President understood this to go only to the point of firing the high explosive components, he said they would proceed on that basis.

G.
Brigadier General, General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 7.
1. This was to be the “1961 Net Evaluation,” to be prepared with the following assumption: “A surprise nuclear attack perpetrated by the USSR late in 1963 preceded by a period of heightened world tension.” (Memorandum from Twining to the President, April 27; ibid.)
2. In a letter to Twining, dated March 6, 1959, General Power recommended operational assignment of Polaris to SAC. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS 471.94 (6 Mar 59)) Memoranda from Burke to the JCS, April 30, 1959 (included with JCS 1620/254, May 2), and from Secretary of the Navy John Russell to McElroy, dated May 5, set forth the Navy’s case for its operational control of Polaris. In Appendix C to SM–469–59, May 5, General White proposed disestablishment of SAC and creation of a “United States Strategic Command,” to include subordinate components from the Air Force and Navy. (All ibid., CCS 4720 Intermediate Range (5 Jan 59)) On May 6, 1959, the Chiefs referred their divergent views to McElroy. (Decision memorandum by Brigadier General H. L. Hillyard, Secretary to the JCS; ibid.)
3. On August 24, 1959, Twining circulated to the JCS CM–386–59, a memorandum enclosing 18 basic questions regarding targeting policy, including such issues as what agency should formulate targeting, whether there should be a single integrated operational plan (SIOP), whether there should be a unified strategic command, and what should be the targeting role of the regional unified commands. (ibid., CJCS 381 (1957–1959)) In a May 23 memorandum to Twining, Hillyard indicated that Gates was receiving briefings on divergencies within the JCS “on the 18 questions.” (ibid., CJCS 381 (1960)) CM–386–59 is in the Supplement.