Office of the Historian

194. Memorandum of a Conversation, Waldorf Towers, New York, September 27, 1960, 2:45 p.m.1

New York, September 27, 1960, 2:45 p.m.

SecDel/MC/120

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
  • The President
  • Secretary Herter
  • Gen. Goodpaster
  • T. C. Achilles
  • Canada
  • Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker
  • Mr. Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs
  • Mr. H. B. Robinson, Prime Minister’s Private Secretary

SUBJECT

  • UN Matters

The Prime Minister opened the conversation by congratulating the President on his excellent conciliatory speech at the UN. By contrast, Khrushchev’s speech had been completely destructive.

The President said that Khrushchev, not content with the veto in the Security Council, was seeking to impose it at the administrative level. Several Heads of Government with whom he had talked had also noted this point. In response to the Prime Minister’s question as to what happened next, the President said that some thought Khrushchev would calm down but that he personally doubted it. He was sure of only one thing—that practically everyone outside the Soviet bloc was strong in support for the UN. He regretted that Nkrumah’s speech had followed the Soviet line.2

The Prime Minister disagreed. Nkrumah had come to see him yesterday and asked what he thought of the Secretary’s statement that “Nkrumah was a Communist”. The Secretary interjected that he had never said that, only that Nkrumah was tending to follow the Soviet line. The Prime Minister had replied that he had never considered Nkrumah a Communist. The publicity concerning the Secretary’s comment had discouraged Nkrumah whereas a few kind words might have brought him back into line. However, Nkrumah should never have made the speech he did. The Secretary remarked that it was the nature of Nkrumah’s speech, shortly after the latter had assured him and the President of his complete support for the UN, that had prompted his comment. The Prime Minister said Nkrumah had denied [Page 364] that he had been influenced by Khrushchev. The Secretary observed that after his speech Nkrumah had stopped to talk with Khrushchev for the benefit of the photographers.

[Here follows discussion of Togolese President Olympio, the Congo, and Africa.]

The Prime Minister asked what the President’s reaction would be should he receive an invitation from Khrushchev to meet with him. The President replied that Khrushchev would have to do something constructive first, such as freeing the two American aviators. In the absence of some such action by Khrushchev, the American people would never understand the President’s seeing him. The Prime Minister observed that any UN resolution requesting that they meet would be out of order. The President replied that it certainly would, that it would put the two on the same level. Khrushchev had cursed him thoroughly but he had never replied in kind.

The Prime Minister expressed concern at Castro’s speech and inquired who was going to answer it. The Secretary replied that Wadsworth would speak briefly this afternoon to the effect that all of Castro’s charges except that dealing with his treatment in New York had been made at the recent OAS meeting in Costa Rica and answered by all the other governments represented there and that we would be preparing documentation for general distribution in the UN.3

The Prime Minister said he had been concerned by the imposition of limitations on the movements of Khrushchev and other bloc leaders. The President said that we had been genuinely alarmed for their safety. Our security personnel was limited. Khrushchev, Kadar, Tito and Nasser had wanted to travel in the US, but, while we imposed no restrictions on the latter two, we were worried over possible dangers to their security. Khrushchev had withdrawn his invitation to the President, who now saw no reason to invite him to this country. The UN Headquarters Agreement referred only to “reasonable access” to the UN and said nothing about the right to travel in the US.

The Prime Minister recognized the antagonism and strong feelings of émigré groups. In his speech,4 he had emphasized that the essence of the Charter was the right of each people to decide its own destiny. He had received a highly favorable reaction in Canada, especially from émigré groups. The President welcomed the fact that the Prime Minister had been so specific on this point in his speech, more specific than the President had thought it advisable to be himself. However, the President firmly believed in self-determination and would keep on saying so.

[Page 365]

The Prime Minister inquired as to Khrushchev’s attitude toward the President’s speech. The President replied that Khrushchev had remained completely quiet during it and had later referred to it as being conciliatory.

The President expressed the opinion that Nasser’s suggestion that the President and Khrushchev meet was probably an attempt on the part of Nasser to gain publicity.

[Here follows discussion of the Prime Minister’s and President’s conversations with Nasser and of the September 26 Nixon–Kennedy debate.]

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Achilles on September 28, approved by S on October 6, and approved by the White House on October 12. For Eisenhower’s comments on this conversation, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961, p. 585.↩
  2. Regarding Nkrumah’s speech, see footnote 2, Document 190.↩
  3. For text of Castro’s statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.872. For text of Wadsworth’s statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.874.↩
  4. For text of Diefenbaker’s statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV.871.↩