Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

57. Draft Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Washington, November 20, 1957¹

Washington, November 20, 1957

SUBJECT

• Luncheon Meeting Between the French Foreign Minister, M. Pineau, and Party and Secretary McElroy, 20 November 1957

1. Present

• French
  • Christian Pineau, Foreign Minister
  • Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
  • Francois de Rose of the Foreign Ministry
  • Albert duChalet, Atomic Energy Official
  • General Andre Martin, Deputy C/S, French Armed Forces
  • Maj. Gen Jean Marie Bezy, Air Attaché
• United States
  • Secretary McElroy
  • Deputy Secretary Quarles
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) Irwin
  • Assistant Secretary (R&E) Macauley
  • General Twining, Chairman,JCS
  • Lt Col Vernon Walters, Interpreter
  • (Under Secretary of State Herter had been invited but was unable to be present)

2. Mr. Pineau said he felt there should not be any political obstacle for any country to produce any particular type of equipment for armament in view of industrial capability and other considerations, which would impose limitations, but he felt it would be wrong to specify that certain countries could not produce certain types of equipment.

3. Mr. Quarles agreed but pointed out that if every nation would try to produce all types of equipment this would result in less effective defense than if the effort were made collectively. Mr. Pineau felt it was important that the country not be asked for an open remuneration as in the case of France, but to announce a decision that they make or not make atomic weapons would be unfortunate for two reasons—first, the obvious political reason, and second, it would discourage atomic research throughout France. They could not accept something that might prevent the French from developing weapons others did not have. Mr. Quarles then said he felt that as soon as possible the U.S. might make available to the French through the Department of State our thinking on collaboration in the research field. We are not demanding anything but merely indicating our thoughts on these matters and how the U.S. could presently fit into them.

4. Ambassador Alphand brought up the question of IRBM s. Mr. Pineau said that the French position on these had changed during the past year. The French had originally asked for a short range missile— this request had been made within the framework of a general attack by the Russians and viewed as a conventional type of invasion. This danger was now decreasing. The launching sites for short range missiles might well be destroyed by longer range missiles and for this reason it was necessary for European countries to base their defense on longer range missiles with which they could strike the vital centers of the Soviet Union.

5. Mr. McElroy then asked whether the French were disposed to work together with the U.S. to establish the capability. Mr. Pineau replied this certainly was the case and the evolution in the French thinking had led them to believe in the need for longer range missiles. Mr. Quarles stated that he felt that the French thinking was consistent with ours and it is a matter of working out arrangements. He did not disagree with Mr. Pineau but felt everyone considered the position of the West versus Russia. We had a continent where we had based the bulk of retaliatory power. For this reason, before Russia could attack Europe she must destroy these U.S. bases first and thus we must view our defense collectively with the French and with others. He felt that locating IRBM s in France should be considered a collective deterrent. He felt that such missiles should be placed in France but it was more necessary for each country to have them, but he did agree with the idea of deploying such missiles in France.

6. Mr. McElroy then said that the question of deployment and training personnel to handle such weapons was a major one and we would have to proceed at the maximum rate so that it would not be a bottleneck in achieving such a capability. Mr. Pineau then said if agreement could be reached they might be able to go ahead with infrastructure for such deployment. The French had never asked that the weapons (?E.M.H) or infrastructure be for France but had always regarded this as a joint NATO project. Mr. Quarles then spoke of the requirement under present laws that the U.S. must control the warheads, but that the NATO stockpile concept would at the present time meet Mr. Pineau’s position.

7. Mr. Pineau then said that one additional point which might come up under the allocation of tasks to the different countries might be that some nations might continue to develop weapons (missiles) and in such case it would require closer cooperation with the U.S. to be able to marry the U.S. warhead with the missiles. Mr. Quarles did not anticipate difficulty in handling this problem and at such a point the U.S. would visualize that the countries would be brought into a bilateral agreement with the U.S., for the exchange of necessary information in making firm arrangements.

8. Mr. Pineau then stated he would further like to clarify the French position. They desired to work in full cooperation with the U.K., Germany, and Italy, and that they are considering working in even closer cooperation with these countries in the future. He felt that if the allocation of the tasks could be made to groups of nations rather than individual nations that this might sometimes give more effective results. Mr. Quarles replied he did not see anything in this that was inconsistent with the U.S. view. Mr. Pineau spoke of France’s conviction for ever closer community to insure a better defense. Mr. Quarles inquired as to Mr. Pineau’s understanding of the community and Pineau replied that he was referring to the six nations.²

9. Mr. Quarles said he did not see any problem in this but in actual practice we have found it more effective when it came to a specific task, to arrange this on a bilateral with the country in question, but he did not think any question of principle was involved. Mr. Pineau then asked if the U.S. would object to dealing with two or three countries instead of a single one, and Mr. Quarles said he did not see any problem providing all participated.

10. Col. duChalet said that the French were considering building atomic submarines—they had reached a stage where it was necessary to make a decision. Admiral Strauss, with whom they had discussed this matter, had indicated objections to the idea³ of operating a reactor on natural uranium. The French had replied that they had done this because they did not have enriched uranium for military purposes. Admiral Strauss indicated it might be possible to supply the enriched uranium but that he would have to have Pentagon consent to do this. Col. duChalet said this was a classical example of a fruitful field for exchange. The French could have a far better submarine at a tremendous economy (15 billion francs). They wondered if this were possible. They had a large allocation of enriched uranium (5000 kilos) for peaceful purposes and they only needed 30 kilos for the submarine. Mr. Quarles replied that he had not discussed this question with Admiral Strauss and was not sure whether it would be possible under the law. However, if we found it was possible we would like to work it out and collaborate on this. He would take the matter up with Admiral Strauss.

11. Col. duChalet said it was a question of developing a propitious system rather than a particular type of ship. Mr. Irwin then said as he understood it the approach to the six would be within the overall framework of NATO, and Mr. Pineau agreed to this.

12. The Ambassador then said he had a separate question. They would be very interested to hear the Secretary’s views concerning Russia’s ICBM capability. Mr. Quarles replied he was somewhat troubled to define what the Russians meant by an ICBM. In the first place the Russians could fire a missile someplace in the Soviet Union to another continent with the Russian missile range of only 1000 miles. Perhaps this is what they meant by an ICBM missile. In the U.S. we think of ICBM missiles with a range of 5 or 6 thousand miles. We think that they do not have in operation weapons in the 5 and 6 thousand mile range. We do credit them with a broad base of capability— guidance, rocketry, etc. The Russians have worked hard on these and it is only a matter of time before they do have such weapons. It is difficult on the basis of what we know to say when they will have this capability or whether they will have it before or after us. Our military likes to concede to them every capability and assume that they may do this ahead of us, and we are working on this basis. The difference in time between us will not be great.

13. The Ambassador then inquired whether we are developing an anti-missile missile. Mr. Quarles replied we were proceeding with the development of such a missile but it contained many difficult problems because there are so many means of confusing the defense, so we do not want to go too far until we are sure that this weapon could be effective in defense. We are pushing our research on this vigorously and if it appears desirable we feel we can develop such a weapon but only at great expense. The Ambassador then asked whether Europe would be involved in such a system. Mr. Quarles said he felt that it would and this was one of the questions which should be discussed in Paris.⁴

14. General Martin then asked the Secretary’s opinion concerning Russia’s ICBM ability. Mr. Quarles replied there were many uncertan-ties in this and it was difficult to know what degree of error the Russians would be willing to accept in such a system. We feel that we have effectively manned bombers that would provide a more effective delivery system for the present. Russians on the other hand might decide to deploy their missiles earlier. He felt we should expect the Russians to have a missile capability of covering French targets in one to one and a half years, and a year later for more distant targets. We agreed the French should have a weapon which would permit them to strike at the USSR in case of aggression.

1. Source: Department of State, French Desk Files: Lot 56 D 645, Atomic. Secret. Prepared on November 20 in the Office of International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense.
2. Reference is to the European Economic Community.
3. The following unidentified handwritten note appears above the words “objections to the idea”: “doubts about the practicability.”
4. Reference is to the meetings of the North Atlantic Council in Paris, December 16–19, 1957.