Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

52. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 7, 1957¹

Washington, September 7, 1957

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

• M. Pineau, French Foreign Minister
• M. Joxe, Secretary General, French Foreign Office
• M. Alphand, French Ambassador to the United States
• M. Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
• M. Vimont, Minister, French Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Houghton, American Ambassador to France
• Mr. Elbrick, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Mr. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
• Mr. Smith, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs
• Mr. Witman, First Secretary (designate), American Embassy, Paris

Armed Forces Definition.

Although the French Foreign Minister had previously indicated that he wished to discuss the question of disarmament, at the meeting with the Secretary he merely referred to the “problem of effectives” and offered to postpone discussing the subject today.

Mr. Smith said that instructions had been sent to the United States Delegation to endeavor to reach agreement with the French on the matter of definition of force levels which, Mr. Smith said, in view of the collapse of the London Talks, was really somewhat academic.

The Secretary asked why this question could not be shelved, and Mr. Smith replied that the French were greatly interested in buttoning it up so that there would be no doubt in the future.

The Secretary then went on to explain that the question of the number of men in the “armed forces” was one which was always subject to evasion. Should “trained reserves” be included, or those in the armed service of the states, which might be subject to incorporation into the federal armed forces? He said the matter was so complicated that it would be a waste of time to attempt to come to a precise definition. For the United States, when we said two million or two million one hundred thousand men, we were talking about Federal forces; we also have State militia, national guard units, etc. We intended to exclude such troops, but if we did so it would open the way for the Soviets also to exclude the possible forces of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union and subvert the whole agreement. This was such a complicated question, the Secretary declared, that he felt the French point was just one small aspect and that under present circumstances it was not worthwhile arguing about the definition of armed forces.

M. Pineau agreed it was an academic and small point but said he believed there was always great interest in adjusting our positions even on minor points in order to prevent the Soviets from exploiting such differences. Zorin² was very expert at this. He therefore hoped we might seek agreement nevertheless, and was sure a formula would be found.

Possibilities of Scientific Cooperation.

M. Pineau then went on to mention the Russian intercontinental missile, and said that he had some reflections to make on the general question. In his view, the Soviets had made gigantic progress in the last few years. He thought this progress was due to their large effort in scientific research. They had the greatest number of scientists actively working and could have a considerable advance over the West.

M. Pineau asked therefore whether in scientific research the West was really doing everything it could do. He said the West had capable scientists not only in France and the United States, but in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany and Italy. He wondered whether the intense fear of secrecy and espionage was fully justified, and suggested that this question be re-examined.

Mr. Dulles declared that his personal views coincided very much with M. Pineau, and said he felt that it was ridiculous for all the countries of the West to conduct separate studies and not pool their capabilities. The Soviet progress was based on pooled efforts with the Germans, not necessarily voluntarily. They had taken over the Peenemunde group, which had given them a big start in the field of guided missiles.

The Secretary pointed out the obstacle of current congressional policy derived from the fact that the United States originally had a monopoly of the atomic weapon and had made an effort to maintain it in the interest of the free world. He said that he thought the Atomic Energy Act restricting or exchanging military nuclear information was obsolete; that the process of persuading Congress and the country away from current policy would be difficult. The original success, he said, was not entirely our own, but derived from the work of scientists from different parts of the world. Mr. Dulles added that the President felt the same way.

Mr. Smith said he agreed that the restrictions on military cooperation with our Allies now contained in the Atomic Energy Act were somewhat obsolescent but that on the non-military side the process of declassification was a helpful development.

M. Pineau explained that when he referred to collaboration in basic scientific matters, he was referring mostly to weapons, but also to general research. Mr. Smith said that there were no legal inhibitions on collaboration in general research. The Secretary said he believed there might be such inhibitions in the field of missiles, but Mr. Smith explained that these would refer only to nuclear components of the warheads. Mr. Dulles assured M. Pineau that we would look into the possibilities of further cooperation in the missile field except for the warhead.

M. Pineau stressed that what he had in mind was a “community of brains”.

Mr. Dulles said he felt we should put our minds together on missiles, or on general uses of fissionable materials for industrial and non-military purposes. The missile problem, he said, bore no direct relationship to the kind of warhead the missiles might carry. Mr. Smith felt, however, that there might be some limitations on what our military would be disposed to exchange with the French.

In response to Mr. Dulles’ question, M. Pineau said that he had in mind research in both atomic and missile fields. The Secretary remarked that these were entirely different fields with no connection. M. Pineau remarked that his general idea was that the Russians have centralization in their research which the West did not have, and he felt this was a very important element.

The Secretary said that intensive U.S. development of the ICBM had been taken up relatively recently, and that in view of our foreign bases we had a major interest in an Intermediate Range Missile. In this field we had made good progress in the last few years and believed that we were ahead of the Russians, or at least that we were not behind them. Mr. Dulles said he thought we would have the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile in production before the Soviets had operational ICBMs in production.

The Secretary said we did not feel particularly worried about the Russian statement;³ we did not know how true it was, nor was it clear. He said there was also a sharp difference of opinion among our military whether in the next decades manned aircraft were not still the best way of bringing weapons to targets. We didn’t think the intercontinental missile had yet acquired sufficient accuracy.

The Secretary promised to give careful study to M. Pineau’s suggestion for cooperation in research among allied countries.

1. Source: Department of State, French Desk Files: Lot 58 D 132. Secret. Drafted by Witman and SMITH.
2. Valerian Alexandrovich Zorin, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Committee.
3. Reference is to the communiqué issued by Soviet news agency TASS on August 26, announcing the successful testing by the Soviet Union of an intercontinental ballistic missile; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, p. 1311.