31. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State1

SUBJECT

  • French Problems and U.S. Policy—First Six Months of 1957

The Paris Embassy has submitted an excellent despatch, enclosed herewith (Tab A),2 which sets forth concisely the major problems that will confront France during the next six months. It also suggests the possible U.S. courses of action in the face of each of these issues. A summary outline follows:

Summary of Despatch

A. French Problems:

1. Algeria remains France’s primary problem. Despite discouragement over the continuation of the rebellion, the French are still determined to hold on. 2. French disillusionment with the UN continues and will markedly increase if a hostile resolution is passed on the Algerian item.3 3. French relations with Morocco and Tunisia are passing through a critical phase owing to Algeria. France will accordingly be unduly sensitive to any indications that the U.S. may intend to replace French influence in these countries. 4. The French have not yet comprehended the degree to which they have destroyed their credit in the Near East and will thus endeavor to continue to play a role, particularly in the Suez settlement. 5. The French will persist in seeking a tripartite summit meeting both for prestige purposes and in order to influence the formulation of Western policy in the Near East and in Eastern Europe. 6. Continued oil shortages will probably have serious economic and political repercussions. 7. The extent and degree of the latter will have a direct bearing on the prospects for French approval of EURATOM and the Common Market. 8. The Mollet Government probably will not survive the trials of the next six months. [Page 93] Should the foregoing problems be seriously aggravated, a successor government with strongly nationalistic and neutralist tendencies could well emerge.

B. Suggested U.S. Policies:

1. U.S. should support the French position on Algeria in the UN, at the same time urging the French to publicize and implement Mollet’s relatively liberal policy. 2. Such U.S. support will be an important factor influencing France’s future attitude towards the UN. 3. Until and unless an understanding between France and Morocco and Tunisia proves impossible, we should urge the parties to reach such an understanding and make clear that the U.S. aid program is intended to supplement, not replace, French aid (which is in our interest for France to continue to provide). 4. We should in some degree, at least, consult with the French in planning and implementing a Near Eastern settlement. 5. A summit meeting with the French and British in the near future would have a beneficial effect. 6. We should continue our efforts to restore the flow of oil to Europe and if the need should arise, provide France with emergency grant aid of moderate and indispensable amounts. 7. Continue discreet and indirect encouragement of EURATOM and Common Market. 8. By helping France to face and resolve these problems, the U.S. can thereby influence the course and results of the next political crisis.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/12–3156. Secret. Drafted by Matthew J. Looram, Jr., of the Office of Western European Affairs, and transmitted to the Secretary through Murphy.
  2. Despatch 981, December 10, not printed. (Ibid., 61 1.51/12–1056)
  3. On November 15, the U.N. General Assembly decided to include Algeria on its agenda for the next session, and the topic was considered in February 1957; for documentation, see vol. XVIII, pp. 261 ff.