Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

298. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan¹

Washington, May 10, 1957.

Dear Harold: I have read with the greatest interest your letter of April twenty-sixth² and its voluminous enclosure containing Bul-ganin’s views on a wide variety of subjects. I fully understand your feeling that you bear a considerable responsibility in framing a substantive reply and appreciate your thoughtfulness in giving me an opportunity to comment.

The letter seems to me to combine several purposes in a skillful manner. Obviously it is a part of the current Soviet effort to stir up issues which will tend to lead people to forget, if not forgive, their actions in Hungary. They would probably like their foreign relations to resume the earlier lines resulting from the liberalizing aspects laid down at the Party Congress last year. The conciliatory tone is well adapted to carry out this purpose. They would of course like to put the Western alliance in the awkward position of appearing to reject genuine efforts to improve the situation.

Second, there is the clear effort to establish a special position in relation to the United Kingdom, such as they periodically seek with the United States. The references to trade, the favorable comments on force reduction and on Britain’s position generally are all calculated to have this effect.

There may, however, be a third aspect. In the context of their other recent actions in the Disarmament Committee³ and elsewhere, the letter seems to betray a genuine concern about the nuclear situation. There is reason to believe that they probably are worried by the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons around their borders, the coming of ballistic missiles, the possibility of German and other forces having nuclear weapons, and the recognition of the inherent instability in the satellites and East Germany. In addition there are signs that the burden of their military forces is weighing heavily on them. Thus there may be a chance that they are thinking in serious terms about ways in which some of these trends might be dealt with or revised. Their first effort is naturally the negative one reflected in the notes to Denmark, Norway and Germany, and the other propaganda moves. And their note to you, while less threatening, does not suggest any immediate readiness to make major concessions in order to obtain relief from the concerns they may have.

I suggest that it might be helpful if your reply took account of these various themes in the Soviet note. Perhaps it could include a reasoned explanation of the British and Western point of view of the principal issues raised in his letter. Of course it should correct some of the misstatements and allegations in the letter but could, perhaps, avoid the tone of a purely debating reply. It might point out the avenues for real progress toward correcting the present situation.

Specifically, in regard to the Middle East, you might recall that in the talks with Bulganin and Khrushchev in London⁴ the United Kingdom made very clear its vital interest in the Middle East and that the Soviets had nonetheless gone ahead to stir up trouble and create friction in ways not compatible with the sweet friendliness they now profess. Similarly in regard to control of nuclear weapons, you might point out the persistent Soviet refusal to talk seriously about methods of control and safeguards. Also I urge you consider whether it is not essential to stress the consequences of Soviet refusal to unify Germany and to relax their control of the satellites. Surely, this is the most explosive situation of all. Finally, I think it worthwhile to point out that the West is united in its basic policies and for collective security and that efforts to split off one or another country are not the fruitful way to improve conditions.

In short, it seems to me that overall the reply could usefully give the impression that the West is prepared to talk seriously of resolving the existing sources of tension and instability whenever the Soviets are ready to consider seriously the revisions of their policy which this would entail. We are not asking for unconditional surrender or the sacrifice of legitimate Soviet interests and we share their concern regarding the nuclear problem and some of the areas of instability. But they will have to raise their bid if progress is to be made.

A few more detailed suggestions are in the enclosed memorandum prepared by the State Department.⁵

Again, let me express my appreciation to you for giving me this opportunity to comment on your letter from Bulganin. FOSTER and I stand at your disposal in case we can be of further assistance to you in this matter.

With warm regard,

As ever

Ike

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Confidential. Drafted in the Department of State and transmitted to the President as an enclosure to a memorandum from Secretary Dulles, May 9. (Ibid., Dulles Papers, B.45 Macmillan–Lloyd Correspondence 1957) According to telegram 6160 from London, May 11, the letter was delivered on that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/5–1157)
2. Document 296.
3. Reference is to the apparent Soviet willingness to consider more seriously a disarmament agreement.
4. Bulganin and Khrushchev made a State visit to Britain, April 18–27, 1956.
5. Not printed.