6. Memorandum from Robert F. Delaney of the Office of Policy and Programs, Soviet Orbit Division, United States Information Agency, to Francis B. Stevens of the Office of Eastern European Affairs1
SUBJECT
- Analysis of Actions to be Taken in Event of Eastern European Uprising
Based upon the January 18 NSC 174 Working Group discussions of my December 1, 1954 draft statement2 of courses of action open to the U.S. in the event of future Eastern European uprisings I submit the following draft for your study.
In attempting to discuss the possibility of an Eastern European uprising a certain realistic framework must be adopted. For purposes of this paper, therefore, the following conditions are assumed:
- 1.
- The conclusions reached in the OCB Detachment Study of January 5, 19553 are considered valid in this instance.
- 2.
- It is realistic to assume explicit Soviet control over the captive peoples of such a degree as to prevent successful uprising, and
- 3.
- An uprising within the Soviet army itself or elements thereof is considered without the scope of this paper since it raises problems of a scope and complexity which is quite beyond the Working Group’s terms of reference.
It is our considered judgment that should an uprising similar to the abortive East Berlin riots of June 17, 1953 occur in the near future in Eastern Europe, the position which the U.S. Government must take would not differ materially from the stand we assumed in 1953.
Specifically, the courses of specific action to be taken by the U.S. are severely circumscribed by over-riding presently applicable policy considerations. Basically this means that the U.S. must not adopt any course of action which would
- 1)
- precipitate hostilities (e.g. armed aid, logistic support, etc.).
- 2)
- cause the premature uprising and consequent annihilation of dissident elements on the basis of exhortations or promises which we are not able to support.
- 3)
- alienate our allies.
Since any active courses of action embarked upon by the U.S. in such a rebellious situation would likely cause one or more of the above reactions, and since such actions are clearly not in concert with established U.S. national policy, positive activity by the U.S. is not feasible.
Thus, should a situation of revolt develop, the U.S. would have to confine itself (1) to dissemination of the facts of the ensuing action and (2) to expressions of sympathy, passive encouragement and moral support coupled with whatever political steps would be deemed feasible and effective in the light of the actual circumstances. No attempts to encourage the participants could justifiably be made which would result in needless loss of life.