You will recall that in 1953 you concurred in the Department’s
determination that, on balance, the interests of the US would best be
served by a resumption of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. Further
[Page 139]
action was suspended at
that time, however, when Congressional leaders consulted on the issue
expressed opposition.2
In a recent development the Bulgarian Government has indicated through
its Legation in Paris that it is now prepared to propose formally that
diplomatic relations be resumed. This development, representing a
departure from Bulgaria’s previous insistence that the US make the first
move, appears to reflect an eagerness on the part of the Bulgarian
Government to normalize relations with various countries including the
US following Bulgaria’s recent admission into the UN.
After careful re-examination of the issue in the light of these
considerations it is again recommended that a resumption of relations
would be in the interests of the US. This view is expressed in the
attached Position Paper (Tab A) which concludes with a series of
recommendations for a course of action. The recommendations may be
summarized as follows:
When the attached paper was circulated for comment, ARA (Mr. Holland),
FE (Mr. Sebald), and P (Mr. McCardle) expressed dissent.
[Page 140]
ARA noted3 that in its view a
resumption of relations with Bulgaria would constitute a dangerous
precedent for Latin American countries not now having diplomatic
relations with the Soviet bloc, and FE
expressed similar apprehensions with respect to countries in its area.
P observed that such a development
might weaken resistance groups in Bulgaria and that it might place us in
an embarrassing position should the Bulgarian Government at some later
date renege on assurances of proper conduct given in order to bring
about a resumption of relations.
The apprehensions reflected in these views were discussed at a meeting in
my office in which representatives from the areas concerned
participated.4 It was
noted that the US currently maintains relations with four Soviet
satellites in Eastern Europe, and would merely be completing the pattern
of its representation in that area by resuming relations with Bulgaria.
Any illusion that a return to Sofia would constitute acceptance of the
Soviet-dominated Bulgarian regime could be dispelled by our information
media, and could be explained in Latin American countries and elsewhere
through our diplomatic missions. It might be noted that Argentina has
for several years maintained diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and
other Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. As for the possibility of a
lack of good faith in negotiations it is to be hoped that the Bulgarians
particularly have learned that there is a limit to our patience. It was
therefore concluded that although certain risks must be recognized, the
advantages to be gained by the US through a resumption of relations with
Bulgaria, on the favorable terms which now appear available to us,
outweigh the disadvantages.
It was agreed that Congressional leaders should be consulted before any
formal negotiations looking toward a resumption of relations are
undertaken.
It was further agreed that the governments of the Balkan Pact countries
(Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey) should be informed of our intended
action. These governments, as well as the governments of France, Great
Britain and Italy, have already been told informally of the Bulgarian
approach in Paris. Reactions were generally favorable to a resumption of
US-Bulgarian diplomatic relations. The Yugoslav Acting Foreign Minister,
Mr. Prica, told our Ambassador in Belgrade that in his view the approach
marked a favorable development in which he was certain his government
would be much interested; he added that
[Page 141]
the approach appeared to be another step in
satellite policy to normalize relations with the West, and that he was
inclined to think tolerable conditions could now be arranged in
Sofia.
That you approve the proposed course of action with respect to the
re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria outlined
above,5 as set forth in detail in the attached Position Paper
(Tab A).
[Attachment]
POSITION PAPER6
SUBJECT
- Re-establishment of US Diplomatic Relations with
Bulgaria
Problem:
Recent indications that the Bulgarian Government, after being
admitted to membership in the United Nations, is now prepared to
take the initiative in steps leading to a re-establishment of
diplomatic relations, makes it desirable and timely for the United
States to review its position on the advantages and disadvantages of
such a development.
Background:
Diplomatic relations with Bulgaria were suspended on February 20,
1950 after the Bulgarian Government had refused to withdraw a note
which accused the American Minister in Sofia of subversive activity
and declared him persona non grata. The rupture had been preceded,
however, by a series of indignities and restrictions, including 1)
false charges against American mission personnel, 2) intimidation
and persecution of local employees, 3) delays in the issuance of
visas for American replacement personnel, and 4) increasingly severe
travel and housing restrictions. As a consequence of these measures
the effectiveness of the American Legation in Sofia had already been
severely curtailed when the note demanding the Minister’s recall was
received. The note itself, therefore, which purported to be based on
testimony produced at the “show trial” in December 1949 of Traicho
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Kostov, a former
Bulgarian Communist leader and alleged “Titoist”, served only to
bring to a climax a deterioration in relations which had begun more
than two years earlier.
It was believed at the time that the suspension of relations might
demonstrate to Soviet leaders that there was a limit to our patience
and might result, at least temporarily, in some improvement in the
treatment accorded our missions in other Soviet bloc countries.
During the months following, however, the Communists unfolded a
series of “show trials” intended to lower the prestige of the US in
the area, and they imposed increasingly severe restrictions on the
activity of our missions in satellite capitals. For its part, the
Bulgarian Government reacted to the suspension with further attacks
on the American mission, disclaimed all responsibility for the
suspension, and alleged that the American withdrawal served merely
to support the charges advanced during the Kostov, and subsequently
the Shipkov trials. Although this belligerence later abated,
Bulgarian officials have persisted in the view that the lack of
relations which resulted from the suspension was not their fault.
This view has been expressed as recently as December 31, 1955, in an
address by the Bulgarian Prime Minister and Party leader, Vulko
Chervenkov.
A shift in the Bulgarian attitude toward the rupture appeared in
1953, after the death of Stalin, when Bulgarian officials let it be
known through French diplomatic circles in Sofia that their country
would welcome a resumption of relations with the US. These
sentiments were subsequently confirmed in two public addresses by
Chervenkov. In view of these “feelers” the question was examined in
the Department and the determination made that, on balance, US
interests would best be served by resuming relations and
re-establishing a mission in Sofia. It was subsequently decided,
however, after Congressional leaders consulted by the Department had
expressed firmly adverse reactions, that any movement in the
direction of renewed diplomatic relations at that time was
premature. Accordingly, no action was taken, and the matter was left
dormant during 1954 and most of 1955. It was only revived after
Bulgaria’s entry into the UN, when a
Bulgarian diplomatic representative in Paris called on the Deputy
Chief of Mission at the American Embassy, indicated informally that
he wished to raise the question of resuming relations, and
acknowledged that he was doing so on the specific instructions of
his government. This representative subsequently declared that his
Government intended to transmit a note to the Embassy which would
formally propose that diplomatic relations between the US and
Bulgaria be resumed.
[Page 143]
Discussion:
As this chronology indicates, the Bulgarian Government’s public
attitude toward diplomatic relations has altered considerably during
the past five years. The vituperative attacks of 1950 have given way
gradually to a milder approach which, in its most recent
manifestation in Paris, reveals a willingness now on the part of
Bulgaria actually to take the initiative in seeking to resume
relations with the US. This change may also be reflected in current
Bulgarian efforts to achieve a normalization of relations with
Greece and other countries with which such relations were previously
strained or non-existent.
The considerations which in 1953 had influenced the Department’s
position concerning the desirability of resuming relations with
Bulgaria, and which with some modifications still prevail, include
the following: 1) intelligence acquisition, 2) desirability of
having American representatives on the spot should any development
of major significance take place in Bulgaria, 3) protection of US
citizens and US property in Bulgaria, 4) possible furtherance of
nationalistic aspirations, and 5) demonstration of continuing
American interest in the welfare of the Bulgarian people. Bulgarian
membership in the UN, and the
presence in this country of a Bulgarian UN delegation provides, moreover, a new element which
can be regarded as an anomaly in the absence of diplomatic
relations.
No one of these considerations alone is enough to justify a
resumption of relations. . . .
Lack of US representation in Sofia has the further adverse effect of
reducing our capacity to exploit promptly and effectively any
development of major significance comparable, for example, to the
Yugoslav defection of 1948, and prevents the US from having a source
of guidance useful in political formulation and propaganda
evaluation. By its absence, moreover, the US is precluded from
following with optimum vigilance Bulgaria’s reaction to the recent
Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement, a development of particular
importance to this area in view of Bulgaria’s traditional ties with
Yugoslavia. It will be recalled that Tito’s expulsion from the
Cominform was in part predicated on his continued support for a
South Slav Federation which had earlier been advocated by the late
Bulgarian Communist leader, Dimitrov, and the Kostov trial which led
directly to the suspension of US-Bulgarian diplomatic relations had
also featured the alleged heresy of the South Slav Federation,
denounced by the Kremlin in 1948. An improvement in
Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations might bring about a revival of the idea
of the Federation and should therefore have the closest attention of
the US.
[Page 144]
As for other US interests, it is noted that not more than 40
Americans, all believed to be dual nationals, now reside in
Bulgaria, and our experience in other satellites shows that the
assistance which might be offered them even if there were an
American mission in Sofia would be very limited. The US Government
nevertheless has an obligation to do all in its power to protect and
assist these unfortunate people; the absence of a diplomatic
mission, and the consequent lack of consular services (even though
these are in part furnished by the US protecting power, Switzerland)
handicaps US efforts on behalf of its nationals.
With respect, finally, to the question of demonstrating US interest
in the welfare of the Bulgarian people and promoting nationalistic
aspirations through the re-establishment of diplomatic relations,
some differences of opinion are inevitable. It appears, however,
that, on balance, and provided it were accomplished on terms
favorable to the US, a re-establishment of relations would be useful
in the furtherance of US objectives with regard to the sympathies of
the Bulgarian people. It could also provide a means for giving
encouragement to nationalistic (Titoist) tendencies which might
develop among Bulgarian leaders. There is, of course, some danger
that other nations—and some elements of the Bulgarian people—might
interpret a re-establishment of relations as a mark of US approval
of the regime. It should be clear, however, from our words and deeds
with respect to other Communist countries of Eastern Europe with
which we now maintain diplomatic relations, that the US does not
approve the Kremlin-dominated regimes now in power. In the case of
Bulgaria, moreover, we are not establishing relations but merely
resuming them after receiving assurances that the situation which
led to the suspension in 1950 has been corrected.
The question may arise that a resumption of relations with Communist
Bulgaria would be inconsistent with US policy against the
establishment of relations by countries of South America and Africa
with the USSR. It does not appear, however, that any such
inconsistency exists. The USSR is the prime mover in the Communist
field which seeks to extend its influence wherever possible;
Bulgaria is but one of the lesser appendages of the Soviet
apparatus. In the re-establishment of diplomatic contact with
Bulgaria, moreover, the US is simply completing a part in the
over-all pattern of its Eastern European relationships.
It is of course evident from the eagerness with which the Bulgarian
Government apparently seeks to resume relations that it, too, would
expect to gain, presumably in prestige and general acceptability in
the family of nations. This gain, however, would not appear to be as
significant as that which would result for the US. The Bulgarian
initiative in seeking a resumption of relations as expressed in
Paris suggests that Bulgaria might be willing now to pay a price to
achieve its goal.
[Page 145]
The
recent Greek experience also suggests an approach which could be
utilized with profit by the US. The Greeks agreed first to resuming
relations with limited representation headed by a chargé d’affaires,
with the understanding that full representation would depend upon
the settlement of certain outstanding issues including Greek
compensation claims against Bulgaria. Although these issues have not
yet been settled, the Bulgarian Government has recently shown such
eagerness to achieve full normalization that it may yet meet Greek
demands. Meanwhile, Greece has obtained many of the advantages of
diplomatic relations without appreciable loss of prestige or
bargaining position. This experience is reflected in the
recommendations below.
Recommendations:
The following recommendations are made:
- 1)
- The US should avoid being drawn into making a move by
which it would appear that it has taken the initiative, but
the Bulgarian démarche in Paris should be encouraged.
- 2)
- The Bulgarian representative in Paris should be
informed,7 a) that the US agrees that a
resumption of diplomatic relations could be of mutual
benefit to the two countries, but that, b) in view of the
circumstances which led up to the suspension of relations in
1950, the US is understandably reluctant to enter into
renewed contact with the Bulgarian Government unless it can
first be assured that the Bulgarian Government is now
prepared to observe traditional rules of diplomatic
intercourse and show a proper respect for the immunities
customarily accorded diplomatic representatives.
- 3)
- When the foregoing position has been established the
American representative should suggest orally that as a
first step toward opening formal negotiations the US would
desire a formal statement from the Bulgarian Government
which would cover the following points: a) specific
withdrawal of Bulgarian charges against the American
Minister which resulted in the suspension of relations, b)
acknowledgement of Bulgarian responsibility for the abuses
which led to the suspension, c) a statement of the desire of
the Bulgarian Government to resume diplomatic relations with
the US, d) assurance that the Bulgarian Government is
prepared to observe the traditional rules of diplomatic
intercourse, and e) the omission of any reference to
previous charges that the US was responsible for the
suspension of relations in 1950. These points may be made
either in a public statement to be issued by the Bulgarian
Government or one of its leaders, or in a note to be
addressed to the US Government, it being understood that the
note will be made public. Should the Bulgarians seek a
modification of these conditions the situation thus created
would have to be reconsidered by the US.
- 4)
- If the Bulgarian Government meets these demands either in
a note or public announcement, the US should reply that it
is prepared to enter into negotiations with a view to
resuming diplomatic relations.
[Page 146]
The Bulgarian initiative and the US
response should be released to the press. The negotiations,
however, should be conducted in secret and agreement on this
point should be reached with the Bulgarian representatives
prior to the formal opening of negotiations.
- 5)
- In negotiations, presumably in Paris, undertaken to
explore the possibility of any re-establishment of
diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, the US should seek
agreement with Bulgaria on the following points:
- a)
- the re-establishment of relations should be
effected in two stages, at first through an exchange
of chargés d’affaires, and subsequently, if
conditions warrant, through an exchange of ministers
with normal representation;
- b)
- the US will expect suitable guarantees in writing
that its mission will not be subjected to harassment
and will be permitted to operate freely according to
the usual rules of diplomatic intercourse, such
guarantees to include specific reference to
provisions for adequate housing, minimum travel
restrictions, prompt issuance of visas for US
Legation personnel, and freedom from intimidation
and persecution for local employees;
- c)
- the Bulgarian Government should give its agreement
prior to the exchange of chargés d’affaires that it
will undertake further negotiations in Sofia through
the US chargé d’affaires to be assigned there, with
a view to settlement of problems concerning i) the
status of US citizens who may visit Bulgaria or who
are presently residing there, and ii) the settlement
of outstanding US claims against Bulgaria.
- 6)
- Provided the Bulgarian Government accepts these prior
conditions, the US will agree to the re-establishment of
relations, and will dispatch a small Legation staff to Sofia
headed by a chargé d’affaires, which will be authorized to
conduct the further negotiations concerning the status of US
citizens and US claims mentioned in sub-paragraph c), above.
Further representation, including an exchange of ministers,
would depend upon the outcome of these negotiations and the
conduct of the Bulgarian Government toward the US chargé
d’affaires in Sofia and his staff.
