4. Notes on the Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, Washington, January 5, 19551

Item 1. Approval of Minutes of December 29, 1954 Meeting

The Minutes were approved.

Item 2. Special Analysis with Respect to Satellite Areas—NSC 174

Mr. Staats gave a rather full introduction to this paper,2 pointing out its genesis and stating that copies had been made available to the Planning Board Members through the Board Assistants and drawing the Board’s attention to the conclusions on pages 15 and 25.3

General Cutler stated that the purpose of the working group was to study the possibility and feasibility of detaching a satellite. The conclusions 4a and 4b are responsive to the terms of reference but 4c deals with making a concentrated effort with a view at some future time to detaching East Germany; that this is not within the charter of the working group; that with reference to East Germany one really means “unification” and not “detachment”. General Cutler went on to say that paragraph 5 is an expression of an opinion by the working group on a matter which is really one of high policy. He said this opinion was neither consistent nor inconsistent with the NSC policy which had just been adopted this morning.4 It was General Cutler’s feeling that certainly the working group should not deal with this policy question and he doubted whether the OCB itself should deal with such a policy question. In summary, General Cutler said he felt that 4a and 4b were acceptable, that 4c should be referred to the “committee” about which he had informed the OCB at luncheon and that paragraph 5 should be dropped.5

Mr. Anderson remarked that perhaps paragraph 5 would be a natural task for the Presidential committee which General Cutler had mentioned.

Mr. Hoover stated that he understood that the last sentence of paragraph 4c had been added after the paper had been considered by the working group and by the Board Assistants and that it was not agreed to by anyone. He suggested that the sentence be changed to call for a study to be made.

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General Cutler said that he liked the change which the Department of State had suggested but he still felt that the “committee” should handle this item.

At this point, Mr. Dulles said that CIA is continually needing guidance on this question of “soft” versus “provocative” courses of action. He added that he for one believed that Czechoslovakia would never have been lost if someone had been there doing something about it. . . . He emphasized that the so-called completely “soft” policy is subject to misinterpretation and we are apt to lapse into a do nothing policy.

General Cutler remarked that he still did not like paragraph 5.

Mr. Hoover suggested one or two minor drafting changes in paragraph 5 which were discussed briefly. Following this, Mr. Stassen stated that it is not OCB which is expressing this opinion but it is merely the working group and that the working group, contrary to what General Cutler had said, was not outside its terms of reference in making such a suggestion. He said he felt the OCB should encourage rather than discourage the working groups to make such suggestions. Stassen pointed out that the Board was only asked to concur in 4a, 4b and 4c and that 5 remained merely the view of the working group.

Mr. Dulles then suggested that paragraph 5 be taken out of the summary and left in the paper as it now is in paragraph 38.6 General Cutler thought that paragraph 4c should be referred to the Presidential committee when it is appointed.

It was finally agreed that paragraph 5 would be put in as paragraph 4, ahead of recommendations in which the Board is asked to concur. This was generally accepted.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Max W. Bishop
  1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Preliminary OCB Minutes. Secret. Drafted by Bishop (U/OP) on January 6.
  2. See footnote 4, supra.
  3. The reference to page 15 is to the last page of the OCB Working Paper of December 30, 1954; the reference to page 25 is to Annex A of the paper, “East Germany”; see footnote 4, supra.
  4. Reference is to the discussion at the 230th meeting of the NSC, January 5, on “Basic National Security Policy”; see vol. XIX, p. 9.
  5. The reference to the “committee” is unclear.
  6. Paragraph 5 of the summary section of the Working Group paper of December 30, 1954, and paragraph 38 of the “Conclusions” section of the same paper are similar, except paragraph 38 contains additional comments about Hungary being a case in point of a satellite facing setbacks and internal problems as well as a concluding sentence that reads: “Only by maintaining a firm position based on strength can the U.S. preserve the balance which is essential to prevent war and hope to exploit to its advantage Soviet weaknesses as they develop.”