Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

278. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Polish Ambassador (Spasowski) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), Department of State, Washington, December 9, 1957¹

Washington, December 9, 1957

SUBJECT

• Significance of Moscow Declaration with Respect to U.S. Aid to Poland

Mr. Dillon opened the conversation by saying that he wished to express frankly his feeling of surprise if not shock to the Moscow Declaration,² signed by the Polish Government, which imputed a false motive of domination to our economic aid programs. He said that it was not clear to us just how far this Declaration represented Polish policy, but he assumed that it did not or Poland would not be negotiating to improve economic relations at this time.³

Secondly, as the Ambassador was aware, it was necessary last spring for the Secretary to make a determination that Poland was an independent country not under the domination of Soviet Russia.⁴ Statements such as those in the Moscow Declaration, therefore, raised difficulties of a legal character.

Mr. Dillon said that he had called the Ambassador in to see what he might have to say or what he might obtain from his Government to interpret the Moscow Declaration.

The Ambassador said that he was not authorized to make a statement on the Moscow Declaration. However, he could say that this Declaration did not represent any change in the policy of the Polish Government. Polish relations with other socialist countries and with the West was unchanged from what it has been since the events of October 1956. He said that he felt those who were aware of the development of Polish affairs should not attach undue importance to this Declaration but should judge the facts. The facts were that cultural relations with the West had expanded and that their objective was that half the trade of Poland would be with the West and half with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. He referred to the Secretary’s talk with the Polish Foreign Minister⁵ in which the Secretary had expressed a hope for better relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Dillon agreed that improved relations with the Soviet Union were desirable but that when the Polish Government signed a declaration which might be expected from the U.S.S.R. but not from Poland, we naturally were concerned as to its meaning. He reiterated that he felt it was best to put our problem frankly and that the statements made by the Ambassador were along helpful lines; it would be of further help if the Ambassador could also obtain additional information from his Government concerning this matter.

The Ambassador said he would do so, but he wanted to make it clear that he would personally be very disappointed if the Moscow Declaration did anything to obstruct the progress of improved economic relations with the United States, and he felt that this was also his Government’s view. At this point he made a guarded reference to the difficulties the Polish Government and Mr. Gomulka faced. He asked Mr. Dillon if it would be possible to bring the negotiations to a conclusion before the end of the year, as he wondered whether there might be some problem with Congress should the talks continue into January.

Mr. Dillon said that he had not put any time limit on the negotiations. He said we had now obtained about all the information needed in order to make our decision. He said that he would be leaving for the Paris meeting⁶ in a few days and when he returned toward the 20th of December the Ambassador might wish to discuss the matter again on the basis of what information he had obtained from Warsaw. However, as funds did not have to be requested of Congress this time, there should not be any great delay in our coming to a decision in January.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 748.5–MSP/12–957. Confidential. Drafted by Jandrey.
2. The Moscow declaration of November 21 was signed by the leaders of all 12 “Sino-Soviet bloc” parties. In regard to international relations, the declaration scored the “war danger” created by an allegedly reactionary United States and called for opposition by the the Communist world, socialists, and neutralists. A specific assessment of Poland’s role is in a memorandum from Elbrick to Murphy, November 27. (Ibid., 811.0048/11–2757)
3. See Document 274.
4. The determination that Poland was a “friendly nation” under the terms of section 107 of P.L. 480 was made within the U.S. Government as early as December 18, 1956. See Document 215.
5. See Document 271.
6. Apparent reference to the NATO Heads of Government meeting in Paris, December 16–19.