Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

265. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, September 13, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Problems Concerning Cardinal Mindszenty

In recent weeks the Hungarian regime has increased its propaganda offensive against Cardinal Mindszenty and his continued presence in the American Legation in Budapest. On August 20 the press spokesman of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry reiterated a previous statement that the Cardinal’s right of asylum in the American Legation is highly debatable and in doing so went into considerable detail including the quotation of a passage from the American Foreign Service Regulations pertaining to the diplomatic right of asylum. Since then, the Hungarian press has dwelt at length on the subject, and the Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister is known to have remarked to the British Minister in Budapest that the American Legation was harboring a convicted criminal. In the light of this mounting campaign, our Chargé d’Affaires in Budapest, Garry Ackerson, is somewhat concerned over a number of potential problems arising from the Cardinal’s status.

In an informal memorandum which Mr. Ackerson recently forwarded to the Department² he points out that it would be highly advantageous if we knew the Vatican’s wishes concerning the Cardinal’s eventual departure from Hungary. It is conceivable, he says, that a temporary easing of the situation might offer a brief opportunity for the Cardinal to leave the country. Without any instructions from Rome, however, he might hesitate to leave until the opportunity had passed. Our Chargé likewise feels that the possibility of a safe conduct from Hungarian and Soviet authorities may also become more real at a future date, and he is of the view that some prior preparation for such an eventuality would be wise. He suggests that the Department might wish to consider the possibility of arranging for the transmission of an “order” or “strong intimation” from the Vatican to the Cardinal “so that he would be favorably inclined toward a request for ‘safe conduct’ in the event that the time for making such a request should become opportune.”

You will recall that on April 26 you spoke with the Apostolic Delegate here in Washington³ and outlined the problem regarding Cardinal Mindszenty. The Apostolic Delegate promised to communicate with you further on the subject as soon as he had received the necessary information from Rome. He has not, however, as far as we know, raised the matter again. Mr. Ackerson was confidentially informed of the initiative which you had taken with the Apostolic Delegate and is therefore aware that the Department has already endeavored to obtain the views of the Vatican concerning the Cardinal’s eventual departure from Hungary. Since, however, there has been no reply you may desire at a convenient opportunity again to broach the subject with the Apostolic Delegate.

Mr. Ackerson has also called attention to the problem we would face in the event of a break in diplomatic relations between Hungary and the United States. It is his view that the Cardinal’s care would presumably pass to the Power assuming protection of American interests. Since the time element might be important and limited, he believes that the Department should make contingency plans now as to which Power would be requested to assume these responsibilities. Certainly it is by no means inconceivable that following our strong action in the UN in support of the UN report, the Hungarian regime may be tempted to create a situation where the further maintenance of relations will be impossible. However, there are two questions which come immediately to mind if the formation of contingency plans is to involve consultation with other nations on this delicate problem. The first question is would it be in our interest to pose the question of assuming the representation of our interests in Hungary at a time when no crisis is apparent and when, as a result, the country approached would have an opportunity to consider all aspects of the situation—most notably the status of the Cardinal—and could in good conscience give a negative or qualified reply on the assumption that we had time to make other plans? If we delayed an approach until such time as a rupture in relations were clearly imminent or had been announced, the country which we approach would have to give a quick decision which in view of longstanding tradition would probably be positive notwithstanding the complications involved.

The second question is one of security. If at this point we made such an approach to other representatives in Budapest, it is entirely possible that it would cause wide-spread rumors that we are preparing to break off relations. It is also possible that the Hungarian regime would gain an indication of what our plan of action would be with reference to the Cardinal should relations be broken. Moreover, should we approach a foreign government at this point with specific reference to the Cardinal it is likely that that government would insist on being told all of the background of the Cardinal’s present status as well as our plans for the future. Here again we might run the risk of compromising the security of our strategy. If efforts were limited to a high level approach to the British in London the security risk would probably be minimal. It would, however, afford the British a convenient opportunity to turn us down. On balance, therefore, we feel that it would be inadvisable to consult with other governments on this matter at the present time. When and if we reach the point of a break in relations we shall simply have to canvass hurriedly the friendly Powers represented in Budapest and see if we can persuade one of them to represent our interests including the maintenance of the Cardinal’s refuge. If at that time no other country is willing to accept this responsibility, we believe that the Chargé d’Affaires should attempt to take the Cardinal out of Hungary with him, assuming that the Cardinal is willing. It would be clearly understood, however, that no resistance would be offered if Hungarian authorities forcibly detained the Cardinal.

The final problem to which our Chargé calls attention is the situation which would arise if the Cardinal should one day decide to give up his refuge and walk out of the Legation. Mr. Ackerson says that he would seek to obtain a written statement from the Cardinal that he was leaving of his own free will and that his refuge had not been withdrawn by the Legation. He then suggests that, following the Cardinal’s departure, he would inform the Foreign Office that the Cardinal was no longer at the Chancery. We feel that if circumstances permit, it would, indeed, be worthwhile to obtain some kind of written statement from the Cardinal prior to his departure though it is not believed that we need to insist on one if this should prove embarrassing. We do not see any advantage, however, to furnishing notification to the Hungarian regime of the Cardinal’s departure, particularly since we never have officially informed the regime that he has been granted refuge in the Legation.

Recommendations:

1. That if an appropriate occasion can be arranged, you again question the Apostolic Delegate in Washington concerning the Vatican’s attitude on the eventual departure of Cardinal Mindszenty from Hungary;⁴

2. That no consultations be initiated with other Powers at this time on the representation of American interests in Hungary should relations between Hungary and the United States be broken;⁵

3. That our Chargé d’Affaires in Budapest be informed in an Official-Informal letter (to be drafted in EE) a) that should the Cardinal relinquish his refuge in the Legation no notification need be given to the Hungarian regime by the Chargé, and b) that if at the time of a break in relations between Hungary and the United States no other Power is willing to continue the Cardinal’s refuge, the Chargé should attempt to take the Cardinal with him out of the country but should not resist any forcible attempt by Hungarian authorities to detain the Primate.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Hungary Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, Refuge for Cardinal Mindszenty, 1956–57. Secret. Drafted by Sutterlin.
2. Undated draft memorandum by Ackerson, entitled “Policy Regarding Cardinal Mindszenty,” attached to official–informal letter from Ackerson to Sutterlin, August 21, neither printed. (Ibid.)
3. A record of this meeting, a memorandum from Murphy to Beam, April 29, is Ibid.
4. Murphy wrote the following marginal notation on the source text at this point: “He [the Apostolic Delegate] is still in Rome. RM.”
5. Murphy wrote the following marginal note on the source text at this point: “Agree, RM.”

6. Murphy wrote a question mark on the source text at this point.

   According to a covering note to this memorandum from Norbert L. Anschuetz (Murphy’s Special Assistant) to Elbrick, Murphy was willing to take up this matter with the Apostolic Delegate when he returned, agreed that no consultation should be initiated with other powers regarding representation of American interests in Hungary, but had “serious reservations” with regard to the third recommendation.