Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

249. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Beam) to the Director of Special Operations, Department of Defense (Erskine)¹

Washington, May 8, 1957.

Dear General Erskine: I would like to return to the question of declaring the Hungarian Assistant Military Attaché in Washington persona non grata in retaliation for the expulsion from Hungary of Captain Thomas R. Gleason.² You will recall that this was the subject of my letter to you on April 23, 1957³ and of your reply of the same date.⁴

After further discussion of this matter in the Department including review by the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, we continue to feel that in the light of our over-all foreign policy objectives in Eastern Europe we should proceed with the expulsion. I would like to call to your attention the following two considerations which we consider of overriding importance:

(a) The United States must maintain a posture of strength vis-à-vis the present Hungarian regime. The position of our Legation in Budapest is a delicate one. We have no minister there and do not intend to send one under present circumstances but we desire if possible to maintain relations. The over-all size of our staff in Budapest at the present time is three times as great as that of the Hungarian staff in Washington. Cardinal Mindszenty’s refugee status within the Legation is unusual. There is in these circumstances much to tempt the Hungarian regime to apply threats and pressures of various kinds. If we on one occasion display a willingness to back down before such a threat the temptation for Hungarian authorities to try again in perhaps an even more sensitive area would become still greater. In the present instance the consequences for us of refusing to give in to the Hungarian threat may be a decrease in our Service Attaché staff. But if we do not react firmly, the Hungarian authorities conceivably may miscalculate our policy and apply further pressure to which we could only react by breaking relations. This would result in the withdrawal of our entire mission from Budapest. In short we cannot afford to allow the Hungarians to assume that we will give in to threats or pressure.

(b) As you rightly imply, actions which we take affecting one country under Soviet domination have implications on our policy toward all the countries of the area. It is in general our intent to make it clear to the Communist governments of the area that if they arbitrarily declare a member of a US Mission persona non grata they must expect similar action against one of their representatives. The object of this policy is of course to discourage Soviet and East European regimes from indulging in indiscriminate expulsions. I don’t need to emphasize that they could create very serious problems for us if they felt free to expel without fear of consequence our trained personnel who have spent many months in preparation for their assignment. (Captain Gleason was, I was told, just such a case.) Thus in the interest of our staffs throughout the area we simply cannot, in our opinion, let a case as blatant as the present one go unchallenged.

Feeling strongly the importance of the above considerations, the Department intends sometime in the near future to declare the Hungarian Assistant Military Attaché persona non grata.⁵ At the same time we will make it clear that the Hungarians are entirely free to replace the officer in question as we consider ourselves to be in Budapest.

Should you continue to have strong objections to this proposed action I would be happy to discuss the matter further with you at your convenience.⁶

Sincerely yours,

Jacob D. Beam⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/4–2357. Confidential. Drafted by Sutterlin and cleared by Murphy.
2. On April 3, Captain Gleason and Colonel J.C. Todd, U.S. Military Attaché, had been apprehended on a public road near the Soviet barracks in Hungary and held for 6 hours. On April 9, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleged that Gleason had been guilty of “open espionage” and ordered his departure within 48 hours. On April 25, Barnes delivered a note to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry denying the charges and protesting Gleason’s treatment. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 20, 1957, pp. 810–811.
3. This letter, not found in Department of State files, asked for Erskine’s views on the desirability of expelling the Hungarian Assistant Military Attaché.
4. Erskine replied that “you may wish to consider again whether it is necessarily desirable to counter one expulsion with another. It might be preferable to expel Soviet bloc officials against whom we have a good case at a time that can appear to be of our choosing.” Thus he recommended either taking no immediate action or else taking action against whomever presented the best target in terms of generating “unfavorable publicity to the bloc.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/4–2357) In a memorandum to Murphy dated April 26, Beam indicated that in deciding between the Air Force view, which opposed a reciprocal expulsion, and the Army view, which favored it, the Office of the Secretary of Defense supported the former. (Ibid., 611.64/4–2357)
5. On May 29, the United States informed Hungary that First Lieutenant Károly Mészaros, the Assistant Military and Air Attaché at their Legation, had been declared persona non grata and was to depart no later than June 3. For text of the note, see Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1957, p. 983.
6. A Hungarian note of May 25 called for a reduction of more than one-third in the number of administrative and diplomatic personnel of the Legation in Budapest. In its reply of June 11, the United States denied Hungary’s right to determine the size and composition of the mission in Budapest and described the proposed action as contrary to the maintenance of friendship between the American and Hungarian peoples. For text, see ibid., July 1, 1957, p. 30.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.