Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

245. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) and the Polish Representative at the United Nations (Michalowski), Washington, April 2, 1957¹

Washington, April 2, 1957

SUBJECT

• U.S. Polish Aid Negotiations

Ambassador Michalowski, with whom I discussed various matters from time to time during the recent session of the General Assembly, called me today to ask me to lunch with him which I accepted, inviting him to my home for my convenience. It became clear at the beginning of his conversation that he wished to discuss the negotiations with the U.S. on aid to Poland in order to impress on me the concern of the Poles.

The Ambassador said he was extremely depressed and pessimistic over the long delays and the relatively small amount which he understood the U.S. negotiators were considering offering to Poland. The Ambassador stated emphatically that he knew his government could not and would not accept an offer of $30 to $50 million.² After commenting that the Poles were highly gratified over the reaction in the American press and even in Congress to the desirability of aid to Poland, he said that he was afraid the American side might not fully understand the very great political implications of adequate U.S. assistance. He hastened to add that he was not criticizing the State Department but only taking into account the fact that the Polish negotiators were technicians and refrained from emphasizing political arguments.

To justify large-scale U.S. assistance to Poland from the Polish political point of view Ambassador Michalowski made the following points:

1. The Polish Government and the elements supporting it cannot take the political risk of accepting a small loan from the United States without compensating economic advantages which such a loan would lack. It would expose the regime to serious attacks from the “conservative Communist” elements and the Soviets. It would also be interpreted by the Polish population as an American rebuff or lack of confidence.

2. Substantial economic assistance is needed to facilitate the structural changes in the Polish economy to move away from the old-style Stalinist regime. For example, sufficient wheat is required in order to terminate the system of compulsory deliveries. While there is enough bread in Poland, the margin of stocks is so low that the end of compulsory delays might cause difficulties. Sufficient stocks are needed by the state to meet any emergency and at the same time permit a new system to take hold.

3. Of long-range significance is Poland’s need to end economic dependency on the U.S.S.R. This cannot be done unless the U.S. provides sufficient cotton, wheat, machinery and other materials to replace Soviet goods. The Ambassador pointed out that Poland is now totally dependent on the U.S.S.R. for cotton and iron ore, and also needs wheat. Under such conditions the Soviets can apply economic pressures to slow down and divert the Polish revolution. The Soviet Government is using this leverage now. If the economic situation further deteriorates, its pressure could bring about undesirable political consequences in Poland.

4. As far as he could see, there is no other national leader at present but Gomulka. If he fails or is forced out, there will be nothing but “Nihilism” and disaster. Gomulka has to make some compromises, and developments in Poland will go zigzag for awhile until the situation straightens out. However, the Ambassador emphasized that we should remember the people of Poland have given Gomulka only a “short term credit” to improve their lot. The economic situation is the real challenge. If Gomulka cannot master this with suitable outside help, the alternatives might be either the return of the Natolin group or another Hungary with its consequence for Europe and the United States.

5. Protracted negotiations in Washington are now beginning to play into the hands of the Natolin group. The Ambassador said that this was to him the real danger in the situation and the reason for his pessimism. He claimed that there were now indications that this group is beginning to take advantage of the delays to spread the idea the U.S. was much less reliable support for Poland than the Soviet Union. According to the Ambassador, the Natolin group now has the Soviet-Hungarian economic agreement to cite as purported proof of Soviet generosity compared with American.³ The Ambassador seemed very disturbed that the Kadar regime had been able to obtain roughly $200 million worth in rubles and free currency for Hungary while Poland after weeks and even months was still unable to reach an agreement with the U.S. If the U.S. offers only $30 million, the comparison with Hungary would be a severe blow to the Gomulka regime. The Ambassador urged that we fully understand the necessity of doing everything to circumvent the Natolin group which he claimed is still powerful, seeking Gomulka’s downfall and is receiving considerable secret support from the Soviet Union.

I commented only to the effect that I had nothing to do with Polish affairs or the aid negotiations, as he well knew, but that I thought something might be worked out if his government would be patient and understand the problems from our side, as I was sure American officials were trying to understand theirs. I also emphasized to him the real difficulties we have in our legislation and procedures in meeting a considerably different situation than what we are used to in the aid field, that is furnishing assistance to a Communist state formally allied to the Soviet Union. He said he thought his people fully understood these difficulties. However, he was concerned as to whether the U.S. fully grasped all the implications of aid to Poland from the Polish point of view. He said that he had the impression that State Department officials were well informed and understood what was going on in Poland, but wondered whether or not there was a general appreciation in the U.S. Government of what the Polish Government is facing.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 748.5–MSP/4–257. Confidential. Drafted by Young.
2. The Secretary discussed the question of aid to Poland in a press conference on April 2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1957, p. 646.
3. Telegram 806 from Budapest, April 2, summarized the March 28 Soviet-Hungarian communiqué which spelled out Soviet economic assistance following Kádár’s trip to the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6461/4–257)
4. Polish Ambassadors Spasowski and Michalowski met with Murphy on April 3 and April 9 to discuss the issue of U.S. aid to Poland. They expressed again Poland’s need and desire for U.S. aid. (Memorandum of conversation by Trivers, April 3; ibid., 748.5–MSP/4–357 and memorandum of conversation by Murphy, April 9; ibid., 748.5–MSP/4–957) At the Secretary’s Staff Meeting on April 9, Kalijarvi described the prospects of reaching agreement with Poland as dim. (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)