Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

243. Despatch From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State¹

No. 417

Bucharest March 27, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Conference with Foreign Minister Preoteasa² March 26, 1957

On Monday February 25th, I called Mr. Caius Frantescu, the Chief of Protocol, to discuss with him the matter of travel regulations, with particular reference to the question as to whether Lt. Col. K. G. Taylor³ would be able to motor through the Oradea district on his way out to Vienna to meet his wife who was returning from a protracted illness in the United States. In the course of this conversation, I casually mentioned that sometime when convenient I would like to see the Foreign Minister and have a general discussion with him about U.S.-Rumanian relations. I said that I hadn’t had a chat with him since he had left before Christmas for the United Nations meetings, and that although there was no great rush I would appreciate the chance of talking to him. A few days later, at a moving picture showing at the Diplomatic Club sponsored by our Legation, Mr. Frantescu volunteered the information that he had already spoken to the Foreign Minister about a meeting with us. Two days later he called me to say that the Foreign Minister was very sorry he had not been able to see me that week but he would surely do so sometime during the coming week.

Thereafter about ten days went by with no word whatsoever, and I therefore called Mr. Frantescu, who said he had no answer but would pursue the matter. Another week went by, and I finally called again and said that although several weeks before when I first requested an appointment I had been in no special hurry, time had sped by with no results, and now certain matters began to be pressing. Mr. Frantescu replied that he was constantly reminding the Minister of my request and had been insisting that an appointment be made. (It should be noted that this is the first time that I have ever had to wait more than three or at most five days to get an appointment with the Foreign Minister.)

It was at the beginning of the fourth week since I had requested an appointment that I met Mr. Frantescu in the gallery of the Chamber of the Grand National Assembly on the occasion of its recent meeting. I at once reminded him that it was now three weeks since I had made my original request, and that I had always understood that international diplomatic usage gave a Minister the right to demand to see the Foreign Minister, which the latter could not refuse. Mr. Frantescu led me aside away from eavesdroppers and said that he frankly was personally very much embarrassed by the situation, and so was the Foreign Minister; but the latter had been told not to see me until the Rumanian Government had made an important decision regarding Rumanian-United States relations. The Minister was therefore powerless to do anything and, as I could well see, the Government at the moment was completely absorbed in the proceedings before the Grand National Assembly and nothing could be expected until they were over. I asked whether the decision involved something pleasant or unpleasant in our relations, and Mr. Frantescu replied that he hadn’t the slightest idea what it was all about. He stressed that he had had no business to tell me as much as he had, and he begged me to keep it very much to myself. Later on in the morning I again had him repeat what he had told me, and received another assurance that he had no inkling as to the nature of the so-called “decision.”

Under the above circumstances the problem presented to the Legation was to determine what action, if any, could be taken to influence in any way the Rumanian Government in coming to this “decision”, in the absence of any clue as to what this decision was. Since no negotiations were at the moment pending on any question, the matter to be decided must, it would seem, necessarily be a question of whether the Rumanian Government should take some action either favorable or unfavorable towards the United States. The objective of favorable action would be to create a climate in which the United States would be disposed to grant export licenses for the materials which the Rumanian Minister is at present actively privately negotiating with various business concerns in the United States, notably in the chemical industry. The objective of unfavorable action would be to assist the Soviets, as had been done by other members of the bloc, in their campaign to show the world, particularly the masses in Asia and Africa, that espionage and subversion was back of the Hungarian revolt and that therefore their violent measures in Hungary were justified. In view of the tenor of not only press attacks but also the current speeches in the Grand National Assembly, particularly that of Prime Minister Stoica emphasizing U.S. espionage and calling for it to halt,⁴ it appeared that unfavorable action was more likely since favorable action would seem anomalous in the existing climate. The unfavorable action most conforming to precedent in other countries of the Soviet bloc, and most logical as a denouement to all of the verbal accusations, would be the declaration of someone such as a Military Attaché as Persona Non Grata and his expulsion.

It has been my personal experience since I have been here that the most effective attitude to adopt towards the Communist regime is a combination of personal friendliness and official firmness and severity. In personal relations they have, all of them, a definite inferiority complex, and they respond to personal warmth with a certain amount of surprise and eagerness. This is particularly true in this country where even the top members of the hierarchy are Latins and Western in their orientation. On the other hand, they understand hard dealing and respect it, and I have never failed to get action as a result of extreme firmness to the point of almost violence on a matter where it was clear that the United States had a justifiable case. I therefore determined to carry out a campaign on this basis covering the few days remaining before the end of the Grand National Assembly Meeting, after which it could be expected that the “decision” would come up for consideration.

This campaign consisted of visiting the Chamber of the Grand National Assembly daily and making myself as agreeable as possible personally to every official of the Rumanian Government that I knew, as well as to the members of the Eastern Diplomatic corps, particularly the Soviet Ambassador. A moving picture at my residence was organized for children of the diplomatic corps and to it there were invited the children of some Eastern diplomats, the first social invitations extended since the Hungarian revolt. An invitation was issued through Protocol several days later for a moving picture showing and dinner to a group of Rumanian musicians. On a Sunday excursion on which I invited a Rumanian, whom I have reason to believe reports conversations with me regularly to the Government, I took pains to explain that unfortunately relations between our two countries were so sensitive at the moment that any unpleasant action by the Rumanians might have the result of seriously affecting any pending business negotiations being carried on by the Minister in the United States, as well as my own position here. I also dropped hints of the same nature casually in passing with Rumanian officials with whom I came in contact. Finally, on Monday, March 25th, the day following the end of the Grand National Assembly, I called Mr. Frantescu and told him that now the situation regarding my appointment with the Foreign Minister had reached a stage where it was becoming a very serious matter. I emphasized that if I had to report to my government that I as a Minister was unable to see the Foreign Minister I could not be at all sure that they would not come to the conclusion that under these circumstances there was not much point in the United States having a Minister in Bucharest. Mr. Frantescu said he would convey this message to the Foreign Minister. About four hours later I received word that the Foreign Minister would see me at 1800 on March 26th.

Later that day at the reception given by the Greek Ambassador on the occasion of the Greek National Holiday, Mr. Frantescu confided to me that my message had had immediate and most successful results. The Foreign Minister upon receiving it had gone immediately to see the Government (a phrase used by Rum officials to indicate the Politburo) and had remained with them three hours even though he had had no prior engagement with them. Upon his return, he had asked to have me advised that the appointment was set for 1800 on the next day. I asked if the “decision” had been made and whether it was favorable or unfavorable⁵ and he said he did not know.

At the same reception, I was greeted cordially by the Foreign Minister who referred to our pending meeting and apologized for the delay, saying that he had been very busy lately. I had a friendly non-political conversation with him. I was also greeted in a friendly if somewhat less cordial fashion than usual by Prime Minister Stoica who is customarily somewhat embarrassingly effusive in his greetings.

The manner of these other Rumanian officials toward me at this reception made it quite evident that a decision unfavorable to the United States had not been taken at the morning meeting with the Foreign Minister. It had either been deferred or else a decision had been made to take no action whatsoever.

This was confirmed by the conference itself with the Foreign Minister. He was most affable and friendly throughout and more receptive to the proposals that I made than I have ever known him to be.

The conference took place at 7:30 P.M. on March 26th at the Foreign Office with Mr. Gavril Gabor, the head of the United States desk in the Rumanian Foreign Office acting as interpreter. I opened the discussion by stating that between November 1955 and November 1956 I had worked very hard to try and improve the relations between our two countries and I felt that I had had some measure of success. I emphasized that progress in improving relations because of past experience must necessarily be very slow but at least we had been inching on. Then suddenly a volcano erupted in the shape of the Hungarian situation. I pointed out that it would be a complete waste of time for me to discuss the events in Hungary with the Foreign Minister since I knew from reading his speeches before the UN that he and I were in complete disagreement in the interpretation of these events, and although I subscribed to Mr. Voltaire’s views on the right of Mr. Preoteasa to have his own opinion, a debate on the subject at this time would serve no useful purpose. The important point, I believed, was to face realistically the situation as it exists today and try to find areas of agreement in which some kind of joint action that would tend to improve relations would be possible. I had several suggestions to make to this end.

I then referred to the refusal to the Rumanian Government to permit American election observers to visit Rumania, although Rumanian observers had gone to the United States.⁶ I said that, on a reciprocal basis, it would seem appropriate that in exchange for the Rumanian visits there should be a visit to Rumania of three American specialists on education, political science, and chemical industrial matters. I also brought up the question of student exchanges and finally I handed to Mr. Preoteasa two copies of the publication, Amerika, pointing out that if it was possible for such a publication to be distributed within the Soviet Union at a time when obviously our relations with the USSR were not of the closest, it should also be possible to do the same thing in Rumania.

I then said that there were several current pressing problems confronting the Legation that needed to be solved and that although each one of them in itself might seem insignificant, I considered their solution symbolic of Rumanian sincerity and good will in trying to improve our relations during this period. I said that first of all it had been agreed that there should be no limitation on our having a reasonable number of Legation employees in Bucharest and that I, personally, had gone to see the head of the ODCD over six months ago on the question of obtaining housing for new employees. I pointed out that three months ago we had been assured that there were two apartments that would be ready about the 15th of March, that they actually existed, and we even had gone so far as to discuss whether or not our employees would assist in making repairs. We had been assured this would not be necessary. Suddenly a few weeks ago, we were advised without prior warning that not only were these apartments not available but that it was doubtful if anything would be ready until the end of the year. I stressed that it would be impossible for me to retain Legation personnel indefinitely in a hotel and that this sudden refusal was tantamount to an act deliberately limiting the number of personnel the Legation could have. If this was done it would mean, of course, that the United States Government in Washington would be compelled to limit the personnel at the Rumanian Legation and we would then start in the same old ridiculous process of retaliatory measures which I deeply deplored.

I then briefly described the case of Mrs. Kohn,⁷ the last American citizen of American birth and upbringing who has not received an exit visa and also the cases of Vasile Charles Cionca, Maria Nanos and Georgeta Cotarla, as being cases deserving of immediate action by reason of their humanitarian elements. I mentioned the subject of tourism, pointing out that an American citizen visiting Rumania had been told by militiamen that no tourist visas would be issued this year to American citizen and said if this were true, it should be reported to American tourist agencies.

Finally, I took up the question of the use of the United States Air Force plane, emphasizing that I had been told by the Chief of Protocol that I could use the plane in any way that I wished, that I had no desire to interfere with the income of the transportation sections of the Rumanian Government, but that the plane was most important for me and my staff in view of the great distances involved when travel was necessary for official or vacation purposes, particularly where children were involved. I said that all I wished was to be told exactly what the Rumanian position was on this subject. I pointed out that I would only require the plane for three or four trips out of Rumania and return each year and that once this permission had been granted by the Rumanian Government last year, I could see no basis for withdrawing it since certainly the privilege had not been abused.

I closed with a statement that even though US-Rumanian relations had been going through a period of heavy weather I felt that there were plenty of opportunities for finding things to do which would be of mutual benefit and have at least a tendency to bring us back to where we had been last year.

Mr. Gabor wrongly translated this last remark to indicate that I expected US-Rumanian relations to enter into a period of heavy weather in the future. The Prime Minister at once asked me in a rather startled manner what specifically I meant by this remark. I pointed out the error in translation and said that I referred to the current situation, not something that would happen in the future. I said that I had read Mr. Stoica’s speech and that I had been surprised to hear from him the same ridiculous propaganda about the United States being imperialistic and attempting to take over the whole world for the benefit of Wall Street bankers which I had been reading lately in the newspapers. I pointed out that I knew from my own personal contacts with the Rumanian people that none of this was having any effect upon them since they all realized it was as ridiculous as I did, but at least it would appear to indicate that at the moment the Rumanian Government did not have very friendly feelings toward the United States.

The Foreign Minister started off by saying that he agreed that our relations had slowly improved during the last year. He hoped I was of course aware that this was a result of Rumanian efforts. They had tried to show the United States Government the real desire of the Rumanians to improve relations. Last fall this desire materialized in actual discussions.⁸ The Minister said he would like to recall that the Rumanians had hoped these discussions would be of a concrete, substantive character but the United States had insisted that they were nothing but preliminary talks. However, even this achieved some useful purpose and at least it was good to know each other’s intentions. The Rumanians wanted to discuss problems which, if relations are to be normal, have to be solved by the two governments. One of them was the problem of American claims and in this connection since the claims are American it was hard for the Rumanians to understand why we had not been prepared to present definite substantive amounts. The American Government in its turn wished to raise other problems which the Rumanians agreed to discuss.

With regard to the present Rumanian position he pointed out that I had been able to listen to Mr. Stoica’s speech and he assumed that I had noticed the part where he had declared the conviction of the Rumanian Government that on the basis of principles of equality and mutual respect, normal and reciprocal relations can develop between our two countries. Mr. Preoteasa said that it was this thought that he wished to be a guide in his answer to the proposals that I had suggested. He also agreed that there was no point in discussing the period of last November. He did not want to talk about the propaganda made against the Rumanian Government which, of course, could not be accepted by the Rumanian people. He laid these matters aside with the aim and the wish that in order to improve relations we should try and find those things upon which we could agree. He said that I had expressed a wish to improve relations—the Rumanian Government had the same wish—let us now see how this can be achieved.

He remarked that I had made certain proposals which I had referred to as symbolic of our desire to improve relations. These proposals will be studied. There are certain elements in them which the Foreign Minister considers as being on good, solid ground. Referring to the visit of United States specialists, he agreed thoroughly with the principles of mutual visits. He recalled that Rumanian specialists in chemistry had visited the United States and found it normal that correspondingly US chemical specialists should come over here. He could not give me an answer on any particular visit since this has to be studied by the Government, but he agreed completely with the principle. Later on, other similar visits should be developed.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that last fall we stopped without any conclusion concerning our discussion of all of these problems. At that time the Rumanians had raised the question of solving United States financial claims, together with the general problem of commercial relations. The Rumanian Government sees in commercial relations an efficient means to improve collaboration and advance relations in general. Specifically, it was through commercial relations that they hoped to find a way to pay for United States claims since Rumania has not the money for such payments that is available to the United States. Rumania is a country with a young economy in the process of development. It is rich in resources and in order to improve the living standards of the Rumanian population they have to pay a great deal for the development of their national economy. It was, therefore, perfectly normal that when they wanted to pay the United States the debts which they owed them they should look for a way of doing so. Mr. Preoteasa pointed out that the United States had never told the Rumanian Government what we thought about this proposal and of whether it could be solved in a commercial manner. He stressed that simply to explore the question is not enough and that they were desirous of finding effective means of definitely solving the problem. Perhaps if it could not be solved immediately through commercial relations, it would be possible for the United States to extend a long term loan to Rumania in order that she could pay her debts. Since the United States has millions of dollars to spend, why should not some of this money be used in this manner? In the Foreign Minister’s opinion, we should re-examine certain parts of the discussion during the autumn conference. It seemed absurd if the United States had claims against Rumania that these claims should not be discussed and an effective solution found to the problem of paying them.

With regard to the publishing of a Rumanian magazine in America and an American magazine in Rumania, the Rumanian Government wished the United States people to know Rumania and its people as they are, the efforts of the Rumanian people to gain a better life and a higher culture. The opposite, of course, is equally valid, namely, that the Rumanian people should know the American people, their life, their culture, their achievements. For this purpose there exists various ways and means and we wished to choose those which are based on mutual considerations. The magazine which I propose is a very nice looking one made on good paper with excellent printing and workmanship. The material in the magazine is not controversial but deals with appropriate subjects. However, it should be pointed out that everything that is valid between the United States and the USSR is not equally valid between the United States and Rumania. Perhaps the USSR has the means to make a magazine of this quality and distribute it within the United States but the Foreign Minister was rather skeptical on this point. In any event, the matter would be studied. Mr. Preoteasa went on to mention that an exchange of exhibits should be seriously considered and other forms of exchanging reciprocal information concerning our countries. He noted in the magazine an article on an American tenor. Why should the tenor not come himself instead of being presented on paper in a magazine?

On the question of tourism, there is no reason this should not continue to be developed provided there is a clear understanding between the travel agencies of the two countries. The Foreign Minister pointed out that Rumania was only in the beginning of its development of tourism. Housing is a basis for tours and it is the one thing which Rumania lacks. Its means are very restricted in this line. In this connection he wanted to emphasize that there was no intention whatsoever on the part of the Rumanian Government to limit Legation personnel by denying it housing. The housing situation was a serious and difficult one in Rumania but the Foreign Minister promised to look into this matter immediately.

The Foreign Minister said that in this answer he was giving me it was necessary to realize that underlying it was the spirit in which the Rumanian people looked on things and he hoped he had been sufficiently clear in expressing it. What the Rumanian Government wanted was that on the basis of certain principles of equality, respect for the Rumanian way of life, Rumanian laws and respect for the American way of life, and American laws, the Rumanian Government should improve and develop these relations with the United States. He hope that these things should be only a tiny part of the great work of the improvement of general international relations throughout the world. Rumania is a much smaller country than the United States but the Rumanian people are proud people and love their country, its independence, and its development. The problem is how to make the Rumanian people known in the world. They are not always understood. The main wish of the Rumanian Government is that Rumania should progress on the road of well-being and many sided development.

The Foreign Minister closed by saying that close attention will be given to the various Legation problems I had brought up and he assured me that the earliest possible answer to them would be forthcoming.

This is one of the few conferences I have ever had with the Foreign Minister when at some point or another he did not raise strong objection to United States actions. I received the very definite impression that at least so far as he himself was concerned, he was most anxious to have things restored to the same basis that they were before. It is obvious that the economic situation is predominant in his mind and I have the feeling that anything that we ask for or suggest will be examined by the Rumanian Government to see if it cannot be turned into something which will redound to their economic advantage. By the same token, I believe that we should have them in mind in considering things that we may desire to obtain from the Rumanian Government. It should not be difficult for us to get them to agree to doing things for us in return for something economically beneficial to them and their need is so great that we should be able to get a great deal in return for very little if we so desire.

What the “decision” contemplated by the Rumanian Government as related to me by Mr. Frantescu was we shall probably never know. I am convinced that it was not merely a device advanced by Mr. Frantescu to cover the Foreign Minister’s failure to make an appointment with me. It is interesting to speculate as to whether at the reported three hour meeting between the Foreign Minister and the Government prior to the fixing of a date for our meeting there was discussion concerning the effect of unfavorable action against us on the prospects of future economic dealings with the United States. It is always impossible to assess accurately the effects of psychological warfare and in this case whether the brief campaign carried on to try and forestall unfavorable action had any influence on the situation is questionable in the extreme. However, I continue to believe that United States interests and objectives can best be advanced in Rumania by a tactful combination of personal friendliness and very severe and firm official relations with the Rumanian officials.

Robert H. Thayer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.66/3–2757. Secret; Limited Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department.
2. Grigore Preoteasa.
3. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth G. Taylor, U.S. Army Attaché.
4. In telegram 567 from Bucharest, March 22, Thayer indicated his belief that a formal protest should be lodged against the “unwarranted and false allegations” made by Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica in his speech. (Department of State, Central Files, 766.13/3–2257) The Department of State replied to Thayer in telegram 331, March 25, that it was not “general practice to protest formally such propaganda charges.” (Ibid.)
5. The words “favorable” and “unfavorable” were underlined and the following appears in the margin: “what’s with this favorable unfavorable stuff!”
6. On January 19, Romania refused to allow three observers from the United States to be present when national parliamentary elections took place on February 3, despite an agreement under which Romanian observers had come to the United States for the 1956 presidential election. See Department of State Bulletin, February 11, 1957, p. 213.
7. Documentation concerning Helene Clepcea Kohn is in Department of State, Central Files, 266.1122–Kohn, Helene Clepcea.
8. See Document 139.