218. Notes of a Meeting With the President, White House, Washington, December 26, 1956, 11 a.m.1
PRESENT
- The Vice President; Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Undersecretary of State; John B. Hollister, Director, ICA; William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General; Tracy Voorhees2
STAFF MEMBERS
- Persons, Murray Snyder and Goodpaster
The Vice President reported on his trip to Austria in connection with the Hungarian refugee problem.3 On that trip he was accompanied by Mr. Hollister and Mr. Rogers.
His first point was that the U.S. should not continue to speak of the numbers of refugees it is admitting. The British and French take credit for an unlimited number, though actually they do have limitation. He came back to this point a number of times.
The Vice President is going to prepare a brief summary report for the leaders’ meetings next Monday and Tuesday.4
Under his general comments, the Vice President first stressed that despite the confusion, generally speaking a very good job is being done for the refugees. There are some big camps, some smaller ones, some people housed in schoolhouses and barracks, and Salzburg and Munich and other places have taken some. The Salzburg camp is probably the best one.
He praised particularly the work Ambassador Thompson, in Austria, of the Immigration people, and talked at some length about the voluntary efforts of service people at various spots along the way to provide packages and extraordinarily thoughtful things for the Hungarians. The President asked Colonel Goodpaster to prepare for him a letter to General Max Taylor commending the service people and wives. He also said parenthetically that the situation at Camp Kilmer had greatly improved from the early first days. The President also suggested that if the Vice President spoke again on television, he should put in a word about the service people.
[Page 536]The Vice President’s next general comment was about the high calibre of the refugees. They are young, in most cases the people “had” to leave the country—i.e. the leadership type—to avoid deportation. The President recalled that Marshal Zhukov had once said if you got rid of the leaders of a country, you could do anything you wanted to.
About the security problem, the Vice President minimised the danger, particularly because there are so many people coming out that everyone is known to a lot of the others and it is hard in that way to slip into them a person who might be planted for spying purposes. However, some of the Congressional leaders are worrying about that. The President thinks such danger is almost zero—and said the Communists did not have to go to such elaborate means as would be necessary in this case, in order to get “spies” into our country.
The Vice President said the other countries regard these particular refugees as tremendous assets, rather than liabilities—pointed out that Holland, overcrowded as it is, had taken 300 and wanted more. Germany is taking 10% of all that come over—they are experts in handling refugees. The Hungarians are productive people—later in the discussion the President pointed out what a tremendous thing it would be for the Mid East people to take in some of these industrious people.
The Vice President next went to the size of the problem, though there are so many imponderables it is difficult to be accurate. Approximately 151,000 have come out to date, of these 70,000 are still in Austria—80,000 having moved on into other countries. We have taken about 14,000—and have processed remaining 7,000 that at present we may take. The transportation of these 7,000 will require until January 10th. They are still coming out at rate of 800 a day, and no one can say for how long that will go on. There is feeling that the Russians are soon going to have a major decision to make—one that might start the tide going back (if any change in government in Hungary)—or the Russians may clamp down on exodus.
The President had been advised that it would be cheaper to keep these people in Austria, the U.S. paying the costs, but the Vice President emphatically disagreed.
Back to the figures, there are about 63,000 in Austria as yet unplaced, of which 10,000 will be taken by other countries. Austria has said that they can absorb 30,000 (but there is a joker in that, since they put as a condition the money to build housing facilities—and, it was later said, any houses that might be built would undoubtedly go to the local politicos rather than the refugees). At any rate that would leave about 20,000 odd thousand for whom places must be found, plus the 800 a day coming in.
[Page 537]The Vice President pointed out the danger in leaving people too long in refugee camps because of morale problem. The President said that the danger was really based on the nature of the people, that the Latvians and Estonians, etc., had, during the war, conducted model camps—because of their very nature. But the Hungarians are volatile and impulsive—and the camps would be breeding grounds for Communist propaganda.
An additional problem is that a number of the refugees have gone to other countries, with the promise that they will be brought to America as soon as possible (however, the other countries will take replacements). The President said Britain should work out an arrangement with the Commonwealth—Australia, however, is taking 4,000. The President said he had asked Nehru to take a certain token number, despite India’s overcrowded condition.5 The ones in Italy must be taken out as soon as possible. The President suggested to Mr. Henderson that the State Department should work with the Latin American nations to try to get them to take a certain number each—they are in general underpopulated and can use the skills the Hungarians have.
The question is where do we go from there? The President suggested that, pending action on the part of Congress, processing be continued on a temporary basis—and at the same time the refugees be processed by other countries, with the explanation given to them that the United States cannot at the moment definitely guarantee them entry. Bill Rogers said that the Attorney General was not willing to guarantee more “parolees” without at least an understanding with the Congressional leaders that such action would be approved by Congress. The President pointed out that he did not want to stop processing, particularly since if we do, the pick of the refugees will go to other countries.
It was agreed that the matter should be presented to the bipartisan meeting of Congress, rather than to the Republicans alone.
Mr. Rogers suggested that something on the order of “suspension deportation” arrangements can be worked out.
The President brought up what he had heard was lack of response to the Red Cross appeal. The Vice President said appeal had picked up, and it was agreed that the money would probably come in in the quantity necessary. The President hopes it does, because that would indicate the people of the country are behind the movement—and if so, Congress will go along. The Vice President emphasized that it is important that the United States not drag its feet—that it stay in the forefront of the moment, that we continue to take applications at current rate. The President said we could take the applications—could say that we will take our “full share” or “decent share” of refugees. He [Page 538] pointed out that what we were talking about was really a small number of those that might come in, if, for instance, Poland and Czechoslovakia should have upheavals similar to the Hungarian one. He also said we have got to have every country in the world feel some responsibility. The United Nations ought to pass a Resolution commending each nation for its readiness to open its doors.
The Vice President suggested that Cabot Lodge might make as a primary order of business the urging of the Ambassadors to the United Nations that their countries accept this responsibility.
There was some question as to how quickly Congress would act (in matter of increasing number of people the US could take)—the Vice President said two months; it was hoped not that long. The President said, incidentally, that he was willing to see Congressman Walter6 if that would be helpful in enlisting his energetic cooperation.
The Vice President urged that here was an opportunity to get needed flexibility into our Immigration laws. He pointed out also the seeming injustice to the 10,000 Eastern European refugees who are anxious to come to this country—who crawled under barbed wire to come out—and who have been long in camps, mainly in Germany. The Justice Department is going to recommend such flexibility.
Turning to the economic side—there was discussion of the amounts needed (which of course depends on the number that will continue to come out) and whether Congress should be asked for a special appropriation. Hollister spoke about the magnitude of the problem and said, with money available in ICA, he could absorb some $60-65 million of the cost, assuming that Mid East projects for which money was appropriated did not materialize. However, the President said that he hoped that at least part of that money would be used for the Mid East. It was agreed that the U.S. was going to have to shoulder the burden of the major part of the financing. A payment of some $5 million has been made to the UN, but it was questioned whether other members of the UN had put in their share.7 If they do not, President agrees money should go direct to Austria. Mr. Hollister pointed out there were three distinct projects: general refugee problem; refugees coming to this country; and the situation in Hungary itself. There are the private agencies; there is the International Red Cross; and there are the other red cross teams operating in Austria. He recommended a “dictator” under Ambassador Thompson to handle the details of payments, etc. Hollister hopes to make as many payments as possible in [Page 539] commodities and in a deal that will utilize some shillings he has in reserve. Hollister told the President of the “bill” the Austrian government presented them, for expenses for people already there, for anticipated people, and, again, for the housing they hope to build with American funds. The Vice President thought it would be well to ask the Congress for $30-40 million for the purpose—he is inclined to think it would be a good idea to let the Congress see this refugee problem in its entirety—as a single package. The President may want to discuss this with Congressional leaders.
Tracy Voorhees presented two or three points. To prevent piling up of refugees at Camp Kilmer, it may be necessary for the government to provide transportation and other assistance to some of the private charities, specifically Catholic Charities. Secondly, he has contracted with a public relations firm, to be paid for independently, a program for creating a “suction effort” throught the country. So far it has been a “retail” job. He hopes this suction effort will prevent later repercussions about placement of refugees. There is needed also some way of “dividing” up the refugees among the voluntary agencies. We ought to have something to say about which agencies will be the sponsoring agencies.
About the transportation from abroad, he said the Pentagon wanted it all contracted for. The President has little patience with the grumblings of the services.
At the conclusion Mr. Voorhees told the President of the reception his letter to the refugees had had at Camp Kilmer.8
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Prepared by Ann C. Whitman. The meeting took place in the President’s office.↩
- On December 12, President Eisenhower announced the establishment of the President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief chaired by Tracy S. Voorhees. He was charged with seeing to it that the voluntary agencies worked effectively with each other and with the government agencies involved in the relief effort. William Hallam Tuck was designated to act for the committee in Austria in a liaison capacity with Ambassador Thompson. Voorhees had earlier been appointed on November 28 to be the President’s representative concerning resettlement activities and refugee relief.↩
- Dulles spoke with Nixon on December 7 regarding a trip to Austria. Nixon suggested various ways of dramatizing the mission including having Mrs. Eisenhower or Mrs. Nixon go over on the Presidential plane to pick up a planeload of women and children. He later stated, however, that he did not wish to go if it appeared like a “grandstand play.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, December 7; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) In his memoirs, Nixon stated that the President recalled him to Washington on December 13 and asked him to meet with Dulles who informed him that it had been decided to have him undertake the mission to Austria (Operation Mercy). (RN: Memoirs of Richard Nixon; p. 182) The announcement of the Vice President’s trip to Austria as the President’s personal representative was made on December 12. He departed on December 18 and returned on December 24. Subsequently, on December 27, he visited the refugee facility at Camp Kilmer. For text of his January 1, 1957, “Report to the President on Hungarian Refugees,” see Department of State Bulletin, January 21, 1957, pp. 94–99.↩
- Following Nixon’s report and his meeting with Congressional leaders on January 1, the President announced that, pending Congressional action, the Attorney General would continue to parole Hungarian refugees into the United States. (Telegram 3045 to Vienna, January 3; Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/1–357)↩
- Nehru visited the United States between December 16 and 20, 1956.↩
- Democratic Congressman Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania was a member of the Joint Committee on Immigration and Nationality Policy.↩
- On December 15, in response to General Assembly Resolution 1007 (ES–II), the President declared that the United States would make $4 million available to the United Nations to assist Hungarian refugees. This was in addition to the earlier $1 million contribution. See Department of State Bulletin, January 9, 1957, p. 9.↩
- In his letter, which was undated, the President welcomed the Hungarians to American soil and concluded: “We realize that you ardently hope for a time when all Hungarians can enjoy the blessings of individual freedom in their Hungarian mother-country. We join in that hope. And we give you this present assurance—if, when that day dawns once more, you should choose to go back to your native homes in Hungary, America will do its best in helping you to return.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)↩