Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

216. Notes on the 58th Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems, Washington, December 19, 1956¹

Washington, December 19, 1956

MEMBERS PRESENT

• State—Mr. Jacob D. Beam, Chairman
• State—Mr. Edward L. Freers
• Defense—Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen
• Defense—Mr. Roger Ernst
• CIA—Mr. Laughlin Campbell
• USIA—Mr. E. Lewis Revey
• OCB—Mr. Warren A. Kelsey, Asst. Staff Representative

OTHERS PRESENT

• State—Mr. Robert M. McKisson
• State—Mr. Philip Burris
• State—Mr. Nathaniel J. Davis
• Defense—Colonel Erik W. Ritzau

1. Aid to Poland. Mr. Beam reported that some progress had been made in normalizing economic relations with Poland. The CFEP had reversed its policy against the sale of surplus commodities to Soviet bloc countries for dollars,² and a tentative determination had been made that for purposes of Titles I and II of PL 480 Poland could be regarded as “friendly” and not under control or domination of the international communist conspiracy. The Department had started consulting leading members of Congress on these steps and the decision about Poland’s “friendliness” was subject to review.³ The Department of State was not altogether happy about this decision but thought on balance that it should be made. Mr. Campbell inquired whether the reversal of CFEP policy applied to Poland only, to which Mr. Beam answered that it applied to the Iron Curtain countries except the Soviet Union on a selective basis, but that Poland was the only one of these countries to which it was applicable at present. He said that next week we might have something to tell the Poles on economic aid and that there was much pressure in the OCB to move ahead in the matter. Mr. Burris inquired whether arrangements had been considered under which other European countries might help Poland by means of triangular trade arrangements. Mr. Beam said that we were not much in favor of that now. Mr. Burris said that such arrangements might save the Poles from endangering their relations with the USSR by seeming to get too close to the United States. Mr. Beam said that there was little danger of this since the Poles were getting comparatively slim pickings from us. On the other hand, we did not want to discourage other Western Countries from trading with Poland; the French and Germans had something along these lines in mind although the British had decided that they could not afford it.

2. Hungary. Mr. Beam reported that UN action on Hungary had slowed down. The Secretary General was not eager to send observers to Austria or other European countries if they could not go to Hungary and the observers themselves were not eager to go. A suggestion had been made that the Secretary General’s role on Hungary be turned over to a watchdog committee to be chosen by the General Assembly. We were considering this idea, which had some advantages in that it would help to preserve the Secretary General’s neutral status in the Near Eastern problem. Mr. Revey said that he had been asked to bring to the Committee’s attention a recent article by Roscoe Drummond suggesting the appointment of Western diplomatic representatives in Budapest as observers.⁴ Mr. Beam answered that we have instructed our UN delegation to get the fact-finding group to request material from diplomatic sources in Budapest.⁵ The group had not done anything yet but the proposed new committee might. Mr. Revey asked whether Hammarskjold himself might designate the diplomats as observers, to which Mr. Beam replied that Hammarskjold wanted to fade out of the picture. Mr. Beam said that the rest of Drummond’s article was good, particularly the emphasis on the fact that the Hungarian revolt had been one of workers and intellectuals against communism, and he suggested that our propaganda might make use of the article.

Mr. Campbell said that a publication was being prepared making a comparison between photographs of demonstrating crowds in the October 1917 Russian revolution and in the Hungarian revolt; there was a remarkable similarity in some of the scenes. Mr. Revey said he had some reservations about this; first, it prejudged the Czarist regime (Mr. Beam commented that the Czarist regime had long since been well judged) and, second, Eastern Europeans might not like it, since they might consider their own revolutions different from the Russian one. Mr. Campbell said that the intention was to make an impression on the type of person who had been impressed by the book Ten Days That Shook the World. Mr. Beam said he thought it might have a good effect on those who still considered themselves Marxists such as the German Social Democrats. Mr. Burris said that Mr. Lightner was impressed by the idea and hoped that USIA was using it. Mr. Campbell said that this was a long-range project especially suitable for use during the 40th anniversary of the 1917 revolution. Mr. Beam said he did not see how we could lose on this project and Colonel Hansen also supported the idea. Mr. Freers said that it would be a good idea to contrast the present policy of countries which had been colonial empires in the 19th century with the colonialism characteristic of the Soviet Union today.

Turning to the Soviet UN resolution indicting the United States for “interference” in Hungary, Mr. Beam said that it was last on the agenda and would probably come to a vote in February. The Department had set up a working group to gather material to refute the charges.⁶

3. Possible Public Accounting for Kersten Fund Expenditures. Mr. Campbell suggested that, if possible, a public accounting of expenditures under the Kersten amendment might be made in order to refute the charges that these funds were being used for subversive purposes.⁷ He added that the CIA was not getting any funds under this amendment. Mr. Beam said that the idea might be useful, especially since some of these funds would probably be used for aid to Poland. He inquired who administered these funds and said the idea would be looked into.

Mr. Campbell said Anna Kethly was back in the United States and had revived her efforts to appear before the UN General Assembly or some other UN organ. He added that an attempt was being made to fix on an organizational basis propaganda efforts concerning Hungary by such means as setting up committees for the exposure of Soviet imperialism. Mr. Revey inquired about the progress of plans to send Hungarian refugees students to various parts of the world to address student organizations. Mr. Campbell said that this plan was going ahead slowly because of the screening problem.

4. Policy Toward Satellites. Mr. Beam said that the Secretary’s statement appearing in the press that morning⁸ seemed to fix our policy toward the satellites in favor of an evolutionary process, and that the question then arose what we would do in case of another Hungary. If a real revolt arose in Poland or East Germany Europe could hardly stand another attack such as had occurred against Hungary. Mr. Ernst said that the Department of Defense was also puzzling over that problem. Defense assumed that our ability to control or influence events was limited and that the question therefore was what we did if such a revolt actually happened. It was inclined to think that the best course would be prompt UN intercession or intervention. Mr. Revey said USIA planned not to give too much play to the Secretary’s statement except as immediate reassurance against any American desire to incite revolt.

Mr. Revey asked for comments on the Polish-Soviet agreement on the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland. Mr. Beam answered that the Department was analyzing it and comparing it with our own status of forces agreement, and that guidance would be forthcoming.⁹

Mr. Beam asked Mr. Boerner how he interpreted the Secretary’s statement. Mr. Boerner said that the USIA was not going to try to knock over any apple carts but it was sometimes a problem how to avoid that in a particular situation. Speculation whether we were going to negotiate with the Soviets was appearing in the press and real policy guidance rather than improvisation was needed. Mr. Beam said that Chalmers Roberts had recently expressed a correct opinion when he wrote that the thing to do now was to take matters easily and do nothing to help the Russians out of the dilemma they were in in Eastern Europe. Negotiations now would be unrealistic.

Colonel Hansen inquired whether the BBC was coordinating with us on output to Eastern Europe to which Mr. Boerner replied that they were also taking a cautious line.

5. Congressional Interest in Allegedly Inflammatory Broadcasts. Mr. Boerner pointed to the likelihood that the new Congress would do a lot of investigating of the allegations about the inflammatory nature of American broadcasts to Hungary. He read portions of a letter the USIA had received from Senator Humphrey¹⁰ in which the Senator asked for texts of sample VOA broadcasts to Hungary, including one of the Voice’s “most inflammatory” broadcasts, one of its “least inflammatory” and one of an “average” broadcast. Mr. Freers said he thought the thing to say was that we meant the same as the Secretary had meant in his recent statement. Mr. Boerner expressed doubts whether the agency would get off so easily. Mr. Beam commented that realization of our impotence to act in Hungary had had a sobering effect on public opinion about Eastern Europe. Mr. McKisson pointed out that the Soviets also had a tough problem in Eastern Europe and that we need not strain ourselves to do anything about it. Mr. Boerner commented that it was hard to stick by some of the Government’s decisions on the Hungarian problem; for example, the original idea had been that as many nations as possible should receive Hungarian refugees but that the refugee matter was more and more becoming an American operation as a result of public criticism that too little was being done for the refugees.

Warren A. Kelsey

Assistant OCB Staff Representative

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 100.4–OCB/12–1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Kelsey.
2. See footnote 4, supra.
3. See footnote 9, supra.
4. The article appeared in The Washington Post on December 18.
5. Not further identified.
6. This was the so-called “Walmsley group.” Regarding the Soviet accusation, see footnote 2, Document 210.
7. See footnote 4, Document 211.
8. Dulles spoke in response to a question at his December 18 press conference. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 7, 1957, pp. 3–4.
9. The agreement on the legal status of Soviet troops in Poland, signed in Warsaw on December 17, reaffirmed Polish internal sovereignty and recognized Poland’s legal jurisdiction over Soviet troops, personnel, and family members. The USIA Guidance on this agreement is in News Policy Note 1227–1130, December 27. (Department of State USIA/IOP/C Files: Lot 70 D 398, Poland)
10. Not found in USIA files.