Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

16. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 7, 1955—10 p.m.

2192. Visit of Soviet delegation to Sofia, Bucharest,² communiqués and press comment on these occasions, as well as summoning of Hungarian and Czech Communist leaders to Bucharest, would appear to indicate that Soviet Government intends to establish some gradation among satellites of permissible and non-permissible relation with Yugoslavia in light of Belgrade talks.³ While pattern is not yet clear, it would seem that those satellites bordering upon Yugoslavia may be permitted to establish somewhat closer relations with Tito than those at greater distance and possibly of more importance to Soviets.

Absence of any representatives of Poland and Albania at Bucharest is of considerable interest.⁴ In case of Poland, not only is geographic location factor, but in all probability Soviets are determined to take no chances whatsoever that Belgrade talks might result in too close a rapprochement between Poland and Yugoslavia. Soviets have always attached maximum importance to control of Poland in view of its geographic location between Soviet Union and Germany, together with full knowledge of character of Polish people and traditional anti-Russian feelings. So far in Soviet press comment on Belgrade talks there has been no specific mention whatsoever of any direct effect upon Polish-Yugoslav relations. Absence of similar reference to Yugoslav-Albania relations and fact that Albanians were not summoned Bucharest is noticeable possibly for opposite reasons. Of all satellites, Albania is more directly affected by Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement and it is not by any means impossible that during Belgrade talks there was some measure of Soviet recognition of Yugoslavia’s special position with regard to Albania, such as I believe existed prior to 1948. Both in communiqués issued after Sofia visit and picked up in Pravda yesterday and again in Izvestia today, reference is made to prospects improvement Bulgarian (and Soviet) relations with Greece and Turkey as result rapprochement with Yugoslavia. It is not clear at this stage exactly what Soviets have in mind in regard to these countries but this aspect has been singled out for special press attention and may forecast some developments effecting Turkey–Yugoslavia–Greek pact.

On general subjects mentioned in Department telegram 1035,⁵ I so far see no indication from Belgrade meeting beyond those already noted as to priority to be given certain international questions which would shed more light on Soviet positions at four-power conference. Before my departure I will do a round-up telegram of current indications concerning possible Soviet topics and positions at four-power conference.

With regard to satellite problem, I continue to believe that Soviets are in process, of which Belgrade talks are a part, of seeking more stable and permanent basis of relations with satellites in light existing circumstances. The purpose is obviously not willingly to lose control over European satellites, but on contrary to make certain readjustments based on more realistic assessment of current situation since Stalin’s death in order to retain maximum degree of such influence and control.

As indicated in beginning of this message, I am inclined to believe that Soviets in this process will make distinction between various satellites depending upon their relative importance to Soviet security, degree of reliability from Soviet point of view and other factors. It is too soon to attempt any definite conclusion as to what final outcome this process may be and most that can be done at this juncture is to keep this subject under close observation.

On Far East, we have noted and reported that Chinese press approval to Belgrade talks has been cited and picked up editorially by Soviet press, and of course, official Yugoslav association with Soviet position on admission China to United Nations and Formosa issue is gain for Soviet bloc, as already observed in Soviet eyes rapprochement with Yugoslavia may reduce possibility of developments damaging to Soviet prestige or interest in Yugoslav-Chinese relationship.

We have not [garble] from here on possible effect Soviet-Yugoslavian relations on Western Communist parties since evidence on that score is more readily ascertainable elsewhere. However, healing of heretical breach with Tito, even at possibly greater price than Soviets intended to pay, will certainly not be damaging to advantage of Communist cause as whole although possible to degree Moscow control.

There have been so far no developments here which would indicate any personnel factor within Soviet leadership as result Belgrade visit, and it is doubtful any such signs will be quickly apparent.

Entire leadership was present at airport on return of delegation and were present last night at Bolshoi gala performance and everyone seemed in normal positions. In general, however, we are inclined to believe that conduct of Soviet delegation at Belgrade, and particular fact that declaration was signed by Bulganin and not Khrushchev, is further sign that up to present at least Khrushchev has not acquired position of personal dominance to point where his will alone determines Soviet policy, and that in effect collective leadership, with all its inherent elements of instability and division applies.

From his remarks to Riddleberger, which were similar to those made to American correspondent, I am informed, here during Czech reception in May, it would appear that Khrushchev, as things now stand, will not attend four-power conference. While delegation probably not yet determined, most likely composition would be Bulganin, Molotov and possibly Mikoyan from among top leaders.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.66/6–755. Secret. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. En route home from Yugoslavia, Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation stopped at Sofia on June 3 and Bucharest on June 4. An initial report of the Bucharest meeting is in telegram 303 from Bucharest, June 6. (Ibid., 661.66/6–655) Because of the lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and Bulgaria, no comparable report for the Sofia meeting exists.
3. See the editorial note, supra.
4. In telegram 5416 from Paris, June 10, the Embassy reported that the French Foreign Ministry was inclined to minimize the importance of the absence of Albania and Poland from the Bucharest meeting on the grounds that the former was generally ignored in satellite gatherings by the Soviet Union and the leaders of the latter were adequately filled in on policy during the Warsaw Pact meetings earlier in May. (Department of State, Central Files, 760.00/6–1055)
5. In telegram 1035, June 6, the Department of State asked for further “thoughts or information” on the implications of the Belgrade meeting on possible Soviet courses of action at the Four-Power Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva, July 18–23. The Department was particularly interested in topics the Soviets might stress, nuances with respect to the satellite problem and the Far East, and personality factors within the Soviet leadership. (Ibid., 661.68/6–455)