150. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State1
1022. Since appears this office temporarily may be closer touch situation western Hungary than Legation Budapest following report based on talks Austrian officials and travelers may be helpful: Strength uprising appears be its popular nature. Although US criticized for failure supply any plan or leadership to rebels, this very fact has both weakened Soviet case for intervention and deprived them any specific center which either they or Communist government could capture in effort suppress revolt. Lack of political leadership of patriots however having effect consolidate power of Budapest Government as only effective organization in existence. Many reports here that Communists making great effort infiltrate western liberation committees. West Hungarian patriots appear go further in their demands for full freedom than citizens of capital doubtless because less exposed to Soviet force. Kreisky2 told me convinced many Hungarians deeply concerned at effect revolutionary action will have on Hungarian economy and hence their ability survive coming winter particularly if eventual government not fully acceptable to US. Suggested statement by US that regardless what happened heroic Hungarian people would not be allowed to starve would have salutary effect. For example refusal of miners and others return to work until satisfactory government would be easier maintain if they did not fear eventual effect on food supplies. He also thought west should give direction to political developments [Page 353] possibly through UN. Pointed out assurance eventual withdrawal Soviet troops from Hungary would have little value unless made to western powers or UN, and warned that once revolution lost its momentum would be difficult if not impossible revive it (for this reason I strongly question advisability sending UN Commission to Hungary which I believe my British colleague3 has suggested to British Foreign Office since this would in itself relax pressure without assurance compensating advantage.
Observers here seem agreed in distrusting Nagy who clearly not even a Gomulka, and in considering Tildy hopelessly weak and compromised and Kovacs and Anna Kethly most reliable characters on the scene.
Following are my tentative personal views admittedly based on incomplete information of rapidly changing situation. Key points with patriots appear be withdrawal Soviet troops and promise free elections. While both highly important, appears danger patriots will overplay their hand and seems unrealistic expect Soviets commit themselves both to withdrawal and elections which would certainly result in anti-Communist government. If opportunity arises suggest therefore we should concentrate on first objective since if achieved, Hungarians could likely insure evolution to democratic government once Soviet troops removed. On other hand if Soviet troops remain even free elections would provide no permanent security Hungarian freedom. Principal cards western hands appear to be potential influence on patriots to restore order and accept interim government, alternative of threat break relations Nagy government, possible willingness our part accept Hungarian neutrality, and possible willingness give economic aid. Presume Department aware risk Wailes presentation credentials to Nagy government may be exploited as endorsement by US of present government.
Reports here indicate western Hungarians intend propose Hungary adopt policy neutrality. Believe Austrians would welcome such decision. If negotiations for commitment to west powers or UN by Soviets agree withdraw troops should develop, suggest we could agree in advance recognize Hungarian neutrality if this should be decided upon by a freely elected Hungarian Government. In this connection recall that Austrian willingness declare neutrality was key point in their negotiations Moscow.
Realize Soviets will doubtless insist deal Hungarian situation directly. Seen from here their immediate objective is take steam out of revolution and establish government with greatest degree Communist control possible. While clear that Soviets could by force easily and quickly wipe out present opposition in west Hungary our information [Page 354] indicates that any stooge government would find it difficult if not impossible operate and Soviets may face choice of full military occupation or withdrawal.