95. Editorial Note
Following the SEATO Council Meeting in Karachi, Secretary Dulles was in New Delhi March 9–10. His memorandum of conversations held with Prime Minister Nehru on March 9 and 10 indicates that discussion twice turned to the question of regional alliances:
“He discussed his attitude toward collective security arrangements. He said he recognized that NATO might have been born of a real necessity. He doubted the genuine security value of any of the Asian arrangements. He bitterly deplored SEATO and Baghdad, which he felt Pakistan had entered not for security against the Soviet Communists but in order to get strength to use against India. He felt that the Pakistanis were a martial people and a fanatical people who could readily attack India. The present government might not have that intention, but the situation was unstable and governments could readily change.”
At a later stage Nehru again brought up the matter:
“The conversation was resumed with Mr. Nehru attacking Pakistan with great emotion as being a military state run by the Army. He described the border incidents around Kashmir. He renewed his attack on SEATO as essentially involving an alliance with Pakistan against India. I said, ‘Why don’t you join SEATO?’ He looked somewhat [Page 206] startled and said I could hardly expect him to join an organization of which he morally disapproved and which he thought mischievous. I said he might be able to change its character if he were a member.” (Memorandum, March 10, PST/MC/1/2; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 675)
For full text of this memorandum, see volume VIII, page 306. For documentation on the interest of the United States in the Central Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact), see volume XII.