93. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State1
Secto 29. Department pass CINCPAC. Fifth session—Thursday morning—March 8.
Council approved resolution2 inviting council representatives continue studies (a) concrete economic problems resulting from defense efforts and (b) determination areas particularly susceptible to subversive activities because of economic difficulties and to study specific needs such areas.
Council referred to council representatives for consideration and recommendations (a) joint declaration principles to govern action undertaken by members in economic field and, (b) assignment in Bangkok by each government of an officer to pinpoint SEATO economic matters for his government.
Approved British resolution making council representatives responsible for all public relations and inviting military advisers to nominate assistant public relations officer. Council representatives also instructed to prepare terms of reference for PRO.
Agreed to refer to council representatives New Zealand study of resolution3 re relationship military advisers and council representatives.
US (Dulles) expressed view it was not necessary take any action on relationship military advisers to council representatives in addition to that taken last year which defined these relations. Expressed belief problem would evolve naturally and properly but had no objection to further study.
Speaking on military advisers report,4 French representative (Pineau) emphasized importance of strengthening local forces.
Pakistan (Amjad Ali) called attention to Soviet intervention in area. Said 55 percent Pakistan budget used on defense and must look to stronger countries for help. Viewed recommendation of military advisers for immediate strengthening certain indigenous forces as [Page 201] most important. Proposed that note be taken this paper5 and program to work out implementation be undertaken immediately and action be taken to press forward on bilateral arrangement to strengthen indigenous forces.
Thai representative (Prince Wan) commended military advisers report and supported Pakistan on immediate aid to indigenous forces.
US (Dulles) endorsed proposal for security coordinator both military and civilian matters. Commended proposal to study combined military exercises. Suggested approval of establishment small military planning staff as basis for further development by military advisers organization. Secretary noted that US has generally same types and numbers of forces in the Far East and Central Pacific as he enumerated last year at Bangkok but with some modernization.
UK and New Zealand stated needed more time to study proposal for permanent military planning staff. UK referring particularly to item 3 a ii (decisions and recommendations by military advisers meeting Melbourne),6 stressed urgent need for closest security. Pointed out newspapers this morning carried exceptionally accurate account yesterday’s proceedings but in view of mention of nuclear weapons felt that greater care must be taken to avoid giving Communists opportunity exploit and distort this recommendation. Suggested Council adopt resolution taking note of conclusions in paragraph 3 a and b of the Military Advisers report on Melbourne meeting as a basis for future defense planning and preparation and to insure that such planning should be based on assumption that force [Page 202] necessary to insure effective defense of area against aggression would be used.7 Prolonged debate on this subject resulted.
Australia (Casey) took view greater advantage in no resolution at all on this specific item. He was supported by Thais and French. Australian also pointed out council would wish do nothing which would impede continued military advisers work and favored simple resolution merely noting military advisers report.
US (Dulles) adhered to view expressed by Australia, New Zealand and Thailand that military advisers report should be noted and that there should be no resolution but indicated US shared sentiments expressed in second paragraph of UK resolution.8 Council finally adopted following: “Council takes note of report of military advisers as basis for future defense planning and preparation”.
Pakistan representative (Amjad Ali) drew attention to fact that his country was only one almost contiguous to Soviet Union. He proposed that council take note of necessity for strengthening indigenous forces in area.
US (Dulles) indicated he preferred not to have a resolution. From experience in US, he considered it academic to ask military advisers for a list of their requirements without knowledge of resources available. A balance must be struck between complete military security and internal solvency. Secretary also stressed collective force available to help any one member in case of aggression, and considered that Pakistan’s purpose would be achieved by this draft9 rather than a resolution. The Secretary added that the US was sharing in a bilateral program with Pakistan to increase Pakistan’s forces very materially.
Pakistan representative said he would not press for moral resolution. Was satisfied if this matter were commended to notice of military advisers. Chair then announced that disposed of item VI10 subject to position taken by UK re security coordinator.
UK explained that this referred to physical security of documents, leakages, etc.
[Page 203]The chair announced this [proposal] was accepted11 and asked French representative regarding his proposal for meeting of economic committee at Paris.12 At US suggestion this proposal will be submitted to permanent representatives for study.13
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–KA/3–956. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Manila, Bangkok, Singapore, Wellington, and Canberra.↩
- All the resolutions approved by the Council at this session are incorporated in the paper infra.↩
- The Council’s action on the New Zealand proposal, “Coordination of SEATO Activities”, designated SCM/K. 56 D/4 and dated March 7, is here misreported. See the paper infra. SCM/K. 56 D/4 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 661.↩
- The U.S. Verbatim Minutes of this session indicate that Pineau was referring to both the Military Advisers’ Progress Report, not printed; and to the Melbourne Report cited in footnote 6, Document 81. (USVerb/5, March 8; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 659)↩
- Reference is to “Requirement for Immediate Strengthening of Certain Indigenous Military Forces”, Annex 4 to the Melbourne Report.↩
- Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of
the Melbourne Report read:
“3.(a) The Military Staff Planners, in considering the attack on selected targets on the Chinese mainland in support of military operations in the Treaty Area, arrived at the following conclusions:—
“‘(i) In the event of overt aggression by Communist China, the course of action which will most effectively and with the least delay in time reduce the threat to the Treaty Area is attack by the SEATO air forces upon selected targets on the Chinese mainland and North Vietnam. This reduction would probably be sufficient to ensure that the defence of the Treaty Area would be practicable.
“‘(ii) In the event of overt aggression by Communist China, the SEATO Nations should adopt a concept of air operations employing atomic and non-atomic munitions.’
“(b) The Military Advisers consider that the conclusions agreed by the Military Staff Planners are of such importance as to warrant their being brought to the notice of the Council, noting that the validity of the conclusion that
“‘This reduction would probably be sufficient to ensure that the defence of the Treaty Area would be practicable’
“is dependent upon a further study of the effect of nuclear weapons within the area under consideration.”
The inner quotes are from the Staff Planners’ report of their Honolulu meeting, November 1–16, 1955, not found in Department of State files. See footnote 4, Document 71.
↩ - A draft resolution to this effect, entitled “Assumptions for Future Defence Planning”, dated March 8 and designated SCM/K.56 D/14, not printed, apparently was circulated at this session, though not formally presented by Lloyd to the Council.↩
- This paragraph contained the formula that SEATO planning should be based on the assumption that force would be such as was necessary to ensure the effective defense of the area against aggression.↩
- According to USVerb/5, Dulles stated at this point: “Therefore, I suggest to the distinguished Delegate of Pakistan that perhaps the purpose which he has in mind is already achieved by the discussion that has taken place; by the fact, I think, that we have all made clear our recognition of the dangers of which he speaks and that we have reflected that in our noting the studies of the military advisers, which presumably will be carried forward.”↩
- The discussion of military matters.↩
- Text of the British proposal was incorporated into paragraph 2 of the paper infra.↩
- That is, for holding the next regular meeting of the SEATO Committee of Economic Experts at Paris.↩
- At the afternoon session on March 8, the Council
met first in private to consider the public communiqué; the members
then made closing statements in public. Both segments of the session
are reported in USVerb/6, March 8, not printed. (Department of
State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 659)
For text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, March 19, 1956, p. 447. Dulles’ statement at the final public meeting is Ibid., p. 451. For text of the Secretary’s address, made over radio and television on March 23 (following his return to the United States on March 21), see Ibid., April 2, 1956, p. 539.
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