Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

51. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Lebanese Ambassador (Malik) and the Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, May 5, 1955¹

Washington, May 5, 1955

SUBJECT

• Report on Bandung; Situation in Syria

The Secretary opened the conversation by inviting Ambassador Malik’s observations on the Bandung conference. The Ambassador described a one and a half hour’s private talk with Chou En-lai which he said followed about twenty hours’ debate with Chou in various committees. Dr. Malik inquired of Chou whether he had any messages which he wished transmitted to Washington. Chou had no specific message, but stated that Malik had his permission to report the substance of their interchange in detail and with “impartiality.” The Ambassador handed the Secretary a long written memorandum.²

The Ambassador felt that it was important for friends of the United States who attended the conference to have extensive informal discussions with Department officers. He also mentioned the possibility of interviews with key members of Congress and reported that he had stopped in Canberra on his way home for meetings with the Australian Government.

With respect to the substance of the conference, Ambassador Malik stated that the most important result was the strengthening of Communist China; it won friends and good will. In fact, the conference appeared staged for this purpose. Three things are now clear: (1) it will be difficult for the US now not to negotiate with Communist China; (2) it will be difficult for the US to counter the good will generated towards Communist China; (3) it will be difficult for the US to keep Communist China out of the UN.

Dr. Malik asserted that the US press was dead wrong in concluding that Nehru’s stature was diminished substantially. Nehru retains power because of India’s position in the area, his personal relationship to Communist China, and India’s membership in the Commonwealth. The American press was equally wrong in claiming Western gains from the conference. The results could have been worse, but the emergence of Communist China was a distinct defeat for the West.

Although Sir John Kotelawala’s speech³ was a bombshell, more important is the fact that his attitude had changed completely by the following day when he seemed “washed out.” For the rest of the conference, he hardly opened his mouth. In the Ambassador’s opinion “someone sat on him.” Sir John refused to support pro-Western resolutions prepared by Dr. Malik and others. Mohammed Ali also began to change his position and became silent by Friday of the conference. Except for his opening and closing speeches, Romulo was generally silent and took no part in drafting texts. The real struggle at the conference lay not in speeches delivered but in the committee work, and here it became clear that there was a general reluctance to attack international Communism and expose its character.

A bloc of five Middle Eastern states—Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Lebanon—was formed at the beginning. The Saudis took no active part while Egypt and Syria leaned toward “at least the neutralist if not the Communist orbit.” Apart from these two states, the Middle East Moslem world was on the side of the West. This illustrates that Islam, when face to face with the rest of Asia is likely to feel with the West; while when shut up with the West alone, it is restless.

If an historian were to evaluate the conference one hundred years hence, he would say that four issues lay behind all the speeches:

1. The UN—Would the Asian-African countries form an exclusive club outside of the UN? At Bandung, the answer was in the negative, and the battle in favor of their working through the UN was won.

2. Racialism—Would the “colored” races form an exclusive grouping directed against the West? There was no clear decision on this point.

3. International Communism—To what extent has it invaded the Asian-African mind? Malik was sorry to report that despite the fight waged by anti-Communists, the general tone of the conference indicated that the “day is far spent” in softening and undermining the minds of Asia and Africa for Communism. There was a general lack of nerve and it was impossible to get the phrase “International Communism” into the text of the communiqué.

4. Relations with the West—On this issue the conference did more harm than good, although it could have been worse. Fortunately, the question of another conference was left undecided. In Malik’s view, no such meeting should be held for at least five years.

The Secretary replied that Malik’s appraisal of the conference was different from his own in certain respects. The Secretary felt that although the Chinese Communists had made gains in disarming people, this had been done only at the price of abandoning some of their more belligerent policies. As he had indicated to the Ambassador before the conference, the decision of war or peace may have hung in the balance. Had Chou felt that he had some tacit backing for an attack on Formosa, war of considerable dimensions might have resulted. The fact that the Chinese Communists encountered sentiments which forced them to make their peace proposals was a considerable gain for the moment. Dr. Malik personally had made a real contribution to peace. Dr. Malik interjected that he doubted that the Chinese Communists had come with the intention of obtaining endorsement by the conference of a policy of attack on Formosa. They would have known there was no chance for such a result, nor even of the conference declaring the US an aggressor in the Taiwan area. The Secretary resumed that he felt a relaxation of tensions in the area is apparent and that this is not an inconsiderable result. The Secretary added that he recognized the long-term implications brought out by the Ambassador; but as regards Chou’s peace talk he took comfort in the saying that “hyprocrisy is a tribute vice pays to virtue.”

The Secretary expressed his gratitude for Ambassador Malik’s report and said that he was very anxious for key Departmental officers to interview Malik on the Bandung Conference. He himself was leaving the next day with some of his principal advisers, but others would remain. Had his own Tuesday statement⁴ on Chou’s offer reached Bandung before Malik left? Malik replied in the negative. He related that when Chou commented that the State Department’s Saturday “conditional” response⁵ to his negotiation offer seemed to constitute a rejection, Malik had cautioned Chou not to accept any response as definitive until it came from the Secretary or the President.

Ambassador Malik then commented briefly on the situation in Syria which he described as “the worst in the world.” He felt that the Communists had succeeded in forming a common front with the left-wing parties which they in fact controlled; were persecuting the friends of the West; and might seize control of the Government.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/5–555. Secret. Drafted by Hart on May 10.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. In his speech before the Political Committee of the conference on April 21, Prime Minister Kotelawala stated that it was the duty of Asian and African states openly to declare their opposition to Soviet colonialism as well as to Western imperialism. Speaking of Eastern European nations, he asked: “Are not these colonies as much as [are] any of the colonial territories in Africa and Asia?” For an extract from the speech, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1955 (London, Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 412.
4. April 26; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1955, p. 755.
5. April 23; for text, see ibid., May 2, 1955, p. 727. This statement and that cited in footnote 4 above dealt with the question of the possibility of direct talks on the Taiwan Straits question.
6. Ambassador Malik discussed the Afro-Asian Conference again in a conversation with Murphy, Allen, and other officials on May 10: “On balance, taking all factors into account, he wished to stress that the conference had been a setback for the West despite all the favorable results that could be mentioned, because of the content of the communiqué and the favorable manner in which Chou En-lai was accepted by the conference as a whole.” (Memorandum of conversation by Francis Allen; Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/5–1055)