417. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
894. Lao Ambassador called on Robertson January 18 inform him he recalled urgently Vientiane for consultation. Ourot not given reasons or target date for arrival Vientiane but assumed consultation connected coalition proposal. Therefore before leaving early next week he wished see Robertson “as friend and elder” obtain advice as to what he should say persuade RLG and Deputies support “our” position which was to fight Communism.
Robertson stated he would reply as friend and elder rather than Assistant Secretary. This was very crucial time Laos. By adopting firm position Lao could make much better agreement with PL than by merely accepting December 28 communiqué. As far as U.S. could see PL did not agree in this communiqué to anything more than already laid down at Geneva; in other words PL giving up nothing, but at same time demanding Cabinet positions, integration in unspecified number into Army, recognition as legal political party. In our opinion it would be dangerous accept such agreement. PL had not fulfilled Geneva pledges and there no assurance whatsoever they would do so now.
Crown Prince and other Lao leaders aware menace Communism, and it might appear presumptuous for Robertson 12,000 miles away indicate what course RLG should follow. Robertson wished merely suggest Lao leaders take firm stand make Souvanna insist PL not only promise but actually carry out commitments before RLG acted on its part bargain. Kind of agreement reached by RLG would inevitably affect Congressional support of Laos through appropriations. Robertson could not say now what Congress would do but it would be grave development if agreement appeared impair Laos’ ability follow independent course. Congress would be very much aware political events Laos.
Concluding, Robertson said we had found through long experience that force and determination were only line Communists understood. If weakness demonstrated they pressed for additional gains. If RLG anxious prevent Communists from getting foothold Laos, it must realize necessity not yield on fundamentals. RLG must therefore adopt firm policy make PL perform before Government concessions given.
[Page 885]Ourot stated he more and more convinced by Robertson’s thinking and would do utmost make U.S. position clear Vientiane.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.51J11/1–2257. Secret. Drafted by Byrne, cleared by SEA and FE, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and USUN for Young.↩