413. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1096. USUN for Kenneth Young. In past several days Embassy … has contacted key members of all groups in Assembly except that of Bong. Among others we have also talked with Souvanna, Sopsaisana, Nhouy Abhay and Oun Hueun who was Cabinet emissary to Crown Prince earlier this week. Have also kept in touch with Thai, British, French and Vietnamese. There is no Lao of importance who does not know that this is critical moment in Laos relations with U.S. Nevertheless, there is only slimmest chance coalition will not be approved, conceivably eleventh, much more likely some days later. Actual Assembly timetable still obscure but met in closed session morning tenth. Given emphasis in Deptels 804 to Vientiane,2 4636 to London (2526 to Paris)3 and 2311 to Bangkok4 on at least stiffening terms by introduction of safeguards we have deliberately followed tactic of seeking (1) insure searching questions are raised in National Assembly, (2) thus cause debate leading to introduction of safeguards or at least reservations, and (3) defeat deal if doubts and confusion should promote this now remote possibility. Parallel to this main endeavor have been efforts (1) get Katay into act, (2) promote return of Crown Prince to preside at customary Cabinet meeting before key decision, (3) insure prompt and adequate reporting of assembly proceedings both to us and publicly. Have sought avoid any act from which Souvanna could derive advantage by charging improper intervention and have found contacts uniformly ready and in some cases eager see us. Anti-Western bias not evident (except in case Leuam who reported still bitter regarding San Francisco incident5) but there are signs both Sen and Souvanna may have misrepresented our position.
Representatives other countries have not helped much except in reporting sense for they have concentrated on application after Assembly decision rather than on safeguards now which would promote effective application if deal goes through.
As of today, tenth, I believe it probable but by no means sure that there will be real debate and that Phoui Sananikone will introduce [Page 877] reservations to put Souvanna on clear notice that effective integration and restoration must take place in next few weeks or he will be thrown out of office (Ministers along with him). Nhouy Abhay claimed to me yesterday he and four or five other Ministers ready and able overthrow government if deal not carried out in good faith. However, I repeat deal probably go through as desired and division very strong and even Nhouy (as well as all other Ministers) agreed in principle to bringing PL into government. If deal should go through without real debate, it will be fairly strong indication US and West influence at low ebb.
At moment see little more we can do except exploit chance opportunities. I am well aware, however, PL can logically insist implementation must work both ways and may soon seek hold government to November 2 agreement on diplomatic relations with other (Bloc) countries and acceptance aid offered without strings attached. We have in fact let drop idea this, too, is factor in our expected re-evaluation.
In absence Crown Prince no chance consult re my recall (Deptel 804) as have not wished go through third party. I fully concur best be here through Assembly debate but unless deal defeated still consider I should participate prompt Washington reevaluation. When and how to reveal recall is difficult question. If I have to act before Crown Prince is available for consultation my present plan (subject Department’s OK if time permits) is to … get word out to several contacts that they “think it likely” US Ambassador will go home if deal goes through and therefore best for Assembly at very least remedy deficiencies in December 28 communiqué. If I tell anyone (other than Savang) I should first tell Souvanna, which, of course, would not help. In fact it might give him opportunity to claim undue pressure on Assembly and ask immediate vote of confidence (no one yet ready throw him out) and in so doing fan anti-Western feeling. Katay arrived noon tenth too late attend closed session Assembly. Pending developments we taking no initiative sound him out directly.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–1057. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Ottawa, Saigon, Bangkok, New Delhi, and Phnom Penh.↩
- Document 410.↩
- Dated January 5, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–357)↩
- Dated January 5, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–257)↩
- Leaum left Washington earlier than expected and was unable to stay in the San Francisco hotel where he had confirmed reservations for later in the week. (Telegram 948 from Vientiane, December 18; Ibid., 033.51J11/12–1856)↩