Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

402. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 7, 1956¹

Washington, December 7, 1956

SUBJECT

• Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Katay D. Sasorith, Deputy Prime Minister of Laos
• His Excellency Ourot R. Souvannavong, Ambassador of Laos
• Mr. William J. Sebald, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Eric Kocher, Acting Director, Southeast Asian Affairs
• Miss Patricia M. Byrne, FE/SEA

At his own request, His Excellency Katay D. Sasorith, Deputy Prime Minister of Laos and Chief of the Lao Delegation to the United Nations, called on Mr. Sebald at 10:55 a.m.

After welcoming Katay to Washington, Mr. Sebald said he was glad to have this opportunity to talk in the privacy of his office and in the time available wished to have a frank exchange on the Deputy Prime Minister’s problems and ours. We were fairly well-informed on the situation in Laos, but naturally we did not understand it so well as did Katay. The nuances escaped us. It would therefore be helpful if he could give us his views on the situation as he saw it.

Katay replied that he was very happy to be here; coming to the United States had long been a dream of his, but it was only on being named head of the Lao Delegation to the UN that he was able to leave Laos and talk with the Secretary and others interested in his country.

The situation in Laos was not disquieting in its totality. While the international aspects were better, there had not been much improvement in the internal situation. Negotiations with the Pathet Lao had resulted in some agreements, but agreements were easy to achieve whereas their application was most difficult.

It now behooved the Royal Government to prevent Pathet Lao subversion and propaganda. Katay considered two things essential: 1) Establishment of an effective propaganda service; and 2) development of the National Police. Anonymous pro-Viet Minh propaganda, often accusing leaders like Katay of being American tools, had a harmful effect on the ignorant masses. While the Lao themselves could handle the propaganda content, it was essential that the United States help with funds, which were nonexistent. When Katay was Prime Minister, he had, by scrounging money from here and there in the budget, established the SSPP (Special Service for Political Propaganda). This organization had achieved excellent results, receiving the praise of all the foreign Ambassadors in Vientiane, but Souvanna Phouma had abolished it for lack of funds.

He was very happy that the United States had aided the development of the National Police. Since hostilities had in principle ended, it was the police rather than the Army which should assure internal security. Moreover, the military were generally poorly regarded by the people, whereas the police were received with greater confidence. It was therefore necessary to expand and reorganize the police as soon as possible.

USOM wished to take too direct a hand in the police program, as well as in other fields. It kept watch on every Lao move and controlled every expenditure. Katay insisted it would be far better for USOM to give Laos the credits and permit Laos to disburse the funds on a jointly agreed program. The present system of requiring a USOM signature for each purchase immobilized the aid program. He recognized the U.S. Government had a right to control the use of its aid funds, but he pled that this control not be complicated by too detailed procedures. These procedures now caused friction between middle- and lower-ranking civil servants in the USOM and in the Government, and gave the Government’s enemies a wide field to charge the United States with trying to substitute for the French or that, when funds were delayed, the U.S. was unhappy over some Lao Government action.

In response to Mr. Sebald’s question as to whether the Deputy Prime Minister would emphasize development of the police or of the Army, Katay said that an Army of 25,000 was sufficient for peacetime but must be maintained at that level to defend Laos in the event of invasion until SEATO help arrived. But it was now necessary to develop the police force so that small posts could blanket the country. The police would keep Communist and pro-Communist subversive activity under control and could spread propaganda in favor of the Royal Government. This would leave the Government free to tackle the subversion problem on the political plane.

To the latter end, Katay would like from the United States a draft law making the Communist party illegal. There were 20 members of his party in the Assembly who would constitute enough votes to pass such a law.

The Government must, however, have the means to support the loyal party members and to gain the favor of the villagers and Buddhist monks. It had no funds, for example, to repair pagodas, or fix leaking roofs of the monks’ houses, or to construct community buildings. Only with such funds for small spot projects could the support of the people be maintained. As Prime Minister he had managed to provide money for these purposes from social welfare, relief, and secret funds. Now nothing was done along these lines.

He was aware of U.S. Government’s noninvolvement in religious matters, but as he had said in a memorandum to Mr. Young in New York,² religion was the primary weapon against Communism in Laos. Projects such as the restoration of historical monuments or of pagodas helped gain mass support through religion but also served as camouflage for providing the Lao Government with a slush fund for propaganda or for buying off self-interested potential troublemakers. He cited as an example of the need of such funds the fact that some Chinese had asked him for money and, when he was unable to comply, had begun publishing newspapers attacking the Lao Government. He asserted the funds for their enterprises must have come from the Communists via Hong Kong.

Mr. Sebald said he appreciated the foregoing helpful exposition of some of the Deputy Prime Minister’s views and that he would like to attempt to put these problems in proper perspective. It seemed to us that the most important aspect of the whole Laos problem was that there must be a reasonably stable political situation in order to take measures and implement programs in such a way as to do the most good to insure the political independence of the country. This was the primary objective.

Under our constitutional system we in the Executive Branch must go before the Congress with our hat in hand, so to speak, to ask for money for programs we consider essential to accomplish our objectives. Members of Congress were generally well-informed and their thinking was pragmatic, based upon their experience in dealing with programs in numerous other countries. It was essential that we be able to demonstrate to the Congress that in Laos there existed the will to maintain its independence. If this could not be done, the Congress would ask why waste money on people who will not help themselves. This was the framework in which we worked.

Therefore Katay could readily understand that, when there was the possibility of Communists being taken in to the Government, our Congress immediately wondered whether it was advisable to support a potential enemy. When a series of concessions, the summation of which could be serious, was made to the Communist-supported Pathet Lao, the Congress asked itself why not write Laos off. We hoped this would not happen, since we had considerable faith in the common sense of Lao leaders. It was essential that there be the outward manifestation of Lao will and backbone.

From what Mr. Sebald had heard of Katay’s views, he thought Katay would agree that the way to deal with the Communists was to be firm and to demonstrate the strength one had. We knew Laos’ resources were not great, but if it showed a will, help would flow. It was largely a question of attitude. Wherever the Communists were confronted with strength, they backed away; if they were given concessions, however, they only demanded more. We were convinced this was true. Mr. Sebald had spoken with considerable emphasis, but the important subject matter deserved such treatment.

Mr. Sebald went on to say we had great difficulty in convincing the Congress that such large amounts were necessary to support the Lao Army. We were aware of the history of the huge cost, that is, that the system had been inherited from the French, but the Lao Army nevertheless remained one of the most expensive in Asia. If the cost could be reduced, more money would be available for the police, for example. Mr. Sebald thought an effective police force excellent for a country like Laos. In Burma, it had been discovered that U.S. aid was best spent on modernizing and training the police. They were then able to get down to the village level and became the symbol of good government.

The conversation ended at 12:00.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–756. Secret. Drafted by Byrne on December 10 and cleared by Kocher and Sebald. Briefing information for use in preparation for this meeting is in a memorandum from Byrne to Sebald, December 6, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.13/12–656)
2. A report of the Katay–Young conversation, November 24, and another summary of the memorandum handed to Young are in telegram 504 from USUN, November 26, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–2656)
3. Katay met with Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, from 3 to 3:30 p.m. on December 7. A memorandum of that conversation by Byrne, December 7, is Ibid., 751J.00/12–756.

   From 3:45 to 4:15 p.m., December 7, Katay met with Murphy. The discussion dealt with the difficulty, in Katay’s view, of negotiating with the Pathet Lao because of their subordination to the Viet Minh and the need for U.S. funds to support a Lao counterpropaganda campaign against subversion. Murphy suggested that propaganda could only serve as an auxiliary to unspecified “other action.” A report of the discussion is in a memorandum of conversation by Byrne, December 7.(Ibid.)

   At 4:20 p.m., December 7, Katay met with Hoover who told Katay that the United States was disturbed to learn that the Pathet Lao were to join the Lao Cabinet. Hoover hoped the report was untrue. Katay stated that if it were true, it was the Prime Minister’s plan, not the government’s. (Memorandum of conversation by Byrne, December 7; ibid.)